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In mid- 2005, a conference on economic development and social equity was held in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil. It unofficially marked the two-year anniversary of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, 
which came to be known simply as IBSA (in this study also referred to as the IBSA Dialogue Forum). 
During a speech at this Forum the Brazilian External Relations Minister Celso Amorim emphasised that 
even if IBSA was the result of a common political position shared between these three leading countries 
of the South, the trilateral coalition was expected to deliver more in tangible benefits and pragmatic 
exchanges. These changes, he argued, range from economic transfers to agreements in the areas of 
information technology, biotechnology, renewable energy and direct transport links (White 2005).  
 
This study will, amongst other things, examine whether IBSA is on the right path and can thus be 
expected to ‘deliver more in tangible benefits and pragmatic exchanges.’ The theory that this 
dissertation will use to analyse the IBSA Dialogue Forum is New Regionalism, which will be closely 
examined in chapter 2. While examining New Regionalism, specific focus will be on not only highlighting 
the main tenets, but to also stress how this theory differs from other theories of integration. In order to 
do so New Regionalism will be compared with another prominent integration theory – Neofunctionalism.  
 
Having dealt with the theory of integration, this dissertation will move on to focus on the so-called 
tangible benefit, by offering a chapter focusing on one of the 11 sub-sectors of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum, namely that of investment. While trade and investment is jointly considered one of the important 
sectors, or focus areas, of the IBSA Dialogue Forum the reason for choosing to focus on investment 
rather than trade is the fact that trade is a more commonly analyzed and debated topic and 
consequently there is a greater need for focusing on the ‘newer’ topic of investment. The three members 
of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are all middle powers, in other words, they are all states that possess more 
agency than small and vulnerable states, but they simultaneously lack the structural position to 
dominate the international system (Taylor 2001: 19). The concept of middle powers will be further 
discussed in Chapter Three  in order to examine the opportunities and limitations that comes with such 
a position, and to evaluate why their position as middle powers are relevant in terms of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum. In addition to being regarded as middle powers the three IBSA members are also 
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considered emerging markets – a fact which is of paramount importance and will be highlighted in 
Chapter Five which deals with investment – and what improved collaboration in this field could come to 
mean for the success of IBSA as coalition and for the three countries separately. Furthermore, another 
factor influencing the choice of focus areas is that the level of integration when it comes to, for example, 
culture is very difficult to measure quantitatively. Consequently focusing on investment within and 
between member states should be aligned with the goal of determining the level of tangible integration. 
It needs, in this context, to be highlighted that investment is not necessarily more important than any of 
the other sub-sectors. In the same way that the IBSA coalition is analysed using the New Regionalism 
framework this theory will also be applied to emphasise the opportunities associated with an increased 
focus on investment. 
  
1.2  A SHORT HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IBSA 
 
Before attempting to answer any of the issues raised above, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
short, but important history of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. In September 2003, Brazil, India and South 
Africa, amongst others, led a group of middle-income countries, known as the G20+ that refused to 
accept an agenda for trade talks as a part of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Development 
Round at Cancún, Mexico. It must be mentioned that this group of countries is sometimes referred to as 
G-20 or G-21, due to varying number of member countries. In this dissertation, however, the group will 
be referred to as G20+ and a list of members is included in the Appendices. This stance arguably led to 
the collapse of the negotiations, which for many illustrated that the amount of power in the hands of the 
countries of the South had dramatically increased (Jawara & Kwa 2004). This event inspired Brazil, 
South Africa and India to pursue further cooperation. Hence, this collapse of the WTO’s Cancún round 
of talks in 2003 can be said to have, more or less directly, led to the establishment of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum (White & Skidmore in SAIIA 2004: 166). It was understood that none of these three so-called 
middle powers emerging markets were able, on their own, to achieve viable results in the negotiation 
process. Furthermore, it was believed that by cooperating this could be changed, and that the South 
could exercise some leverage when they negotiated in the WTO as a coalition. Moreover, the argument 
was that it was not only in terms of trade negotiation that cooperation between India, Brazil and South 
Africa could strengthen the position of the countries of the South; cooperation could also strengthen 
their influence in Forums such as the United Nations (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 2). Already this early 
one sees the awareness of the importance of a broad focus of cooperation – this new way of thinking 
allowed the countries involved to explore previously unexplored avenues of cooperation.   
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The first meeting between the three states took place in Brasília, Brazil, in June 2003 where the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum was launched and the Brasília Declaration was subsequently adopted and signed. 
South Africa is said to have been the primary initiator of IBSA, and the coalition is sometimes referred to 
as ‘Mbeki’s brain child’ (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 8). The meeting in Brasília was followed by one in 
New Delhi, India, in March 2004. During this meeting the areas of mutual interest and cooperation were 
defined, and these areas were later identified in the broad Plan of Action (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 
4). This broad Plan of Action consists of 60 mutually-agreed upon points of both bilateral and trilateral 
cooperation. These points were divided into the following sectors: transportation (civil aviation and 
shipping); tourism, trade and investment; infrastructure; job creation and small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMME); science and technology; information society; health; energy; defence; and 
education (South African Department of Foreign Affairs 2004: 1-7). The third meeting took place in Cape 
Town, South Africa, in March 2005. The focus of this meeting was on trade and the WTO. An objective 
was set suggesting that trade between the three should be doubled within two years (SABC News, 3 
September 2005). The Rio Summit built on the achievements of the Cape Town Ministerial Summit and 
further emphasised the importance of strengthening South-South cooperation in order to bring about 
human development. The Tshwane IBSA Summit of 2007 and the New Delhi Summit of 2008 were 
examples of much more extensive cooperation – focusing on issues including, but not limited to, global 
governance; the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); South-South cooperation; sustainable 
development; Human Rights; Intellectual property; Terrorism; Energy; and the IBSA Facility for 
Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet).  
 
Around the time of the establishment of the IBSA Dialogue Forum there were many pessimistic voices 
suggesting that this was yet another version of South-South cooperation that was bound to be a failure. 
However, by 2009, this Forum is indeed active and it is arguably stronger than ever before. While it 
started off as an initiative where only the respective foreign ministers or deputy foreign ministers would 
meet, this has changed and today these trilateral meetings include the respective heads of state as well 
as representatives from the foreign ministries alongside actors from the relevant private spheres. This 
illustrates a deepening of integration in the way that more important actors are involved, as well as a 
widening in the form of a broader selection of actors participating. During the 2007 Tshwane meeting 
the conference was divided into three meetings, one where the respective governmental structures met, 
another conference where academics from the three countries met for debate and yet another space for 
the business representatives. The New Delhi summit in October 2008 offered an even larger number of 
Forums, including a women’s Forum, an academic Forum, a business seminar, editors Forum, a 
technical seminar on standards in e-Governance and a workshop on energy (IBSA 8 June 2009: 
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internet). Consequently, one sees that there has been an important broadening of both participation and 
topic of debate from establishment to current date. 
 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has joined the voices focusing on the opportunities associated with the 
establishment of IBSA. He was the keynote speaker at the 2006 Rio de Janeiro conference and 
focussed on IBSA’s potential broader contribution towards correcting the skewed results of globalisation 
and its role in shaping the global agenda. Stiglitz strongly advocated the new, improved ‘IBSA approach’ 
to South-South cooperation, he criticised previous coalitions of the South that had for the past 40 years 
been based on ideological differences and, more recently, ‘globalisation and its discontents’. Continuing 
his line of argument he claimed that the IBSA Dialogue Forum differs from other cases of South-South 
cooperation. Stiglitz viewed IBSA as a constructive coalition of the South that is geared toward clear 
objectives based on modern economics (White 2005). 
 
This study will seek to determine who better predicts the future of the IBSA Dialogue Forum; Joseph 
Stiglitz and the people agreeing with him, or the voices referring to IBSA as yet another example of 
South-South cooperation deemed to failure. 
  
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As already established this dissertation will look at the IBSA Dialogue Forum, and discuss whether New 
Regionalism can be used to analyse the developments taking place – and the investment patterns 
(inflows and outflows) – between these three countries. Very little research has been conducted on the 
topic, which makes a literature review extremely difficult. However, it makes identifying gaps in the 
existing literature fairly easy. In terms of structure, the study’s literature review will be divided into three 
sections, the first dealing with the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the second one dealing with New Regionalism 
and lastly a section on literature on investment in emerging markets.  
 
1.3.1 The IBSA Dialogue Forum 
 
There are a relatively small number of academic articles relating to the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Some of 
these are written by scholars of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). In addition to 
the academic articles, these scholars have also published a number of newspaper articles on the topic 
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(Draper 2004; Draper, Mills & White 2004; White & Skidmore 2004; Le Pere & White 2005; White 2005; 
SAIIA 2006). Additionally, most of the other information dealing directly with the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
are either speeches by government officials, Communiqués or information from various web pages, in 
addition to Miller’s ‘South Africa and the IBSA Initiative’ (Africa Insight 2005: 52-57) and Alden & Vieira’s 
‘The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism’ (2005). While Draper, 
Mills and White (2004) focus on the opportunities that the IBSA coalition carries with it, Miller (2005) 
adopts a more negative view and her article highlights the constraints and challenges (from a South 
African standpoint) that this coalition is facing in the globalised international system.  
 
‘Much Ado About Something?’ (Draper, Mills & White 2004) is an assessment of the potential of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum. It looks at the progress that has been made and explores the potential of IBSA. It 
looks at the history of this young coalition, at the socio-economic and demographic positions of India, 
Brazil and South Africa. Furthermore, it explores the various factors promoting further integration 
between the three countries – often referred to as the ties that bind – and factors that could possibly 
prevent such integration to take place. Draper, Mills and White (2004) conclude that the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum has the potential to become a credible and accountable coalition of the most powerful developing 
countries of the world. However, they stress the fact that hard work and commitment are needed in 
order to achieve this. 
 
In ‘Ibsa is about more than just trade’ (Le Pere & White 2005) the authors argue that South Africa is not 
ready for a trilateral trade agreement with India and Brazil. They justify this argument by pointing to the 
fact that South Africa and Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur or the Southern Common Market) are 
staunch competitors on the international markets (especially in terms of agriculture) and further 
highlights that Mercosur has a competitive advantage on South Africa on most fields. Mercosur exports 
five times more to South Africa than vice versa, and, in addition, Mercosur is increasingly trading in 
value-added goods while South Africa still trades basic commodities. However, and this is of paramount 
importance, they argue that trade should not determine the success of South-South cooperation. They 
highlight the fact that IBSA countries share the same interests, skills and needs. All three of them are 
struggling to achieve poverty alleviation, economic development and social equity. Furthermore, they 
point out that the IBSA Dialogue Forum has registered some important achievements, mainly in terms of 
the WTO. Le Pere and White conclude, as the title of the article suggests, that a trilateral cooperation 
such as IBSA offers more than just trilateral trade agreements. They argue that IBSA has the ability to 
chart a new course for South-South cooperation, and that in order to achieve this the focal point should 
be shifted towards areas such as energy, health and education. 
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In their article, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism’ Chris 
Alden and Marco Vieira (2005) looks at countries in the South who are actively challenging the position 
and assumptions of the current leading states of the world. They pay special attention to the fact that 
India, Brazil and South Africa are middle-income developing countries and are thus often referred to as 
middle powers. The article examines the rise of trilateralism and emerging market economies. In doing 
so, the authors compare the IBSA Dialogue Forum to other coalitions of the South. These cooperations 
have had a tendency of failing and Alden and Vieria suggest how IBSA could differ from these failures.  
 
The article by Alden and Vieira (2005) is the academic work with the most similar focus as this 
dissertation. Since there is a limited amount of work done on the IBSA Dialogue Forum there are many 
gaps in the literature where it would have been useful having done further work on. However, this 
dissertation will seek to fill the gap dealing with what benefits are attach to a coalition like the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum for the members, but also for the developing world as a whole. As a sub-focus, this 
thesis will seek to clarify whether placing the spotlight on, for instance, investment can lead to economic 
growth and development for India, Brazil, South Africa and their respective regions. One should keep in 
mind that most of the bibliography is a few years old; hence a new analysis of the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
should be an asset to the further development of this coalition. Furthermore, as the work done so far 
rarely focuses on IBSA as a unit operating in the global political economy there should be room for an 
analysis exploring whether this coalition can, through an increasingly closer cooperation, achieve more 
than the three states would have been able to achieve on their own, for instance in terms of the WTO 
and the United Nations (UN). In other words, the task of this dissertation will be to determine whether 
the whole is indeed greater than its parts.  
 
1.3.2 New Regionalism  
 
The majority of contributions to the topic of New Regionalism are by Scandinavia-based scholars such 
as Marchand, Bøås, & Shaw (1999; 2005); Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel (1999; 2000a; 2000b); Hettne & 
Odén (2002) and Söderbaum (1996; 2004). However, other political theorists have also offered valuable 
contributions; some of the earliest contributions came from Keohane (1994) while Amin (1999) offered a 
rather radical, but nonetheless very important, outlook on regionalism and globalism. 
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‘The Political Economy of Regions and Regionalisms’ edited by Bøås, Marchand and Shaw which was 
published in 2005 focuses on regions and regionalisation, governance, development and change. It can 
be viewed as a continuation of their contribution to ‘Third World Quarterly’ in 1999 – an article called 
‘Special Issue: New Regionalisms in the New Millennium’. Bøås, Marchand and Shaw argue that there 
is a need to include insights from various disciplines. They stress that, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of regionalism’s multidimensionality, one should include critical geography, post-colonial 
theory, cultural studies and post-structuralism as well as international relations, international political 
economy and development. Furthermore, it is argued that one of the greatest benefits of New 
Regionalism is that it moves away from the Eurocentric view of the previous theories of integration 
theory and allows for an efficient and accurate analysis of regional integration in the developing world. 
This book uses case studies from as varied areas as Mesoamerica, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), East Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and 
concludes that it is only New Regionalism with its conceptual changes that would enable these regions 
to adequately analysed.  
 
Another contribution to the field of regionalism comes from Woolcock and Samson in their ‘Regionalism, 
Multilateralism, and Economic Integration’ which was published in 2003 and examines, as the name 
suggests, the link between Regionalism and Multilateralism, and explores the history of the WTO (with a 
specific focus on the Uruguay Round). Throughout the book case studies are used, from both the 
developed and developing world as well North-South examples of cooperation. Their contribution seeks 
to answer the following three questions:  
1. What is the impact of regional agreements in the area of regulatory policy? 
2. Do the approaches to regulatory barriers differ from region to region, and if so does this 
represent a risk of ‘regulatory regionalism’? 
3. Are regional approaches competing with or complementing multilateral attempts to 
remove regulatory barriers to trade? (Woolcock in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 314). 
 
Although a large focus is placed on trade in this book, it is useful in terms of this thesis due to the fact 
that it clearly illustrate how there has been a shift away from trade towards investment and why this has 
occurred. Even if New Regionalism takes a clear stand removed from those who focus narrowly on 
Regional Trade Agreements as the driving force of the integration process, this book is still useful as it 
offers valuable contributions while examining the move from old regionalism towards new regionalism –
and the global context that drove such a change, and it investigate whether regionalism should be seen 
as a part of the globalisation process or a response to it.  It is, however, important to keep in mind that 
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the form of new regionalism that Woolcock and Samson (2003) are referring to differs from the one that 
is examined in this thesis and is referred to as New Regionalism.  
 
Even if many of the scholars behind New Regionalism are Scandinavian it is by no means a concept 
focusing on Scandinavia or even Europe. These scholars, including Bøås et al, Hettne et al & 
Söderbaum et al have mainly focused on the South and have examined regionalism in its true shape in 
the developing world. In fact, Grant and Söderbaum (2003: 193) criticise other scholars (amongst them 
Milner & Mansfield, (1997)) for being too Eurocentric in their approach to regionalism: ‘Orthodox 
theoretical approaches to regionalism have contributed to a better understanding of regionalism and 
regionalist projects. However, one crucial problem is that these theoretical perspectives are developed 
first and foremost for the study of Western Europe, and to a lesser degree North America and Asia-
Pacific. Variations when analysing the latter two are often explained in terms of how these regions differ 
from the ‘standard case’ of Europe.’ As an example, they highlight how for instance regionalism in Asia-
Pacific is seen as ‘less institutionalised’ than the EU. Furthermore, they draw attention to how Milner 
and Mansfield conveniently ignore Africa and the dynamic and often non-conventional regionalisation 
processes on this continent. 
 
‘The New Regionalism in Africa’ which was edited by Grant and Söderbaum (2003), is a collection of 
articles seeking to advance and reinforce the trend towards new approaches to regionalism. The focus 
is as the title suggest on regionalism in Africa. More importantly, it highlights the fact that orthodox 
theories of regionalism do not satisfactorily analyse events taking place in Africa, and in other 
developing areas of the world. They stress that a large extent of the regionalisation that occurs in Africa 
is informal and it even has, in certain cases, features of illegality such as smuggling of blood diamonds 
and warlordism. Therefore, the authors suggest that the only version of regional theory that adequately 
explains events taking place in various parts of Africa is New Regionalism. A last aspect of paramount 
importance is the move beyond the state-centric approach. While the scholars’ contribution to this 
volume do not ignore the importance of states, they argue that in order to understand regionalism, or 
rather regionalisation, in Africa it is necessary to keep in mind that states and ethnicity are two very 
complex issues on this continent and that the latter often is a stronger determinant of people’s actions 
and feelings of belonging than their nationality.  
 
While most versions of regionalist theory are Eurocentric in their outlook, this is not the case for New 
Regionalism. New Regionalism allows for the use of realistic assumptions – which means, amongst 
other things, inclusion of non-state actors and a focus on informal as well as formal integration – in their 
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analysis, the outcome is a result which is closer to reality and which better explains events taking place 
in the developing world. As a result of this, New Regionalism has been chosen as the most suitable 
theory to analyse the current and future position of the IBSA Dialogue Forum in a global context. 
 
1.3.3 Investment (in the lieu of Emerging Market Economies) 
 
Investment is an exceptionally broad topic and it is thus necessary to narrow it down. In terms of this 
dissertation the concept of investment is a ‘sub-topic’ – it is in other words only used as a way to 
illustrate the immense possibilities associated with the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Since investment is not 
the main focus of this study, it will not offer a thorough examination of the various aspects of the 
investment concept. Instead it should be viewed as a brief introduction to the topic and it must be 
highlighted that this should only be regarded as the first step of a concept that arguably deserves further 
attention as a possible focus area of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. One way in which it is natural to narrow 
down the term investment for the purpose of this dissertation is to focus on investment in connection 
with emerging markets. The fact that all three members are emerging markets allows one to highlight 
this important and determining aspect while exploring the topic of investment. 
 
The literature on Emerging Markets Economies (EMEs) is vast despite the fact that in its current shape 
this is a rather recent phenomenon. Hence much of the older literature is not applicable in the current 
global order and is thus not applicable to this thesis. One very useful book for this dissertation is ‘Growth 
and Development in Emerging Market Economies’ which was published in 2008 and edited by Harinder 
S. Kohli, which focuses on international private capital flows, financial markets and globalisation and is a 
valuable addition to the literature on prospects and challenges common to developing countries – often 
referred to as EMEs. This book consists of papers commissioned by the Emerging Markets Forum and 
focuses on exploring common opportunities, challenges and risks, and also forging a consensus 
between the key decision makers in the public and private sectors on how to best sustain and build on 
the successes of these EMEs. 
 
While ‘Growth and Development in Emerging Market Economies’ examined emerging markets in 
general ‘Emerging Capital Markets and Globalization: The Latin American Experience’ by Augusto de la 
Torre and Sergio L. Schmukler (2007) focuses on capital markets in emerging market economies, in 
particularly Latin America. Although this book has a strong focus on Latin America, it is useful in the 
context of this thesis, not only to explore Brazil as an emerging market economy, but it also offers 
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insights into other regions of the world. Furthermore, it presents relevant historical developments, it 
raises questions based on empirical results and it examines policy issues. In addition, the main 
questions raised is whether the so-called Washington Consensus is to blame for the lack of progress in 
the financial markets of Latin America or whether it is the other variables that have hampered growth. It 
is a comparative study and is, as already mentioned, useful even if one’s focus is not Latin America 
since it often examines developing emerging markets without specific attention to the Latin American 
region. The conclusion that is drawn is that while the scholars claiming that the lack of developments 
stems from weaknesses in the implementation of the reforms and the scholars suggesting that the 
weakness is the actual reforms both have valuable arguments. However, Torre and Schmukler (2007) 
suggest that these do not adequately explain the lack of the development of financial markets in the 
South. Instead they propose that there is a need to step back, revisit some basic issues and reshape 
the expectations before formulating the reform agenda. Consequently, the argument is that the flaws are 
found both in the actual reforms, but also in the implementation process – and both these issues must 
be addressed in order to solve the problems and allow for reforms that can be efficiently implemented 
so that the financial markets can successful expand and bring about economic growth in the developing 
world.  
 
Based on this literature review one should be able to argue that New Regionalism is indeed a useful 
analytical tool when examining the IBSA Dialogue Forum. It is the ‘newness’ that allows for an efficient 
analysis of the world system in which the IBSA Dialogue was established and continues to exist.  
 
The initial focus of the IBSA Dialogue Forum cooperation was, amongst other aspect, on trade. Some of 
the older theories of regional integration could have arguably been more applicable than what they are 
today if the focus was purely on trade integration. However, one sees that the focus has moved beyond 
trade. Scholars and policy-makers alike seem to have accepted that trade is not the most important 
aspect of the IBSA Dialogue Forum and it might not even be one of the key elements of the 
developments of this coalition.  
 
In terms of the sub-focus of this thesis – investment in the lieu of emerging markets – it is clear that the 
concept of EMEs is a very important phenomenon and since all three member states are emerging 
markets this is an important aspect to highlight. Investment is interesting due to the fact that it allows for 
a quantification of the integration, in the way one can measure changes that has occurred in the last 
year. What is more, in terms of this dissertation, investment is viewed in the light of being a tool in the 
process of expanding EMEs, like India, Brazil and South Africa. It is however, important to note that 
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investment (and emerging markets) is not the only aspect which is important in terms of future 
cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa. Instead, it should be viewed as one of the many 
ways in which the IBSA Dialogue Forum can continue to grow and become a more important global 
actor while simultaneously working towards achieving economic growth, poverty alleviation and social 
equity.  
 
Not much work has been done on the IBSA Dialogue Forum and although a substantial amount of work 
has been done on New Regionalism, it all focuses on regional cooperation between neighbouring 
countries. In other words, there is indeed a gap in the existing literature – no one has analysed a 
regional cooperation that consists of countries that are not situated close to each other.  Furthermore, 
there seems to be more space to focus on non-conventional aspects of regional integration, such as 
social and cultural features. However, economic integration is also of paramount importance, a fact 
which is highlighted in this dissertation through the sub-focus on investment.  
 
Regionalism in the South has historically focused on building of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) – 
which has not led to the results envisioned upon establishment – such as economic growth and social 
development. However, the IBSA Dialogue Forum differs from previous versions of regional integration 
and it is these new aspects of New Regionalism that allows for an analysis of the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
which would have previously not been possible – and these differences have the potential of leading to 
IBSA becoming the first coalition of the South that actually fulfils its promises of poverty alleviation, 
economic growth and development.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This study attempts to analyse one of the most recent examples of South-South cooperation – the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum. Given the proliferation of organisations focusing on South-South cooperation, as well 
as some of their limited success (two examples of failed Southern based collaboration initiatives are the 
Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) and the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)), this 
study seeks to address the question: Is IBSA offering anything new in terms of South-South cooperation 
and economic development? The IBSA Dialogue Forum has been criticised for being an elitist idea of 
cooperation. If that is the case can this be changed by closer integration? If yes, what shape should this 
closer integration take? The study applies New Regionalism to explain and analyse developments that 
have taken place so far and place a particular focus on investment in terms of emerging markets in 
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order to determine the possible prospects involved in an expansion of scope and structure of 
collaboration between India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 
This dissertation will seek to answer the following questions: 
• Are the actors involved compatible in terms of socio-economic variables? 
• Is the focus on trade the ‘way forward’ for IBSA?  
• Should efforts be put into broadening IBSA’s focus in order to achieve a wider variety of 
benefits?  
• Are the actors– India, Brazil and South Africa – attempting to create economic growth and 
social upliftment for their respective regions, or are they in this coalition solely to pursue their 
national interests?  
• Where and in what shape would cooperation be most beneficial for the member countries? In 
other words, what should be the focus of future coordination and cooperation? 
• Should the IBSA members focus on investment as means of achieving further integration? Can 
an investment focus lead to economic prosperity? And are India, Brazil and South Africa to 
attract foreign investors?  
• What are the patterns of investment between and within the three member state? And most 
importantly, are these three countries able to join forces and collaborate in order to draw 
investment to the political south or is this rather a zero-sum game where for instance India’s 
gain is Brazil’s loss?  
• What should the IBSA Dialogue Forum of the future look like?  
 
In other words, this study will seek to establish whether this coalition has the necessary common 
ground, both in terms of nation specific characteristics, but also in terms of goals, motivations, interests 
and power. Furthermore, it will, based on this, determine how they could maximise international 
leverage (and improve their socio-economic statistics) in order to achieve these goals, and 
consequently strengthen both the countries’ positions as well as IBSA’s position in the global structure. 
If they manage to do this, is should be fair to argue that for India, Brazil and South Africa the whole has 





1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework this study will use is, as already mentioned New Regionalism. New 
Regionalism is ‘a broad, open-ended framework for analysing regionalisation in a multilevel and 
comparative perspective’ (Hettne & Söderbaum 1998: 6). New Regionalism usually refers to the second 
wave of regionalism which started developing in the latter half of the 1980s, after the first wave of 
regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s had become a failure (Söderbaum 1996: 1). What is important to 
keep in mind when discussing New Regionalism, is that there is not only one regionalism, but many. In 
other words, many different versions exist, and this study will use capital letters when referring to the 
New Regionalism, which is by some named New Regionalism Approach/Theory (NRA/T).  
 
One major attraction with New Regionalism is the fact that it rests on assumptions that are closer to 
reality than the assumptions used by scholars of Old Regionalism. Consequently, when applying New 
Regionalism to an analysis of the EU different assumptions are used than when examining for instance 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This allows for the outcome that is closer to real 
life since there are probably more differences between the EU and SADC than there are similarities. 
Furthermore, an important component of New Regionalism is that it obviates the artificial separation of 
state and non-state actors associated with traditional or conventional regional approaches. In addition to 
this, it recognises that formal and informal aspects of regionalisation are often intertwined (Grant & 
Söderbaum 2003: 5). Consequently, New Regionalism moves beyond the state-centric approach and 
allows for the inclusion of non-state actors in the analysis of the integration process. This is not to say 
that states are not important according to New Regionalism, rather this approach to regionalism allows 
for non-actors to be centrally placed – sometimes more central than the states. Moreover, New 
Regionalism argues that countries that share common cultures, languages, religions, or ethnic 
backgrounds – but not geographic proximity – could be considered regional partners. The notion of 
regionalism flows from the idea that various non-governmental factors can induce increased levels of 
economic and political activity among countries, whether they are located nearby or not (Mansfield & 
Milner 1997: 4). This is related to the claim that informal regionalisation might at times be a stronger 
integration factor than formal regionalisation, and allows for a broader focus when examining 
regionalisation – which again offers a more accurate view of the integration process. 
 
One disadvantage with New Regionalism theory is that it has been criticized for applying an ‘everything 
goes approach’ to regionalism. In other words, one needs to be strict when it comes to limiting this 
 18 
approach. This, however, is also one of the advantages with New Regionalism. This approach allows for 
the use of more realistic assumption which again allows for a more realistic outcome, one that is not 
Eurocentric, but rather also applicable to South-South cooperation. New Regionalism will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Two. 
 
1.6 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
In order to create clarity primarily two concepts – regionalism and integration – will be explored. 
Regionalism dates back several centuries. The previous peak in regional activity occurred in the inter-
war period when industrialised countries responded to the great depression by attempting to form 
closed trading blocs with less developed countries- in the case of European countries these did so with 
their colonies (Ravenhill in Ravenhill 2005: 126). Possibly because regionalism has existed for such a 
length of time and in such different forms and shapes there is much disagreement as to how to define 
this concept. One of the few issues on which writers on regionalism agree is that there is no such thing 
as a ‘natural’ region. Regions are social constructions whose members define their boundaries 
(Ravenhill in Ravenhill 2005: 117). According to Haarlov (1997: 14), Haas defines regional integration 
as follows: ‘The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to 
be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours, so as 
to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between 
themselves’. Haas, however, was a Neofunctionalist scholar and there are substantial differences 
between Neofunctionalism and New Regionalism, this will be discussed in Chapter Two , here it suffice 
to highlight the fact that regional integration does not necessarily have take place between neighbours. 
 
Robson (in Haarlov 1997: 13) defines international economic integration as: ‘A state or a process that 
derives its importance from its potential for enabling its participants to achieve a variety of common 
goals more effectively by joint or integrated action than by unilateral measures’. Haarlov (1997: 15) 
offers his own definition when he argues that regional integration is ‘a process through which a group of 
states voluntarily in various degrees share each other’s markets and establish mechanisms and 
techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and 
cultural benefits of their interaction’. Haarlov’s definition is useful to this study due to the fact that his 
definition does not geographically limit regional integration and furthermore he emphasises the fact that 
the degree of integration varies and that, maybe most importantly, it is not only economic integration 
that takes place, but also political, social as well as cultural. The importance of these aspects will be 
further emphasised in Chapter Two. Hettne (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xviii) agrees with Ravenhill 
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(2005) and emphasizes the fact that regions are not ‘given,’ and that they need not be formal 
organisations. Instead he suggests that regions are created and recreated in the process of global 
transformation. Since it is a forever changing concept it is difficult to come up with a definition that is 
generally accepted, but most theorists will agree that regions are: 1) territorially based subsystems of 
the international system, and 2) that there are many varieties of regional subsystems with different 




There has been a debate in social science for more than half a century as to how to conduct research: 
should the focus be on quantitative or qualitative factors? Should social science scholars strive to be 
more like their colleagues in the natural sciences or should they instead do ‘their own thing’ and rather 
risk not being viewed as equals by scholars of the natural sciences (Babbie & Mouton 2001)? 
Qualitative research is in some circles viewed as inferior due to the fact that there is no scientific proof 
that can back up an argument. The result is that some scholars have attempted to quantify their 
qualitative info – often with an unsuccessfully result. The reason being that qualitative research, by 
definition includes a human factor – a human interpretation of facts – which is the reason for it being 
considered inferior to natural science which allows for an externalisation of the human factor. A possible 
way to minimise the negative effect of the uncertainties attached to qualitative research is to be explicit 
about the assumptions and the interpretation of facts – in other words to highlight the fact that this is the 
authors interpretation. In terms of integration theory it is often possible to use quantitative variables to 
measure, at least in certain aspects, the degree of integration that has taken place. Measures used are 
for instance statistics regarding increased trade and investment between the states in question. 
 
In terms of this dissertation one can measure the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) taking place 
in the three countries and where these investors are coming from, and subsequently monitor changes 
that have occurred. These are just a couple of examples of how it is, in the context of this thesis, 
possible to use quantitative indicators-many more exists. However, it is important to keep in mind that it 
is far from sufficient to only use quantitative measures. In order to monitor the integration process it is 
necessary to also use qualitative methods. An example of this is for instance how the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum started off with meetings between the foreign ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa, while 
today the heads of state will partake in the meetings. A further aspect in terms of integration and the 
qualitative measure of the change of levels, is the fact that the selection of actors involved is widening – 
not only has the power increased to include heads of state, it has also widened to include businesses, 
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women’s Forums and academics. Moreover, deep political bonds like for instance India’s support of the 
struggle in Apartheid South Africa, as well as the fact that a large percentage of the population in Brazil 
feel that they have strong ties with Africa are qualitative indicators that may prove to be more important 
than the quantitative ones (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 7). The reason for this being that the feeling of 
familiarity as a decision making tool cannot be underestimated, and a business man that feels that he 
knows and understand what is going on around him is more likely to be willing to invest in a certain 
country, than someone who feels as if they are on completely unfamiliar soil. Consequently, one sees a 
need to not only focus on quantitative variables since the qualitative ones often offer a fuller picture. 
 
An additional aspect tied to the debate around quantitative versus qualitative research, and directly 
related to the topic of integration theory is the importance of, as argued by Ravenhill, distinguishing 
between a formal process of intergovernmental collaboration taking place between two or more states 
and regionalisation, which refers to the growth of economic interdependence within a given 
geographical area (Ravenhill in Ravenhill 2005: 117). Consequently, one might find that when using 
quantitative measures one end up measuring the degree of regionalisation rather than determining 
whether the region is experiencing increased regionness – which would lead to less than adequate 
conclusions being drawn.  
 
When looking at the indicators of integration one has to keep in mind that even if a certain fraction of 
society, for instance the elite, is involved, this does not mean that the nation as a whole has become 
more integrated. By keeping this in mind on should be able to make it apparent whether integration is 
something only the elite is involved in, or whether it includes actors from a wide sector of the respective 
societies. It is therefore important to explore which areas of the integration process are moving at the 
fastest speed, which actors attend meetings, where agreements are signed and so on. This, however, 
will be further discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
The material needed for this dissertation includes official documents, books, journal articles and 
newspapers in addition to personal interviews and internet sources. The reason for the use of internet 
is, as mentioned earlier, that the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established six years ago, and therefore a 
very limited amount of work, academic as well as non-academic, has been done on the topic. 
Furthermore, it allows for a stronger focus on qualitative factors. Consequently, it is necessary to use 
these sources, and to rather be explicit about the fact that this information possibly can lack objectivity 
as well as the required grounding in theory. This, of course, is only applicable when examining the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum; when concentrating on the analytical framework, New Regionalism and on the section 
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dealing with investment, the dissertation will be built on conventional sources, such as historical and 
contemporary books, journals, articles and newspapers. 
 
The first stage of research involved the collection of material concerning IBSA from a broad range of 
relevant actors. This consisted of interviews with scholar and officials at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA) and the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This was 
done in order to create an as wide as possible foundation. Simultaneously, work done on the theoretical 
framework was used in order to examine the various possible development of IBSA. In other words, this 
thesis will attempt to explore, by using a New Regionalist framework, how IBSA can develop into a 
broad and solid cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa, which can potentially lead to 
poverty alleviation, economic growth and social equity in the three poorest regions in the world. 
 
1.8 IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
 
Globalisation and regionalisation are two related processes. Söderbaum (1996) argues that together 
these two processes of structural change are the most important characteristics of the contemporary 
global political economy. Or in the words of Grant & Söderbaum (2003: 7-8): ‘New Regionalism 
acknowledges the external dimension and the close relationship between globalisation and 
regionalisation.  Globalisation and regionalisation is, according to New Regionalism, intimately 
connected and are together shaping the emerging world order’. Amin (1999) agrees with Söderbaum 
when he suggests that these two processes are of paramount importance when discussing the 
development in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. Arguably regionalism is of much greater 
importance to the poor developing states than to other more developed and richer areas of the world 
(Söderbaum 1996: 1). The reason why regionalism is of utmost importance to the poor regions of the 
world is that for instance in Africa political leadership has no possibility of influencing the process of 
globalisation nor its counter-reaction in the form of global regionalisation single-handedly. It is more a 
question of how to relate to the process and to elaborate a strategy for an active way of responding. 
Passivity from the leadership towards the process will only increase the impact of its negative aspects, 
most frequently implying further marginalisation. Subsequently, the present tendency of marginalisation 
of for instance Africa has led to political striving for increased regional cooperation with both security 
and commercial incentives. This development carries with it the possibility of even turning stagnant 
intra-regional activities into dynamic cooperation (Abrahamsson in Hettne et al 2000: 296). 
Consequently, a collaboration as for instance seen in the IBSA coalition could be necessary, not only in 
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order to achieve economic growth in the political South, but also to curb the negative effect of an 
increasingly globalised world – a world where states such as India, Brazil and South Africa could 
become increasingly marginalised – if they do not cooperate in order to influence their positions in the 
global structure as well as the perception of them held by other (often more powerful) states. Hence the 
members have the opportunity to become greater and more powerful than the sum of the power of the 
three countries combined. In other words, together they could achieve goals that they on their own could 
only dream of achieving. It is thus important to determine how this could be done, and how cooperation 
could come to maximise benefits for all three countries. The fact that very little academic work has been 
done on the topic could be an obstacle to achieving these goals and it is therefore important to change 
this.  
 
1.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
This study examines the IBSA Dialogue Forum. In doing so focus will be on exploring when this coalition 
was established and why, this attempt to put IBSA in a historical perspective is important due to the fact 
that the global structure in which the countries find themselves has been an important determinant of 
their foreign policy. These countries (and to a perhaps larger extent their neighbours) have frequently 
been on the receiving end of the adverse effect of the globalisation process – a fact which is arguably 
the strongest driving force behind a continuous focus on increased coordination and cooperation – since 
it is viewed as a way to join force to overcome this dismal position.  
 
Furthermore, the focus of this dissertation is to establish what has been achieved thus far and what the 
potential for further achievements are. In doing so it would have been useful to examine the 
achievements of for instance the various forums, such as the Business Forum, Academic Forum and so 
on. This could have been done in order to measure the extent of integration that has taken place and to 
explore possible ways forward. However, this will not be the focus of this study. Instead this study takes 
on a more overall look, examining what has been achieved on the whole, and looking at only one sub-
sector – investment- as a possible growth factor. The reason for choosing to focus on the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum in its entirety is that it is important to know what the overall picture looks like, and to 




Moreover, one should arguably have examined all the various sectoral cooperation efforts with the 
objective of determining exactly in which areas cooperation would prove to be most beneficial for India, 
Brazil and South Africa. In other words, which sectors should be receiving the most attention in order to 
further these three countries’ national interests. However, this is not the focus of this study, instead one 
sector, namely investment has been chosen in order to illustrate what can be achieved if the IBSA 
members place effort on facilitating a move of capital to the South. It is important to stress the fact that it 
is not implied that this is neither the only sub-sector nor the most beneficial sub-sector; it is merely an 
example of the potential of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Further study should arguable examine and 
compare the different sub-sectors in order to clarify which it would be most beneficial to concentrate on. 
 
1.10 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Chapter one has served as a general introduction to the study. This chapter includes, as indicated, the 
research problem and the methodology. 
 
Chapter Two will specifically focus on the theoretical framework which is New Regionalism. The theory 
will be examined in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of New Regionalism. This is done 
so that the theory can be efficiently used in the rest of the dissertation to analyse the IBSA coalition, and 
the concept of investment. 
 
Chapter Three starts off by exploring the topic middle powers followed by a section examining India, 
Brazil and South Africa’s demographics and socio-economic situation as well as the foreign policies. In 
this chapter emphasis has been placed on analysing these countries separately (as opposed to the 
coalition) and to compare them in order to highlight important similarities and differences.  
  
Chapter Four looks at the coalition formed in June 2003. While the previous chapter focused on the 
three actors separately, this chapter will explore India, Brazil and South Africa jointly- in the shape of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum. The background of the IBSA Dialogue Forum will be explored and focus will be 
placed on looking at the opportunities such cooperation entails for the three member states and their 
respective regions. In addition to this, attention will briefly be on the position of the South (as 
‘represented’ by India, Brazil and South Africa) in the WTO as well as within the United Nations. Most 
importantly, however, this chapter offers an analysis of the IBSA Dialogue Forum using the New 
Regionalism framework. Efforts will in this case be on creating clarity as to why New Regionalism is 
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such a useful theory in a world system that has been changed by globalisation, and why it thus is highly 
applicable to a regionalisation process such as the IBSA initiative. 
  
The focus of Chapter Five will be on investment and the special conditions that need to be taken into 
consideration when analysing investment in emerging markets. All three IBSA member states are 
classified as emerging markets and this thesis will explore possibilities linked to investment within and 
between India, Brazil and South Africa. New Regionalism will be the focus of the last section of this 
chapter and the task will be to determine whether ‘the whole really is greater than its components,’ thus 
answering whether increased integration, (and an increase in investment) between the IBSA member 
states better equips them to achieve some of their shared goals, such as poverty alleviation, economic 
growth and social equity.  
 
Chapter Six will serve as a general conclusion of what has been discussed in this thesis, and will 




This introductory chapter has offered a short description of the various chapters of this study. More 
importantly, it offered a literature review and research questions, took a brief look at the theoretical 
framework and gave conceptual clarification. Following the introduction chapter is a chapter examining 
the theory that will be applied throughout the dissertation – New Regionalism and the next chapter offer 
a comparative look on the three members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. After having explored the 
commonalities and differences of India, Brazil and South Africa, as well as having debated their 
positions as middle powers, this study will turn the focus to the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Starting off with 
some background information, followed by a section highlighting the importance of a collaboration like 
the IBSA Dialogue Forum, before placing focus on exactly which developments that have occurred. This 
will be followed by a chapter exploring investment possibilities and what consequences to expect from 
the facilitation of investment activities for emerging markets in general and for the IBSA members in 
particular. The reason for focusing on investment is that this is one way in which the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum has an opportunity to cooperate closer in order to build a stronger coalition and to bring 
economic development to India, Brazil and South Africa. First of all, though, attention will be given to the 






2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter starts off with a section exploring the evolution of New Regionalism. In doing so, the focus 
will be on first of all determining in what world context this theory developed, furthermore it will be 
established how this new approach to regionalism differs from other, older forms of regionalist theory. In 
addition to this, the most influential writers will be highlighted. Following this is a section examining the 
main tenets of New Regionalism in order to stress how this approach differs from other theories of 
integration. Subsequent to this is a section concentrating on the applicability of New Regionalism to the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum. Lastly, this study will identify the existing criticism of New Regionalism and 
debate the validity of these.  
 
Gavin and van Langenhove (in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 278) argue that regionalism is a dynamic, 
evolving process for which there is no one-size-fits-al definition. Grant and Söderbaum (2003: 7) agree 
and further suggest that:  ‘Regionalism, as a generic term and in the broadest possible sense, refers to 
the general phenomenon of regionalism. In a more narrow and operational sense, regionalism 
represents the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at transforming a 
geographical area into a clearly identified regional social space. In other words, it is the urge to by any 
set of actors re-organise along regional lines in any given issue-area. Regionalisation implies a dynamic 
element, the pursuit of regionalisation, creating a regional system or network in a specific geographical 
area or regional social space, either issue-specific or more general in scope. Regionalisation may be 
caused by regionalism, but it may also emerge regardless of whether there is a regionalist project and 
ideology present. Regionalisation can occur unintentionally, without actors necessarily being conscious 
of or dedicated to regionalism. Likewise, the rhetoric and ideology of regionalism may not always have 
much significance for the reality of regionalisation in practice’. Having stated this it is necessary to note 
that according to New Regionalism, there are two regionalising processes that may be identified. 
‘Regionalism’ refers to the often formal projects with particular plans and strategies and that often lead 
to institutional arrangements. ‘Regionalisation’ on the other hand refers to the actual processes that 
result in forms of cooperation, integration, connectivity and convergence within a particular cross-
national territorial area. Orthodox approaches to integration theory have invariably neglected this latter, 
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often more informal, though no less tangible, set of processes (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000: 458). In 
other words, the term ‘regionalisation’ is often used to describe a process mainly driven by market 
forces of trade and investment flows while ‘regionalism’ emerges from state-led projects of cooperation, 
intergovernmental dialogues and treaties. (Gavin & Van Langenhove in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 
280). 
 
It is crucial to understand that New Regionalism is a complex process of change taking place 
simultaneously at various levels of analysis; the global system level, the level of interregional relations, 
the states, and subnational actors (Hettne & Söderbaum 1998: 7). As a result, New Regionalism is not a 
static framework that uses unrealistic assumptions to analyze the world. Instead this framework allows 
for a wide range of changing variables – where it is accepted that in certain cases there are actors that 
are even more powerful than states. In general, much of the current debates on economics and politics 
centres on the fascinating relationship between globalism and regionalism. There are many perceptions 
of and opinions about both of these processes and how they relate to each other, but according to 
Hettne & Söderbaum (1998: 8) the only conclusion that can be drawn is that regionalisation and 
globalisation are mutually constitutive processes within the broader context of global system change; 
and that it seems that there are different layers of globalism and regionalisms operating simultaneously. 
Consequently, it is of paramount importance to bear in mind that the world system is dynamic. In 
addition to this, New Regionalism allows for the debate to move beyond the question of whether 
regionalism is part of the globalisation process or tool that can be used to prevent the adverse effect of 
globalisation – and instead accept that it can be both a part of and a counter measure. This chapter will 
elaborate further on this issue and other central aspects of New Regionalism, starting with the evolution 
of the New Regionalism approach.  
 
2.2 EVOLUTION OF NEW REGIONALISM 
 
The focus of this study is specifically on New Regionalism, thus a definition of the concept is needed. As 
a consequence of the fact that there is not much agreement amongst scholars regarding how to define 
regionalism many definitions of New Regionalism has been offered. Grant and Söderbaum (2003: 9) 
stress the fact that New Regionalism ‘draws attention to the content of regionalism rather than the form, 
implying a critical questioning of any given type of regionalism, for whom and with what consequences it 
is being put into practice, consolidated or resisted. Furthermore, rooted as it is in critical IPE, an 
unbending concern for the excluded, poor and marginalised people, which critically questions existing 
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structures and in whose interests prevailing strategies are carried out constitutes perhaps the most 
important component of this perspective’. This view on regional integration theory makes it particularly 
interesting for an analysis of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. This is reinforced by Söderbaum (1998: 91) 
noting that New Regionalism is based on ‘the recognition that the Eurocentric and unrealistic 
assumptions of orthodox theory do not apply in the industrialised world and certainly do not apply in the 
developing world’. Bøås, Marchand & Shaw (in Shaw 2005: 4-5) support this view by suggesting that: 
‘One of the most important contributions of New Regionalism has been its challenge to existing Western 
or Eurocentric bias in theorising about regionalism and regionalisation’. New Regionalism  usually refers 
to the revival of regional integration and cooperation theory and praxis since the latter half of the 1980s, 
after the decline and failure of the first wave of regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s (Söderbaum 1996: 
1). Thus the rush to regionalism in the 1990s is the second major wave of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) since the Second World War, and is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘the Second 
Regionalism’. This proliferation of RTAs was rationalised at the time by the widespread concern relating 
to the potential failure of the GATT’s Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Driven by the 
fear of a WTO failure, countries were installing their own safety nets on a regional basis (Sampson & 
Woolcock 2003: xiii). The first wave occurred in the early 1960s, largely in response to the 1957 
establishment of the European Economic Community (Ravenhill in Ravenhill 2005: 126). The late 1950s 
and early1960s were characterized by the formation of various regional arrangements, which sparked 
much theoretical work on their causes and effects. But many of these arrangements were stillborn; and 
most failed to accomplish their stated purposes. These developments contributed to the pattern of 
global, multilateral economic organisation that prevailed throughout much of the post-World War II era 
(Mansfield & Milner 1997: 1). Representatives of Old Regionalism include Mitrany (1945 and 1975) and 
Deutsch (1978) – both these two scholars had a European focus on their work.  
 
Old Regionalism was shaped by the bipolar Cold War context where the United States (US) and Soviet 
Union (USSR) were the two superpowers. The decline of the US hegemony and the breakdown of the 
communist subsystem that took place in the 1980s created a room-for-manoeuvre in which New 
Regionalism could develop (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xx). The structural changes in the global 
political and economic order which followed the collapse of the USSR and ended the bipolar world of 
rivalry between democracy and market economics at one end of the spectrum and communism and 
planned economics at the other, called for new frameworks that could adequately explain the 
dramatically changed global structure (Gavin & Van Langenhove in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 277). 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc  and the emergence of many new states led to a shift of focus towards 
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cooperation, and conflict was no longer defined in terms of Cold War politics (Smith in White, Little & 
Smith 2005: 71).  
 
Old Regionalism focused on the relationship between sovereign states seen through the eyes of pro-
protectionism theories and regionalisation was generally looked upon as a political system imposed 
from above. New Regionalism, on the other hand, takes place in a multipolar global order and is as a 
consequence of this radically different from Old Regionalism. One aspect where it differs is that, New 
Regionalism regard the concept of regionalisation as spontaneous processes from within. In other 
words, according to New Regionalism, regionalisation does not occur unless actors – states and non-
states – in a particular region want it to occur. This aspect of New Regionalism is of paramount 
importance since it creates a clear distinction between regionalism and globalisation. While globalisation 
causes states to get ‘trapped in a process’, New Regionalism sees the integration process as an 
explicitly chosen, voluntary action (Boughey 2003: 53). Therefore, some of the most powerful criticism of 
New Regionalism tends to come from the representatives of the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs); they take on a globalist view, and argue that regionalism constitutes a threat to the multilateral 
system. However, to the supporters of New Regionalism the theory forms the basis for an improved and 
better functioning multilateral system, promoting trade and economic development but also allowing the 
actors some flexibility so that they can avoid getting ‘trapped in the process’ (Hettne in Hettne et al 
2000: xvi). What is important to keep in mind in this regard is that the public debate often portray 
globalisation as exploitation by the strong (developed states and transnational cooperations (TNCs)) of 
the weak (developing states) which will more likely than not end in social disarray and conflict. However, 
most governments both in the developed as well as the developing world are generally favourable to the 
idea of international integration, as long as they can avoid the most harmful aspects of such an 
integration (Soysa & Gleditsch in Hettne & Odén 2002: 26). This, however, will be further discussed 
under heading 2.3 dealing with the main tenets of New Regionalism. Before that it is important to 
explore the origin of New Regionalism, which, as the heading suggest, will be the topic of this section.  
 
The argument here is that New Regionalism is better suited to explain the current global order, or 
disorder. The theory is based on more realistic assumptions than old versions of regionalism – making it 
more suitable to not only analyse a current regional collaboration, but furthermore to analyse South-
South cooperation, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum. 
  
Many political theorists have done work on New Regionalism, the most prominent ones are Keohane 
(1984), Söderbaum & Taylor ( 2003), Söderbaum (2004), Hettne & Söderbaum (1998), Hettne, Inotai,  & 
 29 
Sunkel (1999), Hettne Inotai, & Sunkel (2000a; 2000b) and Hettne & Odén (2002). Keohane argues that 
New Regionalism was a response to the hegemonic decline the world witnessed at the time, and that 
New Regionalism was more open and compatible with the interdependent world economy which had 
started to develop, and it also accepted its place in the world as a component of the globalist framework. 
Moreover, the New Regionalism approach goes beyond the idea of a free market, and includes 
economic, political, social and cultural aspects. Furthermore, these aspects are all interdependent 
variables, consequently attempts to separate and analyze one issue in isolation is at best futile, and as 
Söderbaum argues, at worst devastating (Söderbaum 1996: 43). In other words, the concept of 
regionalism now comprised of issues such as trade, environment degradation and protection, social 
political security, the democratic process and economic integration to mention a few. Another aspect 
which differs when comparing Old and New Regionalism is that the latter includes NGOs and 
relationships between regions (inter-regionalism) in the analysis of the political and economic system of 
the contemporary world (Keohane 1984: 47). A further example of the broadening of analysis and the 
need to always be aware of the dynamic world system In other words, one should always make sure 
that one does not fall for the temptation of analysing it as a static concept – which it is not – instead of 
as the dynamic process it actually is.  
 
Hettne (in Hettne et al 2000: xxvii) suggests that since New Regionalism was conceived as a political 
and therefore also normative project it involves ‘world order values,’ expressed in the three preferred 
outcomes: peace, development, and ecological sustainability. The corresponding problems related to 
these values are of course war, starvation and environmental degradation. New Regionalism considers 
it as being of paramount importance to address these problems aggressively in order to achieve the 
‘world order values’. In ‘Globalisation and the New Regionalism’ Hettne et al (1999: 11) argue that 
regions are an emerging phenomena and that the dynamics of regionalisation must be understood in 
the context of globalisation and can be analysed as processes that go on ‘between various dimensions 
inherent in the process’ and ‘between levels of the world-system’. This phenomenon is supporting the 
globalisation process at the same time as it is a mean of controlling it. The result of these processes is a 
change from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity, especially regarding culture, security, 
economic policies, and political regime. This aspect of regionalisation corresponds with globalisation in 
the way that the latter can be seen as a wave of liberal ideas spreading across the globe, forcing people 
and countries to conform to the globalisation ideas or to be left behind. However, Hettne emphasises 
the power regionalism has as a tool to combat globalisation, arguably its own ‘creator’, and thus sees it 
also as a response to the globalisation process. In fact, he goes as far as claiming that regionalism is 
the only viable option for instance for Africa, keeping in mind the massive inequality that exists between 
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North and South. In other words, according to Hettne, the only way to achieve peace, development and 
ecological sustainability in Africa is through regionalisation. However, it is not only important to Africa, 
but also to other regions of the world that have severe problems with poverty and unrest such as Latin-
America and parts of Asia. Hettne et al (1999: 23) claim war can be avoided by changing the level of 
analysis from the states to regions. He justifies this by highlighting the fact that regions normally have 
more dynamic borders than states in the developing world and thus territorial disputes can more easily 
be avoided. 
 
Samir Amin (1999) agrees with Hettne (1999) in most aspects, his opinions are, however, more radical 
than the ones of Hettne. He claims that to challenge the capitalist globalisation process the focus must 
shift towards regional integration both in Latin-America and Africa as well as in the Arab world. In 
addition, he argues that the United States’ power as a hegemon has not declined significantly and he 
maintains that if the system we have today, with the US as the hegemonic power, continues the west 
will continue to get increasingly richer while the developing countries will only get increasingly poorer. 
Amin argues that the only way to prevent this from happening is through regionalisation due to the fact 
that operating in a large, more powerful unit, the voice of the South becomes more likely to be heard. 
  
Bertil Odén (2002) used the theory of Amin (1999) as a building block when he claimed that the third 
world should see regionalism as an alternative to globalisation. Regionalism is, according to Odén 
(2002), needed for the developing countries to stop the exploitation they have been exposed to for 
decades by the industrialised world (Boughey 2003: 45). Odén justifies this point of view by suggesting 
that although regionalism will bring about a stronger focus on the powerful countries’ interests, the 
world’s developing countries are better off in a regional collaboration than in a unilateral world. The 
reason for this being, first of all, that the poorest countries have relatively more bargaining power when 
negotiating with the region’s hegemon than when negotiating with the world’s hegemon. Secondly, and 
arguably more importantly, countries in a region are more likely to have common interests and 
consequently have more to gain if they join forces with their regional counterparts.  
 
2.3 THE MAIN TENETS OF NEW REGIONALISM 
 
It has so far been established that various theories on integration exist. However, this study argues that 
New Regionalism is different to most of them and that it is the approach that best explains the current 
world system. New Regionalism is a multidimensional process, implying increased regional 
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homogeneity and integration with respect to a number of dimensions, such as culture, politics, security, 
economics and diplomacy. It is thus wider in its analysis – or more inclusive than previous versions of 
regionalisation theory. There are various versions of new regionalism, and consequently different names 
have been applied to this approach. This thesis will however follow the theories as put forward by the 
likes of Hettne, Söderbaum, Amin and Odén and this version will, for the purpose of this study, be 
referred to as New Regionalism (which is identical with what these scholars sometimes refer to as the 
New Regionalist Approach/Theory) (Söderbaum 1996: 1-2).  
 
Although the topic was briefly touched upon in the section above, the differences between Old and New 
Regionalism cannot be over-emphasised as they enable one to explore the characteristics of New 
Regionalism and shall therefore be further discussed here. The term ‘New Regionalism’ has been 
widely employed in the theoretical, ontological and methodological debates. There is however some 
confusion regarding its meaning as well as its divergence from Old Regionalism’ (Grant & Söderbaum 
2003: 3). There are obvious differences between Old and New Regionalism such as the fact that the 
latter is taking place in a very different world context, as a result of this the content has changed 
drastically. The negligence of the global and external factor was often a fallacy of old theories of 
regional integration (for example neofunctionalism) (Grant & Söderbaum 2003: 7-8). Old Regionalism 
had a narrow focus and specific objectives. It was primarily evaluated within a static comparative 
framework, and most often with respect to the famous trade creation versus trade diversion dichotomy. 
Political cooperation was distinctively separated from economic integration, while simultaneously there 
could be different forms of economic cooperation in various sectors (Söderbaum 1996: 2).  
 
New Regionalism, on the other hand, is a multidisciplinary and multidimensional process, which is 
based on the idea that economic, political, social and cultural variables are interdependent and cannot 
be artificially separated and treated as if it was monodisciplinary. Conventional economic analysis often 
treats political, social and cultural aspects as exogenous variables, while socio-economic variables and 
realities are often neglected by political scientists, and it should be fair to argue that Old Regionalism 
actually reflect this perception of the world.  
 
New Regionalism is an attempt to merge three previously isolated theoretical perspectives: theory of 
international relations/international political economy (IPE); development theory; and regional integration 
theory. The reason for this being that the study of international politics makes little sense in isolation 
from global economic issues. Similarly, the study of world order makes little sense if not related to 
‘development.’ Development theory however is state-centric and thus lacks relevance and needs to be 
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merged with IPE in turn would be enriched by the more dynamic and normative concerns central to 
classical development theory, and in particular alternative development theory. Such a merger may 
ultimately strengthen an emerging ‘critical political economy’, dealing with historical power structures at 
various levels of analysis, emphasizing contradictions in them, as well as change and transformation 
expressed in normative terms (Hettne & Söderbaum 1998: 14). Söderbaum (1996: 43) suggests that 
because of this it is justified to argue that New Regionalism takes on a holistic view of theory and 
methodology and one of the main tenets is that the whole is indeed more than the sum of the parts, and 
that in addition to this the parts are understood from the perspective of the whole. In other words, 
according to New Regionalism, regionalisation goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free 
trade regimes and security alliances. Rather, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence 
and identity seems to be of primary importance (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xix). This is what Odén (in 
Hettne et al 1999: 159-164) refers to as the importance of creating ‘territorial identity’ and ‘regional 
coherence’. The re-conceptualisation of regions is one of the central themes in New Regionalism. Its 
approach to the concept of region is one of the main aspects that separate New Regionalism from 
previous regional paradigms. As Marchand, Bøås and Shaw (1999: 903) argued one of the more 
serious limitations of earlier regionalist approaches was a tendency to only focus on highly 
institutionalised forms of regionalisation. They argue that New Regionalism, on the other hand, reflects 
the multitude of interrelated and complex structural transformations of the current world political 
economy. One of the consequences of this is that when it comes to conceptualising the region and the 
process of regionalisation they assert ‘there does not exist any single hegemonic definition of any of 
these concepts. Instead we are confronted with a multitude of competing genres and approaches, which 
should be cherished rather than perceived as problematic’. 
 
A further divergence from Old Regionalism is found in the way New Regionalism stresses the fact that 
the process of regionalisation must be from ‘below’ and ‘within.’ The re-definition of the process and 
objectives of regionalism derives from ‘pressures from blow’ – this pressure followed the transformations 
in world politics after the Cold War. Critical theory scholarship developed a concept of region as a unit of 
analysis where transformations in post-Cold War world politics and globalisation have unleash a 
peace/security/development nexus involving complex patterns of interaction between states and non-
state actors (Iheduru in Grant & Söderbaum 2003: 50). 
 
Moreover, it is no longer only economic, but also ecological and security imperatives that push countries 
and communities towards cooperation. Therefore states are no longer the only actors, rather actors 
such as organisations, institutions and various movements are of paramount importance. Furthermore, 
 33 
while Old Regionalism was considered to be introverted New Regionalism is argued to be extroverted 
reflecting the deeper interdependence of today’s global economy. In other words, states have generally 
accepted that there are threats to their survival that they are not capable of handling on their own, and in 
order to cope with the global transformation that is constantly taking place it is necessary for them to 
cooperate, across borders (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xx). 
 
For close to two decades the global system has witnessed a new trend towards regionalism in all parts 
of the world. Regions can, as Hettne (in Hettne et al 2000: xxi) argues, only be defined post factum, and 
many different regionalisms exist, supported or challenged by many different ideological arguments and 
reflecting various positions in the world economy as a whole. Regionalism is one way to deal with 
various global problems, but its content will be conditioned by the nature of these problems. A rough 
distinction can be made between core regions and peripheral regions. The former are politically stable 
and economically dynamic and organise for the sake of being better able to control the world, an 
example of this kind of regional grouping is the EU. Peripheral regions are defined as being politically 
more turbulent and economically more stagnant; consequently they organise in order to diminish the 
harm caused by the process of marginalisation. At the same time regional arrangements in peripheral 
regions are often fragile and in many cases ineffective – an example here is SADC.  Due to this the 
focus of peripheral regions are often on security regionalism and developmental regionalism rather than 
on the creation of free trade regimes (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxi). The three states of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum do not easily fit into either of these two categories, instead they are middle power and 
emerging markets that are growing increasingly influential in the global system. This leaves one at the 
interesting position where it is possible to argue that India, Brazil and South Africa are states that are 
neither a part of the periphery, nor of the core. However, it is also possible to argue that they are both 
core and peripheral states (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 2). This is evident when exploring the IBSA 
initiative and one discovers that indeed the initial focus of the cooperation was on trade and investment, 
but that this was done in order to fuel the development curves of these three states – and the members 
soon adopted a much broader agenda. In other words, this cooperation has both characteristics 
common in regional cooperation among developed states as well as characteristics most likely found in 
the South. Therefore, the IBSA Dialogue Forum can be viewed as an attempt by the three states to 
promote economic growth and development – allowing them to some day in the future to be firmly 
placed amongst the core states of the world. 
 
Another very important characteristic of New Regionalism is the concept of ‘regionness’. The degree of 
regionness of a particular area can increase or decrease depending on regional dynamics, on which 
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global as well as national and local forces of course have an impact. Regionalisation takes place at 
many levels of the world system: the system as a whole, the level of interregional relations, and the 
international structure of the single region, the latter including states, subnational ethnic groups and 
microregions. It is not possible to state which of these levels that are most influential since changes on 
the various levels interact and the relative importance of them varies from one region and one period to 
another (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxii). Consequently, in all regions the level of regionness will differ 
at any given time due to the fact that regionalisation remains a complex and ever-changing process – 
thus, there will always be at least one aspect that is going through transformation.  
 
In order to accentuate the important characteristics of New Regionalism, it is useful to compare the 
theory to other, older, theories of integration, for instance Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalist writers 
argued that regional integration is promoted through the creation of limited supranational institutions. 
These supranational institutions will initially be set up in order to deal with complex technical issues. The 
interaction between the technocrats would then eventually lead the political elite and interest groups of a 
state to support further integration (Kriek 1986: 24). As soon as these powerful elements of any state 
realize that it would serve their economic self-interests to further integrate they would pursue this goal. 
When these influential parts of a society pursue further regional integration it will lead to spillover effects 
into other areas. This process of spillovers is an issue of paramount importance to Neofunctionalist 
writers, due to the fact that they claim it will eventually lead to political cooperation between states and 
complete integration of regions (Gilpin 2001: 351). Said differently, the spillover effect suggests that the 
initial steps towards integration would give rise to internal economic and political developments which in 
turn would necessitate further cooperation (Kriek 1996: 30).  
 
The concept of spillover effect is of such importance to Neofunctionalist theory that it needs to be further 
explained. The world, according to Neofunctionalists, has become so complex, so inter-linked and 
consequently interdependent that the need for technocrats has developed. These technocrats have 
obviously become actors in their own right and with their own self-interests. With them being so widely 
used their ability to influence a decision making process has dramatically increased. Consequently, and 
as a result of the complexities of the world system and the consequent use of technocrats the 
governments have been ‘trapped in a web of unintended consequences spun by their own previous 
commitments’ (Moravcsik 1993: 475). Because of this it should be fair to argue that Neofunctionalists 
view integration as a process in which the political elite and other powerful actors gradually redefine 
their interests in accordance with regional orientation. Hence it is seen as a ‘top-down’ phenomenon 
where the upper stratum of society pushes the integration process forward in order to serve their self-
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interests. In addition, and this point is of paramount importance,  Neofunctionalism as well as other Old 
Regionalism theories viewed regional integration as self-maintaining. Not only was it self-maintaining, 
but it also had an end-goal that was a complete integration of regions. New Regionalism on the other 
hand views, as discussed earlier, integration as a process from within and below and argues that the 
states, sub-national organisation as well as the global structure determine how closely integrated a 
region is. What is more, it stresses the fact that integration is a dynamic process, not a static concept. In 
other words, New Regionalism uses a dynamic analysis which is grounded in the interrelation of global-
regional-national-sub-national levels (Söderbaum 1996: 43). All this allows the actors to ‘mix and match’ 
within the constraint of the existing world (dis)order to decide how they want integration to occur and 
what level of regionness they see as most beneficial to them. Consequently, one sees that 
Neofunctionalism and New Regionalism both include other than state actors. However, in 
Neofunctionalism the integration process is driven by an elite, while New Regionalism argues that there 
is indeed grass-root involvement and that this force can at times be just as strong as the power of a 
political or economic elite. In addition to this, New Regionalism diverge from Neofunctionalism in arguing 
that it is not a process that is out of the actors’ control – rather it can be steered in directions that best 
benefits the actors. Or, in the words of Grant and Söderbaum (2003: 6), ‘There are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ 
regions, but these are constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed – intentionally and sometimes 
unintentionally – in the process of global transformation by collective human  action and identity 
formation’. 
 
The debate around regionalisation is, as mentioned earlier, inextricably intertwined with globalisation. 
The topic of discussion often revolves around whether regionalism should be seen as ‘part-of’ or as a 
‘response-to’ the globalisation process. Hettne refers to this as the debate about whether regionalism is 
a ‘stepping-stone’ or a ‘stumbling-block’ for the globalisation process (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxii). 
Söderbaum (1996: 30) argues that the exact balance of outward-and inward-orientation is an intriguing 
issue, and that regionalism cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional question of the formation of trade 
blocks or whether regionalism is a ‘stumbling block’ or a ‘stepping-stone’ for multilateral free trade. The 
reason for this is that New Regionalism is simultaneously both outward-and inward-oriented. 
Söderbaum justifies this argument by stressing the fact that New Regionalism does not challenge the 
notion that increased international and regional trade is important for development in the poor regions of 
the world such as for instance Southern Africa. However, he points out that cooperation is by its very 
nature exclusive, and genuine regionalisation is therefore per definition also inward-orientated. New 
Regionalism subsequently challenges the neoliberal and neoclassical one-dimensional propositions that 
ceteris paribus multilateralism is preferable to regionalism or that, ceteris paribus, it is irrelevant whether 
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developing states choose to cooperate with regional or non-regional partners. In other words, New 
Regionalist theory suggests that it is indeed a relevant issue (which carries with it serious 
consequences) whether states choose globalisation (also often referred to as unilateralism) or 
regionalism as a method of integration (Söderbaum 1996: 30).  
 
New Regionalism recognizes the limitations and inherent risks associated with unilateralism, 
uncoordinated adjustment to the world market and the adverse effects of globalism on poor regions of 
the world such as Southern Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. Seen from this perspective, mutual 
cooperation is often to be preferred rather than non-cooperation in the present volatile and imperfect 
world order. This is due to the fact that regional and inter-regional cooperation will be more optimal than 
globalisation, atomistic bilateral cooperation with the developed world and/or national development 
strategies. Said differently, both the strategy of inward- and outward-orientation are qualified, and it is 
not a policy option of either or, but of both and. This means that for instance Southern Africa as a region 
will become an actor in international affairs and it is mainly through the strengthening of the whole that it 
will be possible to increase the region’s bargaining power, which seems to be a precondition for finding 
a solution to the debt situation as well as for gaining better access to other markets and improving the 
region’s terms-of-trade (ToT). At the same time it is only through New Regionalism that there will be a 
climate conducive to raising the level of investment (domestic as well as foreign) and for genuine 
regionalisation concerning the ‘core’ of regionalism (Söderbaum 1996: 30-31). Thus, in terms of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum a strengthening of the whole – through the strengthening of the parts –can allow 
for increased investment, and this strengthening of the parts will hence reinforce the whole.  
 
Hettne (in Hettne et al 2000: xxiii) agrees with Söderbaum (1996) and argues that in terms of New 
Regionalism the regionalisation process is neither only a ‘stepping-stone’ nor only a ‘stumbling-block’. 
Instead he suggests that New Regionalism is at the same time both a ‘stumbling-block’ as well as a 
‘stepping stone.’ The processes of economic globalisation and political regionalisation are going on 
simultaneously; hence they contribute to both disorder, and possibly, a future order. These two 
processes are articulated within the same larger process of global structural transformation, the 
outcome of which depends on a dialectical rather than linear development. The latter cannot therefore 
be readily extrapolated or easily foreseen. Instead it expresses the relative strength of contending social 
forces involved in the two processes, taking different forms in different parts of the world. Thus regions 
can be viewed as emerging phenomena, ambiguously forming part of and driving, but also reacting 
against and modifying, the process of globalisation. Söderbaum (1996: 41) refers to this as the 
interdependence between actors and structure, and regards it as one of the most important 
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characteristic of New Regionalist theory. The actors (amongst other, states) are influenced by the 
structure, the global political economy, but they are not ‘helpless victims’ of what is going on in the 
contemporary world. At least they do not have to be, according to New Regionalism theory the states, 
and other actors, are capable of steering the development in directions that are beneficial to them, 
obviously within the constraint of the global structure. 
  
It has been mentioned that New Regionalism is not confined to what is agreed on and implemented 
within the framework of formal regional organisations and agendas. This is often labelled political, formal 
or de jure regionalisation – earlier in this chapter referred to as ‘regionalism’ (Söderbaum 1996: 33). 
Instead taking place is actually a spontaneous, market-driven, informal or de facto regionalisation 
despite what has been agreed upon on a political level – so-called regionalisation. What is important to 
keep in mind is that in the long-run one cannot exist without the other and hence these two ‘types’ of 
regionalisation have to be consistent and mutually reinforcing. Thus negative and positive integration 
must be implemented simultaneously (Söderbaum 1996: 42). However, according to New Regionalism 
there is no ‘order’ which determine what should come first, and therefore, no way of telling which of the 
two types that is the most influential. New Regionalism settle with establishing the fact that politics of 
formal regionalism must be linked with the economics and sociology of spontaneous regionalism 
(Söderbaum 1996: 34). 
  
Regional integration is traditionally seen as a harmonisation of trade policies leading to deeper 
economic integration and with political integration as a possible future result (what the Neofunctionalist 
writers would refer to as ‘spillover’ effects). New Regionalism, however, refers to a more comprehensive 
process, implying a change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity 
with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies, 
and political regimes. The convergence along these dimensions may be a natural process or politically 
steered or, maybe most likely as Hettne argues a mixture of the two (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxiv). 
In other words, the convergence occurs, in most cases, when both regionalism (formal) and 
regionalisation (informal) factors are at play. Culture takes a long time to change; of importance here is 
rather the inherently shared culture which more often than not is transnational, national borders in many 
cases being artificial divisions of a larger cultural area. This is of course not the case with India, Brazil 
and South Africa, the ‘borders’ (or dividing line) between them are indeed real and the substantial 
geographic distances between them might raise the question whether these three states have anything 
in common in terms of culture. However, what is important to keep in mind in this regard is the fact that 
although the countries might be geographically situated far from each other, they still have important 
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similarities. They are all emerging markets, and for instance Brazil possesses the largest population 
claiming African descent outside of Africa. In fact, it is the second largest overall, surpassed only by 
Nigeria. Similarly India and South Africa share strong ties as a result of India’s stance against Apartheid 
(Draper, Mills & White 2004: 7). This tie is reinforced by the fact that South Africa currently has the 
highest population of Indians outside of India (Mail & Guardian 2006: 27). In terms of cultural bonds, 
South Africa could arguable end up being the glue that keeps the coalition together. Hence one sees 
that the two countries that are generally considered to be the most powerful in the coalition are 
dependent on South Africa as ‘the link’, suggesting that it is indeed not possible to only measure 
integration in quantitative form, but that rather qualitative aspect can be the strongest aspect of the 
integration process. 
 
Typically, regional politics is an aggregation and ‘concentration’ of national interests (Hettne in Hettne et 
al 2000: xxv). This is clearly illustrated in the cooperation efforts between India, Brazil and South Africa; 
the three states share similarities such as their positions in the world system as emerging markets and 
their immense socio-economic problems, all three being some of the most unequal societies of the 
world. They seek to use these similarities to their advantage, in other words to ‘unite’ in order to have 
more political and economic leverage vis-à-vis core states and regions such as the US, the EU and 
Japan. What is conceived as ‘national interests’ does not disappear, but due to the imperative of global 
interdependence, it becomes inseparable from various shared transnational interests and concerns, 
which are manifesting themselves in the regionalisation process. This is often referred to as the change 
from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian logic (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxvii). The Westphalian 
Treaty of 1648 was based on three principles stating that: ‘Sovereign states should not be subject to 
higher political authority; sovereign heads of state should determine the religion of their realm; and all 
states should strive to maintain the balance of power in order to avoid the emergence of a hegemon that 
could threaten the concept of sovereignty (Jackson in Baylis & Smith 2001: 43). Globalisation and its 
consequences have altered the global system and the definition of a country’s sovereignty has been 
altered. A sovereign country in the current global order is exposed to very strong interest groups, 
domestic and international ones, and are forced to include the interests of these groups in the decision 
making process. Consequently, a country will, in theory, be considered sovereign, but might in fact not 
be sovereign according to the Westphalia principles. In fact, no country is completely sovereign – as 
defined by the Westphalia Treaty – in the current world order. 
 
India, Brazil and South Africa share similarities that have the potential of making the coalition very 
beneficial for all three states, not to say the three regions. However, there are also substantial 
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differences between them, for instance the population number, while India has a population of more 
than one billion people, Brazil and South Africa only has 198 million and 49 million, respectively. 
Furthermore, in terms of GDP, India and Brazil are relatively equal, but substantially bigger than South 
Africa with GDP’s of US$ 1237 billion and US$ 1665 billion respectively, while South Africa’s GDP is 
only US$ 300 billion. These similarities and differences between the three states will be further 
discussed in Chapter Three. The reason for mentioning it here is that many will view these differences 
(in GDP and population) as a major obstacle to successful cooperation between India, Brazil and South 
Africa. Classical integration models, for instance, largely ignore the problems as well as the 
opportunities associated with asymmetries and large differences between member states. However, 
according New Regionalism this does not necessarily have to prevent a successful and beneficial 
cooperation for all three countries involved. The result of regionalisation between states which are 
unequal depends on how the dominating power acts, and when there is not one power that is 
dominating in all fields, it is more likely to be a successful collaboration (Söderbaum 1996: 38) – and 
whether there is indeed one dominating power in the IBSA Dialogue Forum will be discussed in Chapter 
Three which compares the three member countries.  
 
In summary, development, according to New Regionalism theory, is not reduced to a question of 
economics and consequently goes far beyond the formation of trade blocks, and includes, but is not 
limited to, avoiding costs of globalisation and marginalisation in a multipolar hierarchically structured 
world and avoiding the costs of market fragmentation, increased collective self-reliance, investment, 
production, trade, employment, macro-economic stability and credibility, infrastructure, structural 
transformation (including social and inter-state redistribution), economic diversification, increased 
collective bargaining power and social development. In short, a broad focus is necessary in order to 
reap the benefits of regionalisation – which can be long-term economic growth and social development 
(Söderbaum 1996: 41-43). 
 
2.4 APPLICABILITY OF NEW REGIONALISM TO IBSA 
 
When discussing regionalism most scholars analyse states that are situated geographically close to 
each other, for instance European states. Laursen (2003: 1) argues that theories of integration have 
mainly been developed to explain European integration, the reason for this being that Europe was the 
first region to venture down the integration path, starting in the early 1950s with the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). However, through focusing on the ‘real’ regions, New Regionalism offers 
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analytical tools by which the diverse sets of regionalising processes may be better understood. This is of 
particular importance when analysing the integration processes in developing regions as these are 
multi-layered and cannot be analysed in the same way as for instance the EU. In the developing world 
one sees that much of the social and economic interconnectedness remain at the nexus of 
formal/informal and national/global and in some cases even legal/illegal (Taylor in Bøås, Marchand & 
Shaw 2005: 149). Consequently, it is fair to argue that New Regionalism makes an explicit effort not to 
be Eurocentric. The second perceived obstacle, the fact that India, Brazil and South Africa are not 
situated geographically close to each other does not have to be an obstacle at all. As Söderbaum (1996: 
1) points out: ‘A region may be differently defined depending on whether geographic proximity, 
economic, political, social, cultural or historical relations are used as the principal variable’. Dunn and 
Hentz (Grant & Söderbaum 2003: 185) argue that it is important to recognise the plurality of space and 
the multiplicity of possible constructions of space and highlight the importance of exploring the inter-
connectedness of special practice and the representation of space. This is important in terms of this 
thesis due to the fact that it is such a view on regionalism that allows us to refer to the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum as a regional cooperation. In older, conventional theories of regionalism the issue of geographic 
proximity is stressed and according to scholars of these theories the IBSA Dialogue Forum could 
consequently not be considered an example of regional cooperation. 
 
As discussed, New Regionalism recognizes the fact that classical integration theory is Eurocentric and 
rests on unrealistic assumptions that do not apply to the developing world, and arguably not even to the 
developed world. As a result, New Regionalism aims at using more realistic assumptions such as the 
presence of underdeveloped, distorted factor and goods markets and production structures, the 
presence of other market and government failures, high transportation costs, imperfect and asymmetric 
information and competition, externalities, bounded economic and actor rationality, the role of 
institutions and the fact that various public and common goods may not always be achieved. These less 
restrictive and more realistic assumptions (in comparison to classical integration theory) make the New 
Regionalism approach more applicable to states of the South (Söderbaum 1996: 41). 
 
It is important to keep in mind when discussing the IBSA Dialogue Forum that none of the three IBSA 
members are representative for a state of their respective regions. India, Brazil and South Africa are all 
surrounded by states that are substantially poorer and much less developed than them, and thus much 
more marginalised. This should be stressed due to the fact that their status as middle powers sets them 
apart from their neighbours as more powerful states and is arguably the reason why the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum has more potential to succeed than other South- South collaboration. The fact can also work out 
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to be a negative one; South Africa is different from, for example, Angola which means that their national 
interests might differ vastly from those of Angola’s and it is thus possible that Angola’s interests are not 
taken into account when South Africa is negotiating with a third party. Abrahamsson (in Hettne et al 
2000: 296) argues that closer cooperation between marginalised states is the best, not to say only, 
option these states have when facing the effect of globalisation. Therefore, IBSA might prove to become 
the very much needed life-buoy for the states in their regions. However, neither India, Brazil nor South 
Africa are able to control the globalisation process on their own, hence closer cooperation is not only 
important to their neighbours but is also viewed to be of paramount importance for the economic and 
social development of the three states. Consequently, it can be argued that they can use regionalisation 
as a counter-measure to the harmful features of globalisation. As discussed above, New Regionalism 
goes far beyond the narrow gains emphasized in the classical theories of regional integration. What 
makes this theory extremely relevant in terms of the IBSA initiative is that it stresses the importance of 
counteracting the present trend of economic and political marginalisation, avoiding the ‘costs of non-
integration’, achieving ‘non-orthodox gains’ and other dynamic benefits, for instance increased domestic 
and foreign investments and trade, production and employment creation, increased leverage in 
international negotiations, political-economic-social-stability and credibility, various types of economies 
of scale, the development of infrastructure and other services as well as structural transformation 
leading to improved utilisation, allocation and distribution of resources and capacities (Söderbaum 1996: 
3).  
 
Much has been said about how New Regionalism broadens the view of regionalisation so that it is no 
longer narrowly focusing on economic integration. However, it is important to stress that trade is still one 
of the core issues of integration although, as often emphasised, this is not the only issue that is 
important in the eyes of New Regionalist theorists (Söderbaum 1996: 36). Classical economists 
recognised the benefits of mutual gain from trade and exchange. The example of enormous gains made 
by the miracle economies of East and South-East Asia that practised export-led growth strategies is 
often contrasted with the failure of the import-substitution strategies that were followed by many other 
states, notably in Latin America, Africa and South Asia. Consequently, neoliberal theories of 
development assume that interdependence between the developed and the developing countries can 
serve to benefit the latter because capital will flow from rich to poor areas where the returns on capital 
investments will be highest, helping to bring about a transformation of ‘backward’ societies (Soysa & 
Gleditsch in Hettne & Odén 2002: 56). In terms of the IBSA  Dialogue Forum one sees that, India, Brazil 
and South Africa might have learned something from the ‘Asian Tigers’ and consequently the initial 
focus of this coalition was on improving trade links between the three states, both as bilateral, as well as 
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trilateral agreements. However, and this is very much according to New Regionalist theory, even if the 
main focus was on trade, it should be highlighted that the current focus is much broader than trade and 
that even when trade is made a priority this is often done due to the fact that the issue of trade is closely 
interlinked with other aspects that also needs to form part of the integration process. Whether one agree 
with this or not, it is still of paramount importance for IBSA countries to join force, learn from each other 
and build up their economies in order to facilitate a possible move of capital towards their regions. This 
will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
At the same time as regional integration needs some kind of structure and rules for the actors to play by 
in order to steer the integration in directions beneficial for the member states, it is also of great 
importance that regional integration is both flexible and pragmatic, and should consequently include a 
certain degree of variable geometry and multi-speedism (Söderbaum 1996: 31). New Regionalism is 
founded on the existence of a commonality of interests at the same time as different states and actors 
face different problems and have different needs. One very important characteristic where New 
Regionalism differs from earlier, classic versions of regionalism, and which makes this theory 
particularly relevant to the IBSA Dialogue Forum is the fact that even though various states to some 
extent have different needs and face very different problems, many of these problems must be solved 
through regionalisation and not only by means of action at the national level or at the global level. 
Söderbaum (1996: 31) therefore suggests that national, regional and global levels are much more 
interrelated than anticipated in conventional analysis. 
 
If regionalisation is not incorporated within a holistic framework which provides the appropriate political 
regime for the guidance and steering of spontaneous and market-driven regionalisation there is a 
chance that the trickle-down-effect will be lost and that there will be no positive spillover or balanced 
regional development (Söderbaum 1996: 31). This trickle-down effect is very important in terms of IBSA 
as one of the strongest criticisms of this coalition comes from those who claim that IBSA is nothing more 
than an elitist idea of cooperation, which has no support from the general populations of India, Brazil 
and South Africa. New Regionalism offers a solution to this problem by focusing on the holistic approach 
which views economic, political, social and cultural aspects of regionalisation as interlinked, thus 
ensuring economic and political spillover, trickle-down, spread effects; to capitalize on cross-sectoral 
linkages; to integrate positive and negative integration; to move beyond the obsolete policy option of 
inward-versus outward-orientation (Söderbaum 1996: 41). 
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Possibly due to the fact that the IBSA Dialogue Forum is such a young coalition one sees that many of 
the agreements that are signed are bilateral as opposed to multilateral. This could hamper economic 
growth and development. However, the three states have attempted to solve this issue through 
discussing ways of making the agreements multilateral. The change from bilateralism to regionalism is 
one crucial indicator of increasing regionness of a region, but increasing regionness can also result from 
overlapping bilateral agreements within a region, since such agreements imply policy convergences in 
various fields. Therefore there is reason not only to expect that in the future an increasing number of 
agreements between the three states will be multilateral as opposed to bilateral, but also that the 
amount of regionness will increase as the bilateral agreements overlap each other.  
 
The importance of integration and interdependence of the national, subnational, regional and global 
levels, have already been mentioned. National strategies and economic programmes, including SAPs, 
should be integrated within regional plans, while regional strategies must be much more integrated 
within national plans. The reason for this being of paramount importance is the fact that New 
Regionalism places such a great importance on the holistic approach to integration. This holistic 
approach suggests that the parts (in the case of IBSA: India, Brazil and South Africa) can be 
strengthened through a strengthening of the whole IBSA, and not only vice versa. What are traditionally 
considered strictly national concerns and objectives, for instance macro-economic stabilisation and 
reform, development of financial and capital markets and the markets for goods and services, non-
tradable as well as ‘national goods’ will be achieved not only through national policy reform and 
implementation but also through an adequately designed regionalisation strategy. Said differently, in 
sharp contrast to conventional wisdom, the goals of national development, national integration and 
nation-building, macro-economic stabilisation and functioning markets and prices at the national level 
are not necessary preconditions for successful regionalism. Instead, it is the other way around, that 
these goals and objectives will and can (for some regions at least) only be achieved if New Regionalism 
is allowed to play a greater developmental role (Söderbaum 1996: 32). 
 
What is important to keep in mind when focusing on the holistic approach New Regionalism uses, is that 
it does not demand excessive supra-nationality or far-reaching regional institutions. Söderbaum uses 
Southern Africa as an example, and argue that supra-nationality in this region has led to a spill-back into 
disintegration. In order to avoid this, Söderbaum (1996: 33) suggest to limit the supra-national institution 
and instead focus on fostering a cooperation and regionalisation culture, what he refers to as an 
increased sense of common destiny and ‘sitting in the same boat’ and a recognition that joint action and 
reciprocity are preferable to unilateral action and purely nation programmes in an imperfect world. 
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Through such focus one allows for more flexibility and a more efficient form of cooperation, instead of a 
large bureaucracy that can turn out to counter-productive. The members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
seem to have adopted such an approach where they are continuously making sure that institution 
building is kept at a minimum – what is needed to facilitate efficient cooperation, without allowing more 
than what is strictly needed.  
 
There are, however, some benefits to creating institutions and some institution building is necessary in 
order to help the integration process between the three member states. When discussing institutions 
and mechanisms that are put in place in order to promote and facilitate regional integration, it is 
important to keep in mind that these are costly and are not goals in themselves. However, institutions 
are important risk-reducers and facilitators of cooperation, providers of information, communication, 
knowledge in an imperfect context, benign regional hegemony will facilitate mutually beneficial 
regionalism and the achievement of public goods in a complex and often imperfect environment 
(Söderbaum 1996: 43). However, it is also important to remember that these institutions and 
mechanisms will not be automatically created. They will, in other words, not automatically appear when 
someone decides that they are needed in order to drive the integration process forward. Rather a 
conscious effort must be made and the political will must be there (and therefore the benefits of such an 
institution must be easily seen). Keohane (1984: 85) points out that: ‘Like imperfect markets, world 
politics is characterized by institutional deficiencies that inhibit mutually advantageous cooperation.’ 
Consequently, while some focus on institution building is needed, this should always be kept at a 
minimum.  
 
This section has illustrated that there are certain characteristics of the New Regionalism approach that 
makes this theory particularly fitting when analysing the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Firstly, the fact that the 
assumptions on which New Regionalism is based differ greatly from earlier theories of regional 
integration as they are less Eurocentric and more aligned with the reality facing states of the South. 
Secondly, New Regionalism has a much broader idea of regional integration and includes factors such 
as culture and politics and thus not focusing narrowly on trade. In the case of the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
it is not unlikely that it is culture and socio-economic values which will be the most powerful forces 
driving the integration process. One must, however, keep in mind that it is a difficult task to evaluate the 
outcome of these forces and that they are most easily measured – or seen – in hindsight.  
 
Thirdly, New Regionalism is much more flexible than earlier approaches to regional integration. This 
means that integration is not viewed as a linear process, instead depending on the need of the 
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members the integration can operate in various speeds and shapes. New Regionalism is eclectic and 
concerned with the dynamics and consequences of processes of regionalisation in various fields of 
activity and at various levels. The challenge is to understand and explain the phenomenon of 
regionalism and the process through which regions are coming into existence and are being 
consolidated – their ‘becoming so to speak – rather than a particular set of activities and flows within a 
pre-given (and often pre-scientific) region or regional framework (Grant & Söderbaum  2003: 6). In other 
words, it is India, Brazil and South Africa (the individuals, the groupings and the politicians) that 
determine the degree of integration that occur – they can thus avoid getting ‘trapped in the process.’ 
However, these actors are of course influenced by the global structure in which they operate. This is 
closely related to the fourth aspect which is the fact that the various levels, national, subnational, 
regional and global are interconnected, consequently the cooperation between India, Brazil and South 
Africa does not, or at least shall not, prevent for instance South Africa from closer integrating with the 
SADC member states. The last aspect discussed in this section is the topic of institutions. This is of 
course related to the four former aspects. Great emphasis is placed on the fact that states still have 
some autonomy; they can create the institutions they consider necessary in order to promote further 
integration between India, Brazil and South Africa. What is of great importance is that the members are 
cautious and do not establish too many institutions which will only increase the bureaucracy as well as 
make the coalition an expensive discipline for the parties involved, in addition it could carry with it the 
potential of slowing down the integration process. However, as pointed out by Söderbaum (1996: 43), 
institutions do not create themselves and a conscious political effort is needed in order to establish 
institutions that can facilitate further cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa. The ‘beauty of 
New Regionalism’ is that this is not a large obstacle as it allows the member to create and recreate 
institutions according to when they are needed and even close them down when they are not needed. In 
other words, regions are dynamic and can constantly be constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed 
(Grant & Söderbaum  2003: 6) The reason for this being that regionalisation is not believed to be a self-
maintaining process, rather it is a process that allows India, Brazil and South Africa to chose the speed 
and shape of integration, and steer the process in the direction that is more beneficial to them, within the 
constraints of the contemporary global structure.  
 
2.5 DISADVANTAGES OF NEW REGIONALISM TO IBSA  
 
Intuitively, the first criticism offered on theories of regionalism is that these are Eurocentric. Thus, the 
argument is that they are not applicable on regional integration efforts of the South. However, this study 
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has illustrated that New Regionalism differs from other theories of regionalism in that it is indeed 
applicable to the South due to the fact that this framework rests on more realistic assumptions.  
 
The fact that New Regionalism is a merger of IPE, development theory and regional integration theory 
has led to suggestions that New Regionalism is too open-ended. However, New Regionalist theorists 
argue that this open-endedness is a strength since it allows for a more ‘real’ theory – one that better 
corresponds with reality. Consequently, New Regionalism is able to turn the criticisms around and make 
them a positive aspect of the theory in the way that these two issues allow for a more realistic analysis 
of current global events. In other words, the theory might be open-ended and vague, but it is still limited 
and clear enough to appropriate explain developments taking place in the contemporary world.  
 
One important aspect worth mentioning in terms of disadvantages of applying New Regionalism to the 
South is, as argued by Haarlov (1997: 12) that: ‘Experience with formal schemes for regional integration 
has generally been disappointing in Africa, as in the Third World in general.’ He illustrates this after 
stating that South African goods have penetrated nearly all African markets. This occurred even during 
the height of sanctions during Apartheid rule in South Africa. Gavin and van Langehoven (Sampson & 
Woolcock 2003: 278-279) note that the growth of regionalisation in the developing world was historically 
influenced by the Cold War. Economists encouraged developing countries to create Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) as the only viable means of economic development – to diversify their economy, to 
develop intra-industry trade and to develop South-South trade. However, many schemes of regional 
economic integration in Africa and Latin America were built on closed economy principles and insulation 
against outside competition, and consequently they became failures. Although this is valid criticism in 
terms of many of the approaches to regionalism, this is not so for New Regionalism since this 
framework explicitly includes a wide array of other factors and do not see RTAs as the end goal of the 
integrations process. Additionally, New Regionalist scholars stress the fact that only focusing on formal 
integration is futile – instead they advocate a framework which includes both formal as well as informal 
integration.  
 
Another important aspect is the movement of labour. French is for instance widely spoken in central 
Johannesburg due to the large amount of illegal immigrants working in the metropole. This has 
happened despite the fact there are no agreements regarding free circulation of labour between African 
countries. Here one explores two concepts – what Söderbaum and Hettne refers to as de facto and de 
jure integrations. The illegal immigrants in central Johannesburg illustrates the fact that the de facto 
integration (also often referred to as regionalisation) is actually taking place, same as it did under 
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Apartheid, while, the political will, or de jure integration (or regionalism) is lacking. Söderbaum 
emphasises the fact that these two types of integration needs to occur simultaneously, while in reality it 
might not occur this way. In terms of the French speaking illegal immigrants one sees that de facto 
integration has occurred, but not de jure integration. Thus, according to New Regionalisation focus 
should be placed on what could be done in order to make sure that these two versions of integrations 
are on a similar level as possible.  
 
One obstacle facing the IBSA Dialogue Forum at inception was that while the political will was clearly 
there, it would be necessary to bring along de facto integration in order to make it a successful coalition. 
Or, in other words, the IBSA Dialogue Forum was viewed as an elitist idea without any ‘grass root’ 
support. Policy-makers in India, Brazil and South Africa were reminded that of the fact that as long as 
IBSA is an elitist idea of intra-regional integration, thus as long as the national bureaucracy and 
administration and other groupings do not change their attitude, integration was going to be very 
difficult. The reason for this being that national bureaucracies tend to be excessively nationally oriented 
and work against as opposed to hand in hand with the economic and private forces contributing to 
regionalisation and the common good. In other words, a ‘cooperation culture’ needs to be encouraged 
among institutions, bureaucracies and national administrations in order to create an environment 
conducive to investment, trade, production and business (Söderbaum 1996: 37). However, policy-
makers seem to have managed this task and have without a doubt succeeded in broadening the scope 
of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. In other words, while more work is needed it is fair to argue that the 
coalition is today less of an elitist project than it was at inception. 
 
Even if the arguably strongest criticism of IBSA comes from the ones who view the coalition as a purely 
elitist project is it important to point out, as Falk (in Hettne & Odén 2002: 178) does, that there are 
presently indications that even in Europe regionalism is far more popular among elites than with the 
citizenry of the respective countries. Still, most scholars will claim that Europe is (on a general level) 
more integrated now than what it was in, for instance, the 1970s. The fact that it is, even in Europe, 
viewed as an elitist idea should hush the voices the critics of the IBSA Dialogue Forum as a South-
South cooperation initiative who argue that the coalition is valueless due to the fact that it is only the 
elites of India, Brazil and South Africa that are interested in this cooperation. The IBSA Dialogue Forum 
is only a few years old and the process of integration requires time in order to get the ‘average citizens’ 
to see the value of such a regionalisation process (Falk in Hettne & Odén 2002: 170-181). It is however, 
fair to argue that with the small amount of time that has elapsed great changes have been made – a 
substantially wider group of citizens are currently involved. An example of this is the inclusion of a 
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Business Forum, a Women Forum and an Academics Forum to mention a few at the official IBSA 
meetings. This fact suggests that there was, and indeed is, a need for such a South-South coalition 
where members are able to further their own interests through cooperating with their counterparts in the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
A last point worth mentioning is that Falk (in Hettne & Odén 2002) argues that there are no indications 
suggesting a linear growth of regionalism in Europe. This should highlight the fact that regionalisation is 
not (as argued amongst others by Neofunctional theorists) a self-sustained process and it is in addition 
not linear. This offers large room for manoeuvre for the actors taking part in the integration process. In 
other words, by getting involved the actors will not all of a sudden find themselves ‘trapped in a process’ 
– at least if they do so they have the opportunity of reversing the trend. The reason being that according 
to New Regionalism a region is a constructed concept, one which can be de-constructed and re-
constructed aligned with the needs and interests of the actors in question. This lack of linear growth also 
means that it is at times difficult to measure the ‘amount’ of integration that has taken place – and it is 
thus difficult to compare the various variables to other coalitions. This problem New Regionalism solves 
by allowing for an inclusion of as many aspects of integration as possible, through explicitly including 
these variables in the analysis one will get a clearer picture of the actual developments that have 
occurred and one is thus not forced to evaluate these with only narrow quantitative tools. Consequently, 
New Regionalism counters criticism of being too broad and too open-ended through illustrating that it is 
these features that make the theory applicable – more so than other frameworks – to real-life integration 




This chapter has established that in comparison with old theories of regionalism New Regionalism 
differs in the way that it views regionalisation as a multidimensional process and it gives importance to a 
wide array of dimensions such as culture, politics, security, economics and diplomacy. Furthermore, 
New Regionalism includes a larger number of actors in its analysis of integration. With the introduction 
of New Regionalism state actors were no longer the only actors of importance – instead business, 
interest groups and other actors are considered to be important in the analysis of the process of regional 
integration. Consequently, according to New Regionalism, regionalisation is about much more than just 
free-trade and security alliances.  
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Furthermore, New Regionalism views integration as a process from within and below, suggesting that it 
is indeed not controlled by the elite. Rather ‘the parts’ are able to choose the kind of collaboration that 
serves their self-interests. In addition to this, New Regionalism stresses the fact that there is 
interdependence between the actors and structure, and that one of the dimension –culture, politics, 
economics and security, to mention some –cannot be analysed independently. In addition, the various 
levels of integration – global, regional, national and micro-regional – are also inextricably intertwined.  
 
Another aspect discussed in this chapter is the applicability of New Regionalism on the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum. It is clear that as opposed to old theories of integration, New Regionalism fits the developing 
world due to the use of more realistic assumptions such as the presence of market and government 
failures and imperfect and asymmetric information and competition, to mention some. It is, amongst 
other things, these less restrictive and more realistic assumptions that make New Regionalism a useful 
tool when analysing integration in the South. 
 
New Regionalism takes on a holistic view of theory and methodology and the whole (the IBSA dialogue 
forum) is indeed more than the sum of the parts (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the parts are 
understood from the perspective of the whole. The next chapter will explore ‘the parts’: India, Brazil and 






















India, Brazil and South Africa are all considered to be middle powers and emerging markets. The topic 
of emerging markets will be further explored in Chapter Four; this chapter will look at the countries 
separately – examining demographics and foreign policies. However, before attempting to create clarity 
around these aspects the concept of middle powers should be discussed. So far, this study has only 
offered a brief description of a middle power, in the form of Ian Taylor’s (2001: 19) definition: ‘A middle 
power is a state that possesses more agency than a small and vulnerable state, but lacks the structural 
position to dominate the international system’. The reason why the concept of middle power is important 
in relation to this chapter is that it places India, Brazil and South Africa in a global context. 
 
The three middle powers, India, Brazil and South Africa are all surrounded by states that are 
substantially poorer and much less developed than them, and thus much more marginalised. It is 
important to emphasize their position as middle powers due to the fact that this status sets them apart 
from their neighbours as more powerful states and is arguably the reason why the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
has more potential to succeed than other South- South collaborations. New Regionalism recognizes the 
fact that the world system is forever changing and that a state will never remain in a static position. A 
collaboration like the IBSA Dialogue Forum could thus prove to be beneficial for India, Brazil and South 
Africa’s respective regions if they are able to use their position as middle powers to alter the global 
structure.  
 
South Africa’s stance as a middle power can be highlighted by using the following example: Pretoria 
remains ‘independent’ over such issues as, for example, the Iraq war, relations with Cuba or the G-20+. 
Bond (1998) notes that South Africa is willing to go against the developing world, mainly the US and 
cooperate with Castro, Gaddaffi, and Arafat, but they are able to get away with this without serious 
repercussions as long as they are cooperating with the US in terms of controlling African geopolitics and 
endorse and promote neo-liberal economics. Such autonomy is not only a useful tool by which the 
government can prevent criticism of its essentially capitalist post-apartheid foreign policy but also, as in 
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the case of the G-20+ actually makes material sense (Taylor 2005: 9). In other words, in comparison to 
their neighbours, India, Brazil and South Africa are powerful actors in the world system. A middle power 
is more independent and has more leverage than developing states in general. Their position as middle 
powers means that they focus on multilateralism and it also means that the leaders have political and 
economic influence – consequently an alliance by such states is more likely to succeed than a coalition 
of weak states, offering hope that the IBSA Dialogue Forum will indeed foster economic growth and 
social development for the developing world. In addition to this, the position as middle powers also 
suggests something about the integration process. As mentioned earlier, peripheral states tend to 
integrate for different reasons than core states. While the latter organise in order to be better able to 
control the world, the latter organise with the purpose of diminishing the harm caused by the 
marginalisation process. IBSA countries are situated in the middle of core and periphery, and thus hold 
characteristics common in both these groupings. Consequently, a regionalisation effort needs to make 
space for these important attributes and their position as middle powers need to be highlighted. This 
thesis will therefore offer a section (below) on this concept. 
 
3.2 INDIA, BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA AS MIDDLE POWERS 
 
When discussing conventional middle powers, most writers are referring to countries such as Canada, 
Australia, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. These states gained the status of middle powers 
in the Cold War era as they did not have sufficient power to alter the structure (the US and the USSR 
were controlling this kind of power), but yet had sufficient power to use their positions to influences – not 
dominate – international decision-making bodies. Middle powers are often viewed as catalysts who 
promote global issues, facilitators in the process of building coalitions and managers acting within their 
region to promote and enforce norms and institutional rules. By the end of this chapter, it should be 
evident that the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are indeed ‘regional giants’ that are already able 
to some extent to influence international decision-making bodies. Closer cooperation between IBSA 
members will lead to a strengthening of the coalition and IBSA’s ability to influence the global order will 
grow according to the strength of the coalition.  
 
Middle powers justify their positions not on the basis of economic or military importance on the global 
stage, but rather through their activism in the name of international norms and their position as an 
intermediary for the states excluded from the ranks of power. This further highlights the fact that a 
successful IBSA Dialogue Forum might turn out to be beneficial for other countries than India, Brazil and 
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South Africa. Many of these three countries’ neighbours are weak states with close to no leverage in 
global forums. The presence of a strong coalition of the South which works towards, amongst other 
things, a more fair playing field in global forums could prove to be these countries’ best chance, as of 
yet, to improve their current dismal positions in the world structure.  
 
When the Cold War ended, conventional middle powers still remained middle powers, but they got 
company- whether they liked it or not. Some established middle powers felt threatened by the inclusion 
of middle powers from the South- these countries, for instance India (with their nuclear weapons), were 
far superior in military capabilities compared to a country such as Australia. However, they were also 
embraced due to the fact that an inclusion allowed for coalition building and the promotion of norms to 
become truly global. In other words, if the old middle powers had worked against an inclusion of these 
new countries, they would have, by definition, not have acted as middle powers. Countries like Brazil, 
India and South Africa all share complex relations with their respective regions, grounded in their 
superior economic and military position relative to other states. However, their neighbours also realises 
the special status these countries have as the regional powerhouse and the fact that they are 
subsequently much better equipped when negotiating with global powers (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1080).   
 
The position these three countries hold becomes evident through their presence being actively 
encouraged in multilateral settings such as the WTO and the G7 as the representatives of their regions. 
As such, one sees a paradox where these countries are viewed as representatives of their regions, but 
that their neighbours might not always be convinced that their interests are fairly represented by these 
regional hegemons. To use an example: Mozambique may not trust that South Africa is advocating 
Mozambique’s interests for instance in a G7 meeting, and might accuse South Africa of being solely 
motivated by self-interest. In this regard it is important to keep in mind that Mozambique will not in the 
foreseeable future be invited to attend such a meeting and having South Africa as a representative is 
likely to be more beneficial than having no one representing them at all, in other words they are 
choosing the lesser of two evils. In addition, Mozambique is in a stronger position when negotiating with 
South Africa than when facing for instance the US. Therefore, one could arguably suggest that India, 
Brazil and South Africa are all sound representatives for their respective regions and that the potential 
associated with this – assuming they take this role seriously- is endless.  
 
This short discussion of the concept of middle powers suggests that India, Brazil and South Africa has a 
very important role to play and that these countries have the power to ensure social and economic 
development not only in the three countries, but in their respective regions. It is important to highlight the 
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features of middle powers due to the fact that these set India, Brazil and South Africa aside from most 
other developing countries – a fact which is important to keep in mind in an analysis of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum since it could potentially mean that it is not only India, Brazil and South Africa that could 
benefit from a stronger IBSA Dialogue Forum, but also these three countries’ neighbouring states could 
potentially (and even unintentionally) benefit.  
 
While old theories of regional integration were accused of being Eurocentric in their analysis of regional 
cooperation efforts, this is not so for New Regionalism. The assumptions used in New Regionalism rests 
on a wide array of variables, a few of which are shared by India, Brazil and South Africa – and have 
been highlighted here. However, before exploring the foreign policies and consequently their attitude 
towards their neighbours, this paper will examine the demographics of India, Brazil and South Africa. 
This is done in order to get a better overview of the socio-economic situation of the countries. 
 
3.3 DEMOGRAPHICS AND FOREIGN POLICIES 
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum brings together three of the world’s most vibrant and globally active 
democracies of the South. In order to determine the potential of these three democracies it is necessary 
to explore the distinctiveness of each member – which is the focus of this section: to examine and 
compare the member countries of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. According to Womack (2006: 3-4) there is 
no question that India, Brazil and South Africa are all regional powers. He highlights the fact that each 
has quite a different relationship to their neighbours. India and Brazil are both central to their neighbours 
in every respect, but they differ in their exposure to global power as well as in their relationship with the 
next largest neighbour – Pakistan, in the case of India, and Argentina, in the case of Brazil. The 
peacefulness of regional relationships in Latin America has been remarkable, especially when keeping 
in mind that this has occurred despite intra-state violence.  Furthermore, South America and Africa are 
the two success cases in avoiding nuclear proliferation, in contrast to South Asia, Northeast Asia and 
the Middle East. As a consequence of this, the significance of regional institutions differs greatly. South 
Africa’s region is more ambiguous in many respects, but its political transformation in 1990-1994 
resulted in a transformation of its regional and global status, thus creating interesting pre/post 
comparisons for the same political entity. 
 
As argued by Womack (2006), and many others, there are many similarities between India, Brazil and 
South Africa, but also a substantial amount of dissimilarities. It is, therefore, essential to look at basic 
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economic and demographic data as well as on the three countries’ foreign policies, in order to create 
clarity on the similarities and the differences that exist. Table 1 illustrates basic data of India, Brazil and 
South Africa and it will be used in the rest of this chapter as a base of the comparison of these three 
countries. A brief comparison will be offered before focusing on the individual countries and at the end 
of this chapter there will be a summary of differences and similarities between India, Brazil and South 
Africa.  
 
Table 1: Basic economic and demographic data 
 
Indicator  South Africa  Brazil India 
Population (2009) (billion)  0.049 0.198  1.2 
Population living with AIDS (2008 est) (million)  5.7 0,73 5, 1 
Population growth (annual %) (2008)  1.1  1.2  1.4 
Life expectancy (years) 49 71.9 69.9 
Adult literacy rate (% of pop above 15yrs) (2008) 86.4 88.6 61.3 
GDP (purchasing power parity) (2008 est.) (billion US$)  490           1 990           3 267  
GDP (current $) (2008est) (billion US$)  300.4           1 665           1 237  
GDP real growth rate (ppp) (annual %) (2008 est.)   4.5  5.2  6.6 
GDP per capita (2008 est.) (US$)           10 000          10 100           2 800  
Unemployment rate (2008 est.) %  21.7 8  6.8 
Population living below US$2 per day (2008) 34.1 % 21.2 % 80.4 % 
Total exports (2008) (billlion) $36.77 $200 $175.7 
Exports of goods&services (% of GDP) (2004)  28.2  22.5  15.3 
Total imports (2008 est.) (billion) $33.89 $176 $287.5 
Imports of goods&services (% of GDP) (2004)  26.4  17.0  17.2 
External Debt (2008 est.) (billion) $44.33 $236.6 $163.8 
Public debt (% of GDP) (2008 est.)  29.9 40.7 78 
Gross Fixed Investment (% of GDP) (2008 est.)  20.1  18.6 39 
FDI (net inflows in reporting country) (2003) (billion) $0.82 $0.17 $4.3 
Aid per capita (current US$) (2003)  13.6  1.7  0.9 
HDI value (2008) 0.666 0.800 0.619 
HDI rank (out of 177 countries) (2008) 121 70 128 
Gini coefficient (2008) 57.8 57 36.8 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (www.imf.org)  
The World Bank (www.worldbank.com) 
 The CIA World Fact Book (www.cia.gov)  
 The UNCTAD (www.unctad.org)  
 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (www.undp.org) 
This table shows that more than 1.4 billion people live in these three countries combined, which 
encompasses approximately  20 percent of the world’s total population (Draper, Mills & White 2004: 1). 
This highlights the combined power these three countries hold. Separately they might not make up a 
large percentage of the world’s population (India is the obvious exception here), but combined they do. 
However, a powerful global position does not necessarily follow from having a large population and one 
 55 
observes that a large number of these people live below the poverty line. According to Table 1as much 
as 80.4 percent of India’s population lives on below US$ 2 per day, while the figures for Brazil and 
South Africa, respectively are 21.2 percent and 34.1percent. Despite the poor and relatively uneducated 
populations, India, Brazil and South Africa are still considered to have extensive global leverage – at 
least in certain fields – a position that would be further enhanced when they join forces (UNCTAD 14 
July 2008: internet).  
 
All these three countries are considered to have medium to low human development according to the 
UNDP’s Human Development Report (2008). Out of 177 countries, Brazil ranks number 70, South Africa 
ranks number 121 while India is only number 128. When examining literacy rates it becomes apparent 
that compared to other countries in the developing world India, Brazil and South Africa have relatively 
high literacy rates, but in comparison to the developed world these statistics are rather poor (with India 
having the smallest literate population out of the three). These two facts are well-aligned with the 
generally held view that these three countries are middle powers which possess some agency, but is 
still far from close to be in a position where they are referred to as very influential actors in the global 
structure.  
 
A further striking fact illustrated in Table 1 is the high Gini coefficient value in all these three leading 
countries of the South – a fact which corresponds with the argument raised above. The Gini coefficient 
is a measure of inequality developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini. The Gini coefficient 
measures the income inequality, and is a number between 0 and 100 (or between 0 and 1), where 0 
corresponds with perfect equality, while 100 corresponds with perfect inequality. Especially Brazil and 
South Africa have a very high level of inequality; in fact they are some of the world’s highest Gini 
coefficient values, indicating extremely large differences between the rich and the poor population (the 
World Bank 29 July 2009: internet). 
 
Although trade is not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning while India and Brazil are rather large 
markets (on a global scale), importing to the value of US$ 287.5 billion and US$ 187 billion, in 2008, this 
is not so for South Africa whose export was worth less than US$ 34 billion in the same year (refer to 
Table 1). The story is somewhat similar when it comes to exports – Brazil and India are large exporters 
at US$ 200 billion and US$ 175 billion, respectively. However, both South Africa and Brazil are net 
exporters, while India is a net importer. This holds important consequences for the economy on a whole, 
which is an entirely different topic altogether, but in this context it is sufficient to say that in terms of 
trade India and Brazil are important global actors while South Africa is still insignificant.  
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One very important indicator has not received any attention thus far – the GDP – or what is generally 
referred to as the size of the economy. The size of the GDP is of vital importance when discussing a 
country and its position in the world system. However, the following sections will thoroughly examine the 
three countries’ GDP as well as other characteristics in order to further accentuate commonalities and 
differences found amongst the IBSA coalition’s member states. However, a graph showing the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum’s members’, as well as China’s, GDP growth from the 1980s to 2008 will be included 
here. The reason why China is included is that the Chinese economy has, in the past decade, 
experienced growth rates which are unprecedented in recent history. In the graph below, which 
measures annual percentage changes of GDPs, one sees that, although far from stable, all four 
countries have experienced tremendous growth since the 1980s. 
  
Figure 1: GDP growth (annual % change) 









































































Brazil China India South Africa  
Source: IMF (www.imf.org)  
 
3.3.1 India 
India is one of the world’s largest economies, and by far the largest one in the IBSA coalition. Not only is 
it a large economy, but it is also a rapidly growing one. Section 3.3.1.1 further explores these facts as 
well as other characteristics of this large country. This is followed by a section dealing with India’s 
outlook, their foreign policy – in global as well as regional terms. This is done in order to highlight 




India is the world’s 12th
 
 largest economy with a GDP of US$ 3267 billion in 2008. Leading up to this 
strong position is a decade long sturdy GDP growth rate – an achievement surpassed by very few of the 
world’s economies. According to Aftenposten (10 July 2009: internet), India experienced an average 
economic growth of nine percent from 2003 to 2007. In other words, it is a force to be reckoned with, on 
its own, but even more so when in partnership with other powerful states of the South – states whose 
strengths differ from those of India’s. Despite the fact that India is one of the larger economies as many 
as 80 percent of the population live on less than two US$ a day (Aftenposten 10 July 2009: internet). 
However, the GDP growth rate was in 2008 estimated to have slowed down to 6.6 percent, this is hardly 
surprising though keeping in mind the current global financial crisis (that started in 2008). Regardless, of 
the so-called credit-crunch India’s economy is substantially larger (measured in purchasing power 
parity-PPP) than both Brazil’s and South Africa’s- where Brazil’s GDP (PPP) sits at less than two thirds 
of India’s US$ 3267 billion and South Africa’s mere US$ 490 billion (2008 estimates). However, 
measuring the GDP in current US$ the picture is different (which is the reason for including both PPP 
GDP and current US$ GDP in Table 1). The Indian GDP measured in current US$ is substantially lower 
than measured in PPP at US$ 1237 billion in 2008. Figure 1 shows that since 1996 the Indian GDP has 
experienced a relatively stable growth, peaking in 2006 when the Indian economy experienced a growth 
rate of almost 10 percent. One should note that while both South Africa’s and Brazil’s GDP 
measurement make intuitively sense, this is not so for India’s. In fact, measured in current $ the Indian 
GDP is actually lower than Brazil’s current US$ GDP (US$ 1665 billion in 2008). However, the 
imperative here is that India is, regardless of measurement used, a large economy in absolute terms – a 
fact which is accentuated by it being (in current US$) more than four times the size of the South African 
economy in 2008. 
The Indian economy is clearly strong and what’s more it has been growing rapidly in the past decade. 
This growth has slowed down over the past year as a consequence of the current financial crisis. 
However, the recent historic growth in India is worth exploring further. Sachs (2005: 16) points out that 
the new trends in India are incredibly powerful, especially within IT, textiles and apparel, electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, automotive components. These trends have led to India over the past decade having 
enjoyed economic growth ranging from 6 to 9 percent annually. Sachs argues that India has ‘started to 
nip at the heels of China’s growth rates’, and investors all over the world are warming to the notion of 
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establishing operations, from IT to manufacturing to research and development, in the fast-growing 
Indian economy. This suggests that the tremendous Indian growth rate is likely to continue.  
 
However, despite the thriving Indian economy the GDP per capita is low (US$ 2800 in 2008) and a 
quarter of the population live below the poverty line (refer to Table 1) and according to the UNDP it is 
positioned low on the Human Development Index (number 128 in 2008) – all indicating its status as a 
developing state. However, further economic growth has the possibility – if combined with the right 
policies – to improve India’s gloomy socio-economic indicators. (CIA 10 May 2009: internet). 
  
At the same time as the Indian economy is a large one on a global scale, the country is also in 
possession of nuclear power and is considered to be the world’s third largest military power 
(Aftenposten 10 July 2009: internet). As discussed in the previous session, this is a classical middle 
power dilemma. The possession of nuclear power has made some countries view India as a threat to 
stability – both in the region as well as globally. This create a paradoxical situation where, their military 
capabilities has partly led to India’s leading position in the region, but it could also hamper future growth 
– due to the suspicious light other states views India in because of the fear attached to their nuclear 
power capabilities. Hence one sees great growth potential in the Indian economy, but the realisation of 
this potential depends on how efficient Indian politicians handle the current threats to economic growth.  
 
3.3.1.2 India’s outlook: Foreign policy, with special focus on regional integration 
 
A country’s foreign policy is a set of goals outlining a country’s behaviour towards other countries and 
non-state actors in terms of economics, politics, social and military issues. A country’s foreign policy 
should theoretically (or ideally) be a reflection of the will and interests of its people. This becomes a 
difficult task when dealing with countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa due to their 
heterogeneous population – a further feature shared by the three members of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum. One of the commonalities between these three countries is that within their borders one finds 
multiple population groups, widely varying religious beliefs and a diversity of cultures. For instance, a 
Hindu in the south of India might have a very differing view of what should be the focus of India’s foreign 
policy to a Muslim in the northern parts of the country.  
 
India’s foreign policy is inextricably tied to the domestic tension between the Hindu majority and the 
Muslim minority as well as other ethnic, separatist and social strains which has forced politicians to 
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concentrate on getting the balancing act right often drawing attention away from efficient policy planning 
and implementation.  
 
India, South Africa and Brazil are all regional giants. India dominates the South Asia region by the virtue 
of its large geographical size and population, economic extent and military might. Within South Asia 
itself India’s position has been systematically challenged by Pakistan, ever since the latter broke away 
to form a separate Muslim state. Pakistan’s already sceptical view of India was reinforced by the fact 
that India played a decisive role in the break-up of Pakistan and the subsequent founding of 
Bangladesh. The animosity that ensued has been referred to as a localised version of the Cold War due 
to the fact that the rivalry has strongly influenced decision makers’ analysis of other regional issues and 
affected the actions of smaller states (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1087).    
 
Historically, India’s commitment to an open market economy has been rather limited. The creation of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1983 represented a step towards 
reconciliation with the region as well as an opportunity to shift the balance of trade towards local 
sources – a shift from the previous outward orientation. Unfortunately, the SAARC proved to be nothing 
more than an annual diplomatic get-together – an example of an inefficient South-South collaboration. 
However, since the early 1990s India has taken decisive steps to liberalise its economy through 
embracing privatisation and independent management of formerly excluded areas of the domestic 
economy: In addition to this more latitude was given to state governments in order to encourage foreign 
direct investment – a step which has, judging by the current FDI figure, been extremely successful 
(Alden & Vieira 2005: 1087).  
 
More recently, one sees that India and Asian economies have in general recovered from the Asian crisis 
and have not only regained their position, but have also shown greater resilience in many ways. Current 
IFI reports suggest that there are generally improved corporate governance, stronger supervision, 
healthier fiscal and balance of payments positions and higher reserves. From 1980 to 2005, intra-Asian 
trade increased steadily from 34.6 percent to 54.5 percent of the region’s total world trade. The positive 
developments subsequent to the Asian crisis have led to Asia emerging as the third largest (measured 
in size and importance) area of trade integration in the world (behind the EU and NAFTA). Asia has 
emerged as the manufacturing global supply chain; initially built around Japan, but increasingly China 
(and to a lesser extent India) has begun to play a significant role. In the software and Information 
Technology (IT) services, India is, as mentioned above, emerging as the hub of the global services 
supply chain. However, like many other emerging markets India’s financial sector lags behind its 
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manufacturing prowess and remains bank dominated (Sheng in Kohli 2008: 175-177) – a fact which will 
be further explored in Chapter Five. 
 
Much has been said, and written on China’s remarkable economic growth over the past decade. This is 
not the topic of this thesis, but it is should be mentioned due to the fact that many economists have 
predicted that India is likely to follow China with a lag of about 10 to 15 years. Both Brazil and Russia 
have been popularly linked to China and India as, what Goldman Sachs termed, the so-called BRIC 
(Brazil-Russia-India-China) countries. This is because of their high growth from relatively low GDP 
levels, accelerating materials consumption per capita and large population bases (USB 2007: 9). 
Therefore, India is a force to be reckoned with and if the country continues on this tremendous growth 
path (as predicted by most economists) its ability to influence global development will only increase. The 
IBSA Dialogue Forum is likely to also increase their leverage in international fora as the economies of 
the member states grow.  
 
3.3.2 Brazil 
Brazil is geographically the largest country in South America. The country shares common boundaries 
with every South American countries country except Chile and Ecuador – a fact which holds 
consequences for Brazil’s foreign policies. In addition to this, it is also the largest economy in Latin 




In terms of population, Brazil is larger than South Africa, but substantially smaller than India. The official 
figure varies, but according to the CIA World Fact Book, an estimated 198 million people lived in Brazil 
at the beginning of 2009 (with a population growth rate of 1.2 percent). Like its counterparts, Brazil’s 
population is heterogeneous where a wide array of population groups refers to themselves as Brazilian. 
Furthermore, one also identifies diverse cultural aspects as well as representation of many noticeably 
differing religious group. It goes without saying that with such diversity it is difficult to ensure that the 
entire population relates to the domestic policy and subsequently the foreign policies will not be an 
extension of the whole of Brazil’s population’s wills and interests, however, the next section will look at 
Brazil’s foreign policies. This one will examine the demographics of South America’s largest country. 
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A characteristic which further illustrates Brazil’s differing nature is that, according to IBSA (02 May 2009: 
internet), Brazil occupies roughly 47 percent of Latin-America’s land area and the country possesses 20 
percent of the world’s biodiversity, a large share of which is found in the Amazon rainforests. A large 
amount of this enormous land area is used productively. Characterized by large and well-developed 
agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other 
South American countries and is expanding its presence in world markets (CIA 2 May 2009: internet).  
 
Brazil’s economic indicators suggest that although this is a large economy, it also has substantial 
problems – quite typical of a developing state. The unemployment rate is low – 8 percent in 2008 – but 
still as much as 31 percent of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line. Consequently, 
despite the relatively high literacy rate – 86.4 percent – one sees that many Brazilian have not benefited 
from a GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent. This is further highlighted by a Gini coefficient of 57 – 
suggesting that the inequalities are extremely high (although not as high as in South Africa, which is to 
be discussed in the next session) (CIA 28 April 2009: internet).  
 
Brazil’s has the highest external debt of the three members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (US$ 236.6 
billion in 2008), Since da Silva came to power in 2003 the focus of the economy has been to ensure 
economic growth while reducing the debt burden. This has led to inflationary pressure and is possible 
the reason why the external debt is currently still very high. In addition to this, Brazil has the lowest FDI 
of all the three countries and Gross Fixed Investment only constitutes 18.6 percent of GDP, a couple of 
percentages lower than South Africa’s and substantially lower than that of India (CIA 28 April 2009: 
internet). This combination of high debt and low investment is clearly harmful to the goal of achieving 
economic growth and Brazil would do well trying to change this current pattern. One option could be for 
Brazil to facilitate increased foreign investment through joining other powerful emerging markets and 
use the IBSA Dialogue Forum as a platform to attract investors to their country and their region – an 
opportunity that will be further discussed in Chapter Five . 
 
3.3.2.2 Brazil’s view of the world: foreign policies in general, regional integration in particular 
 
Brazil’s dominant position in South America is a product of its geography, population, economic status 
and military capacity. The focus of Brazilian foreign policies has been to run two separate, but 
coordinated approaches simultaneously. The first approach concerns itself with actively seeking a form 
of partnership with the US, while the second one makes multilateralism the centre of attention and 
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focuses on how multilateralism can be used as a means to enhance Brazil’s status as an influential 
global actor – the latter approach being typical of a middle power. Bøås, Marchand & Shaw (2005: 13) 
refers to these two approaches as the ‘Latin American-led regionalism’ originating in Bolívar’s Pan-
American dream, and ‘US visions of a cooperating Latin America’ originating in the Monroe Doctrine. 
Currently, the most important expressions of the two competing forms of regionalism are Brazilian-led 
Mercosur pursuing a multidimensional regionalism on the one hand, and the US-led neoliberal project of 
creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) on the other. 
 
In the early 1990s, most of Latin America embraced the pro-market reforms which are generally referred 
to as the Washington Consensus: market liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation – Brazil was no 
exception. In this period, the world witnessed a growth in regional trade agreements unprecedented in 
history. The reason for this proliferation was the threat of deadlock during GATT’s Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The fear of a WTO failure drove countries to focus on Regional Trade 
Agreements (Sampson & Woolcock 2003: xiii; Bach in Grant & Söderbaum  2003: 21). One of the 
consequences of this was the formation of Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Cone Common Market) 
or Mercosur in 1994.  As a result, trade initially surged, but the dominance of the Brazilian economy 
over the region was underscored by the unilateral decision to devalue the Brazilian currency in 1999 – 
which again led to the meltdown of the Argentinean economy. An example of the weaknesses 
associated with regionalism showing that even a newly founded benevolent relationship could have a 
negative impact on its neighbours (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1084-1085). 
 
The election of Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva as the Brazilian President in 2003 was an indication of the 
changes that were to occur in tone and substance of Brazil’s foreign policy. The focus shifted towards 
the South, illustrated by Lula’s numerous high-profile visits to Africa, Southeast Asia and China. Da 
Silva is a former trade unionist and much aligned with his idealistic convictions he turned focus towards 
bringing economic growth and development to the South. To understand da Silva’s foreign policy and 
the focus on trilateralism, it is important to bear in mind that much emphasism is still placed on 
previously defined and implemented policies. In other words, the relationship with the US was still 
important while multilateralism remained the word of the day and da Silva continued to invest in 
cooperative arrangements between middle power states. The new aspect was the strong focus on the 
South and to create formalized coalitions of regional powerhouses that could pool their material and 
principled assets together to achieve national interests in multilateral fora of negotiation (Alden & Vieira 
2005: 1085-1086).  
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To explore the more practical consequences of Brazil’s foreign policy program, it should be mentioned 
that Brazil’s economic program consists of three pillars. These three pillars are a floating exchange rate, 
an inflation-targeting regime, and tight fiscal policy, all reinforced by a series of IMF programs (CIA 02 
May 2009: internet). While economic management has been good, there remain important economic 
vulnerabilities. The most significant are debt-related: the government's large domestic debt increased 
steadily from 1994 to 2003 – until da Silva came to power. This debt burden obviously strained 
government finances, but the pressure eased as the debt burden as a percentage of GDP started falling 
in 2005. However, Brazil's foreign debt (a mix of private and public debt) remains large (even if it has 
decreased) in relation to Brazil's small (but growing) export base. Thus another challenge facing da 
Silva and his labour party is maintaining economic growth over a period of time to generate employment 
and make the government debt burden more manageable (CIA 12 May 2009: internet).  
 
Before ending the section on Brazil’s foreign policy one important aspect needs to be mentioned, 
namely the fact that the domestic support for trilateralism is limited. This means that a trilateral 
partnership is under constant threat since da Silva needs to appease his electorate. His attempt to 
create deeper connections with the South has been criticised due to the fact that a segment of the 
population feel that their interests are threatened since currently the markets of the South are minute in 
comparison with the markets of the US and the EU (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1086). These critics argue that 
it is of paramount importance that export growth is facilitated and believe this is easier achieved in the 
North. As a consequence, da Silva has to continue the two-folded focus of foreign policy – one strand 
focusing on the US and the other one on multilateralism. The amount of effort spent on the latter will 
determine Brazil’s contributions to IBSA and subsequently its success.  
 
3.3.3 South Africa 
South Africa is geographically much smaller than India and Brazil – more importantly, it is also smaller 
both in economic terms and measured in military capabilities. However, South Africa is a giant on the 
African continent (especially in the sub-Saharan region) and is furthermore known to perform above 
perceived potential on the international arena. Hence, the prospective role of South Africa in a coalition 






In terms of real GDP (measured in current US$), South Africa is far behind India and Brazil equalling 
only a quarter of India’s GDP, and less than a fifth of Brazil’s. This suggests that it is fair to argue that 
South Africa’s position in the world system compared to its counterparts, India and Brazil, is that of a 
marginalized country in terms of economic size and demographics as illustrated in Table 1. However, 
South Africa is still instrumental in relation to the IBSA Dialogue Forum due to it being one of the most 
influential countries in the multilateral arena with the most liberalised and globally integrated economy of 
the three (White & Skidmore 2004: 168). Furthermore, when looking at GDP per capita, South Africa is 
performing considerably better than India and only in the past year has Brazil reached GDP per capita 
levels that are on par with those of South Africa. This illustrates that even if the economy in itself is 
rather small the population is on average substantially richer than the average Indian population. In 
addition to this, South Africa enjoys hegemonic status in sub-Saharan Africa – an important feature – as 
established in the section above dealing with middle powers. Furthermore, Draper, Mills and White 
(2004: 8) argue that South Africa is known to ‘punch above its weight’ in global Forums – making it an 
invaluable member of a coalition like the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
Even if South Africa’s GDP has grown steadily since 1994, South Africa’s position on the UN Human 
Development Index has worsened from being number 89 in 1998 to number 128 in 2008. A position that 
is feared to deteriorate now due to the fact that the South African economy is likely to move towards 
recession as a result of  the global economic crisis (Aftenposten 10 July 2009: internet). A further aspect 
accentuating this is the high Gini coefficient (at 57.8 in 2008) which indicates that the wealth is in the 
hands of a small group of people, while the majority of the population is living in absolute poverty. This 
is further emphasised by both the unemployment rate (which officially was at 21.7 percent in 2008 
although many economists argues that the actual rate is substantially higher- often suggested to be as 
high as 40 percent) and the 2007 estimate of  50 percent of the population living below the poverty line 
(UNDP 14 July 2009: online). 
  
As a consequence of its dismal performance on the HDI, its high unemployment rate and the fact that 
poverty is widespread South Africa receives a considerable amount of foreign aid – the total of US$ 13.6 
per inhabitant. This is significantly more than Brazil who receive US$ 1.7 and India at 0.9 per capita. In 
addition to this South Africa has a smaller external debt as well as public debt – just over US$ 44billion 
and 30 percent of GDP, respectively. When it comes to investment, as indicated in Table 1, gross fixed 
investment equals roughly 20 percent of GDP (half of India, but a couple of percentages higher than the 
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case of Brazil) (UNCTAD 12 September 2009: internet). In terms of FDI, a topic that will be further 
discussed in Chapter Five, it is evident that the inflow to South Africa in 2008 was equal to US$ 820 
million. In other words, South Africa is well behind India when it comes to FDI inflow (US$ 4.3 billion), 
but ahead of Brazil’s US$ 170 million (UNCTAD 12 September 2009: internet). Keeping in mind these 
three countries’ debt the importance of increased investment is highlighted. Investment is in general 
needed in order to achieve growth objectives, but the need only increases when high debt figures are 
added. One way of attracting investors to the Southern hemisphere is through an increased focus on 
investment (and the facilitation of it) in the IBSA Dialogue Forum. If these countries manage to make it 
attractive for people, its own population as well as foreigners, to invest in these three countries, the 
growth they have all been experiencing over the past decade could be amplified. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter Five, dealing with the concept of emerging markets and investment (CIA 02 May 
2009: internet).   
 
3.3.3.2 South Africa in Africa and in the world 
 
South Africa’s has historically had a dominant economic position on the African continent, especially 
when considering sub-Saharan Africa – a position the country still holds today. When the African 
National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994 they were democratic socialists in orientation. 
However, a shift occurred, not necessarily completely away from social democratic ideals, but there was 
a stronger influence of neo-liberal ideas as soon as the ANC came to power. Consequently, attention 
was placed on opening markets and strengthening trade and foreign investment became the ideal 
source of capital accumulation. In addition to this there was an inclination towards multilateralism in 
foreign policy – this was reinforced by negative responses to South Africa’s unilateralism among African 
states and it mirrors aspects of classic middle power strategy as the new government sought to 
leverage its material deficiencies through recourse to international organisations. Where South Africa 
differed from established middle power was that it sought to position itself within the institutional and 
ideational framework of Southern international organisation such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(Alden & Vieira 2005: 1083).  
 
Under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa grew increasingly confident in the promotion of its position 
as the ‘natural leader’ of the African continent, leading to the establishment of the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Nepad sought to engage industrialised countries in a 
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programme of trade and development assistance to foster development within African countries. Much 
aligned with this was the South African Department of Trade and Industry’s launch of the ‘butterfly 
strategy’ where Africa was the body and the wings extending out westwards towards South-America 
and eastwards towards Asia (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1083). 
  
The reason behind the ‘butterfly strategy’ is the fact that a partnership with South American countries 
carries immense possibilities for South Africa. A strategic partnership has been developing between 
South Africa and Brazil since the early 1990s. The political affinity between these two leaders of the 
South helped initiate and galvanise Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)-Mercosur relations, despite 
the relatively low levels of growth in trade. An agreement was signed during President Mbeki’s visit to 
Brazil at the end of 2000. However, very little progress was subsequently made. The SACU-Mercosur 
free-trade agreement (FTA) seems to have become a lame duck and relations with Mercosur have 
earned the reputation of being a ‘long process with little progress.’ Political will, especially between 
Brazil and South Africa, has clearly been the driving force behind SACU-Mercosur relations. This 
originates from likeminded governments, which share a commitment toward priorities of human 
development and international integration. This is what New Regionalism refers to as formal integration 
which tends to be unsuccessful unless accompanied by informal integration – so-called regionalisation. 
The problem with focusing narrowly on trade issues in a collaboration between South Africa and Brazil, 
or SACU and Mercosur, is that both regions produce the same products at the same time of the year 
and are thus competitors in international markets (White & Skidmore 2004: 163-166). 
 
So far these regional giants from the three developing continents seem to be compatible in some areas 
and they are extremely incompatible in other areas. In other words, while there is a lot to gain in certain 
sectors there are other parts where these three countries, or regions, are staunch competitors operating 
in a zero-sum game situation. The potential for instance, viewed with South African eyes, of the Asian 
market represents immense opportunities in the metals, automotive and components, and agro-
processing sectors. As a key emerging economy, India remains a strategic partner for South Africa and 
great potential exists for increased trade and technology ties between the two countries. Opportunities 
for closer cooperation include the mining, capital equipment, agro-processing, automotive and 
components, information and communications technology (ICT), and services sectors (White & 
Skidmore 2004: 161-163). 
 
It seems as if South Africa, much like its counterparts in the IBSA Dialogue Forum is geared towards 
South-South cooperation. However, it is important to keep in mind that in South Africa, similarly to in 
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India and Brazil, there are powerful segments of the population that do not agree with this strong 
political and economic focus on trilateralism. Outside the business society and the black elite in South 
Africa the country’s foreign policy seems out of touch with many key domestic constituencies and it is 
constrained by an absence of resources. With such a large proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line and with one of the world’s highest unemployment rate the pursuit of neoliberalism at home 
and abroad has had to face severe criticism. However, much effort has been put into this coalition from 
the South African side and no segment of the South African society seems to object to shifting the focus 
towards economic growth and development – something an efficient IBSA Dialogue Forum could assist 




This chapter has illustrated that the real strength of the IBSA Dialogue Forum is found in the narrow 
membership allowing for a more efficient and focused collaboration and a common, strong position in 
international fora. Furthermore, it has been established that the leverage and combined weight of these 
three countries is unprecedented in any previous examples of South-South cooperation.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that this is not a coalition among equals – the geographic and economic 
size and dimensions of these three countries are far from equal. However, the differences between 
these states need not prevent it from becoming a successful coalition. They might be different in terms 
of economic size and capabilities, but as this thesis has argued so far, there are also important 
similarities – and the fact that they are different could be turned to their advantage – provided that the 
countries are able to take advantage of each other strengths to build an even stronger coalition. One 
very important similarity, which could prove to be (and possibly has been) the glue that holds the 
coalition together is the fact that they share some important characteristics, in the form that they are all 
middle powers, emerging markets seeking to ensure economic growth in the South through, amongst 
other things, a more fair global system. 
 
Demographically, there are some common strengths and some common weaknesses, in addition to this 
it has become evident that there is not one ‘leader’ amongst the three members of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum. What is meant here is that there is not one country that is performing better than the other two 
on the majority of indicators. In order to use an example to illustrate this, one sees that while India is by 
far larger than Brazil and South Africa geographically as well as in terms of absolute GDP, this is not the 
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case when it comes to GDP per capita – where South Africa and Brazil are as good as equal at 
approximately US$ 10000 per capita while India’s population only have on average US$ 2800 (Table 1) 
(www.imf.org). In other words, measured in absolute terms it might seem as if India is by far 
outperforming its counterparts, but when one examines the per capita GDP it becomes apparent that 
Brazil and South Africa are in effect performing better than India. This also seems to be the case in 
other respects as well leading to a situation where not one country can constantly dominate the two 
others. Instead it allows the IBSA members to utilize each other’s strengths to build a stronger coalition 
– which again will yield more power to the individual members. Consequently, one sees that the 
member’s have managed not to be caught up with the differences between them, but instead placed 
focus on their like-mindedness and the possibility to achieve national interests through cooperating 
closely with offer different, but compatible, middle powers of the South. 
  
In short, there is not one country that dominates in all fields – they each dominate in some fields. If they 
are able to take advantage of each other’s strengths and have a cooperation where whoever is the 
strongest can lead, this coalition could indeed become a very strong regional cooperation – one which 
has the leverage to improve the developing world’s position in the current global order. Here, one sees 
the benefit of the inclusion of a multitude of factors in the New Regionalism framework. If one had a 
narrow focus, on for instance trade, it would be difficult to argue that further integration amongst IBSA 
members would be beneficial to all of them. The reason for this being that there would be no reason for 
the dominating power to cooperate with the two weaker ones. However, the combination of the IBSA 
members being leaders in differing fields and the fact that New Regionalism argues for the inclusion of 
multiple variables highlights the potential benefits associated with further integration of the members of 
the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
While this chapter has focused on the three IBSA members as separate entities, the next one will 










The IBSA Dialogue Forum was established in June 2003. Central to the IBSA Dialogue Forum’s mission 
was the goal of democratizing global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization (as well as other Bretton Woods institutions). In addition, these three giants from the South 
wanted to clarify and coordinate the ideal of bringing economic growth and social development to the 
South – and hence ensure poverty alleviation.  
 
The idea of building a coalition of developing countries, as indicated below, is far from a new one. A 
coordinated approach within the developing world has been deemed vital, as a part of a reformist 
approach to the world system. The G-20+ and the IBSA Dialogue Forum are the latest manifestations of 
this approach. In 1998, South African President Thabo Mbeki (cited in Taylor 2005: 7) addressed the 
NAM ministerial meeting and asserted that: 
 
‘[I]t is vital that the NAM and the Group of 77 plus China should have a common, co-ordinated 
and strategic approach in their interactions with organisations of the North such as the G8 and 
European Union. We must ensure that the benefits of the twin processes of globalization and 
liberalization accrue to all of our countries and peoples and that its potential threats and risks 
are accordingly mitigated. It is therefore incumbent upon the Movement to continue being in the 
forefront of efforts to ensure the full integration of the developing countries’ economies into the 
global economy. It is to our mutual benefit that we continue advocating for a new, transparent 
and accountable financial architecture.’  
 
This statement by then-President Mbeki illustrates the foundation upon which the establishment of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum was based – the need to alter the global structures to ensure that it becomes 
more democratic to hinder further marginalisation of the countries of the South. In other words, Mbeki 
stresses the need to ensure that the developing countries are able to curb the adverse consequences of 
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globalisation. He furthermore, highlights the importance of a united stance by the developing world 
when negotiating with the much more powerful countries of the developed world.  
 
Although the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established to, inter alia, improve political cooperation in the 
South and to ensure UN Security reform, one sees a new momentum toward alternatives for 
development and economic reform has emerged in the more recent trilateral discussions. Aligned with 
these goals the IBSA Dialogue Forum has suggested alternatives to the currently accepted economic 
orthodoxy, debunking some of the approaches to development advocated by credit lending agencies 
and from the developed world. Mokoena (SAIIA 2007: 125) highlights the changes that have occurred: 
‘What began primarily as a political alliance, IBSA’s agenda now extends to trilateral cooperation on 
trade, security, bio-fuels, social development, and research and development’. 
  
This chapter will, firstly, explore the reason for the formation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. It will, in doing 
so, establish in which global structure this coalition came into being, the rationale behind the foundation 
of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, what the members set out to achieve and what they continue to do to 
ensure that these goals are realized. Secondly, it will use the New Regionalist framework to examine 
the developments that have taken place since initiation and explore which possible directions the 
coalition could move in, in order to best promote the members’ interests.  
 
4.2 EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IBSA DIALOGUE 
FORUM 
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum was established in 2003 and is thus a very recent coalition. This fact is 
important to highlight when analysing the Forum and its achievements, and the expectations of it should 
be adjusted accordingly. The argument for the need of a stronger, more united South was however not 
a recent idea. For instance, in March 2000 South Africa, Brazil, India, Nigeria and Egypt met in Cairo, 
Egypt, to launch a developing nations’ trade bloc to challenge the G-7 in the post-Seattle, US, meeting 
of WTO negotiations. South Africa has been particularly eager to forge a common strategy and 
approach to global trade and development. In 2000, South Africa’s Foreign Minister at the time,  
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma asserted that a select group of developing countries should ‘form a nucleus of 
countries in the South that can interact on behalf of developing countries’ (cited in Taylor 2005: 11). 
Dlamini-Zuma’s idea came closer to becoming a reality when the participants at the G-77 meeting in 
Havana, Cuba, in April 2000 adopted a resolution aligned with Mbeki’s and Dlamini-Zuma’s vision of a 
united developing world within global trading bodies such as the WTO. Indeed, the G-77 summit was 
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viewed as the starting point of a collective process which would come to affect the future of the global 
system, sending ‘a clear message to the developed countries that their reluctance to reform the 
international financial system is a major threat to international peace and security’ (Taylor 2005: 11). 
However, the list of success stories resulting from this cooperation is short, arguably due to the fact that 
too many and too different countries were involved. These countries did not succeed in furthering their 
national interests through this initiative and consequently the enthusiasm which surrounded the Havana 
meeting soon ceased to exist.   
 
Significant changes occurred only two years later. South Africa, Brazil and India played a key role in the 
establishment of the G-20+ ahead of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico, which followed 
the breakdown of the WTO meeting in Seattle. Appendix 1 offers a list of the current members of the G-
20+, the number of members has been varying which is the reason for referring to this grouping as G-
20+. Events leading up to this the establishment of this grouping were, amongst others, the 2000 Cairo 
meeting and the subsequent Havana meeting – therefore one cannot claim that these initiatives were a 
complete failure. Rather one could argue that in order to succeed the scope and strategy needed to be 
altered. The immediate impetus behind the formation of the G-20+ was the fact that certain deadlines 
relating to the construction of a framework for the reduction of agricultural subsidies, agreed to at the 
WTO’s Doha Round, were missed before the Cancún meeting. The motive for the G-20+’s formation 
was summed up by the Brazilian Permanent Representative to the WTO, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa 
(cited in Taylor 2005: 12), when he asserted that: 
 
‘What prompted the creation of this group in the WTO was a recurrent phenomenon that we 
think has to be changed in order to cope with the new realities of multilateral negotiations. There 
is the belief or understanding that everything can be solved when the two majors get together 
and carve out a deal that represents their convergence of interests. And that the rest of the 
world, being so disunited or being so fragmented or having so many different perspectives, 
ends up one by one being co-opted into an agreement – or lack of an organizational 
framework’. 
 
In other words, one sees that the idea of a united negotiation front against the developed world remains, 
but that one has learnt from previous mistakes and take care not to make the coalition too large. Instead 
the strongest representatives of the South joined forces in order to achieve a goal. Consequently, the 
action taken by these dominating countries of the South was a reaction to the global structures of the 
time (structures that have arguably not changed much since then). This joining of forces has the 
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potential to become beneficial for most countries in the South. These powerful countries were India, 
Brazil and South Africa and their cooperation ahead of to the Cancún WTO meeting indirectly led to the 
establishment of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum.  
 
Before further exploring the IBSA Dialogue Forum it is worth lingering on the global structure forming the 
backdrop which initiated the birth of this coalition. This is important due to the fact that it highlights why 
and how the foundation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum came about. Globalisation has often been accused 
of engendering division and inequity across and within states, where the developing states generally 
carry the adverse effect of this process. The fact that the globalisation process seems to benefit the 
developed world at the expense of the developing states led Thabo Mbeki to refer to the process and its 
consequences as ‘global apartheid’ (Taylor 2005: 2). As a consequence of this, South Africa’s foreign 
policy has, since the 1994 elections, but particularly under the presidency of Mbeki, to an increasingly 
extent started adopting a reformist stance towards the global system. Activism has been particularly 
focussed on multilateral initiatives and alliance-building amongst like-minded states, such as for 
instance India and Brazil, in order to further an agenda that seeks to curb the perceived negative 
outcomes of globalisation, whilst also seeking to open up the markets of the developed world. Even 
though South Africa’s diplomacy is, perhaps as expected, implicitly statist, such bargaining coalitions 
are of increasing interest and importance in pushing positions in the emerging global trade regime 
(Taylor 2005: 2). Similarly, in Brazil the inauguration of Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva as the country’s 
President heralded a shift in their foreign policy focus, which was discussed in Chapter Three. It is thus 
often argued that these two countries, South Africa and Brazil are the driving forces behind the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum and that they view it, more so than India, as a vital mean to further their national 
interests.  
 
Most of the work of the G-20 so far has focused on making emerging markets less vulnerable to 
financial crises. The current global financial crisis should allow one to determine whether this task has 
been successfully achieved. Relatively little time and resources has been on the very important issue of 
market access. The lack of access to the US and the European market for the developing world is 
something which has been of a great concern for key developing countries with relatively strong 
agricultural export sectors, such as for instance South Africa and Brazil. The unwillingness by developed 
countries to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, especially on agriculture and textiles, has become an 
increasingly serious concern in the developing world (Taylor 2005: 5). In other words, it is apparent that 
it is indeed a long way to go for India, Brazil and South Africa – the tasks they have given themselves 
are by no measure small and will require continuous efforts on their parts.  
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Through the construction of a reformist-inclined coalition with key strategic partners, the IBSA members 
hoped to build an alliance that would be taken more seriously than the G-15 and G-77 groupings, which 
were hamstrung by dissimilar attitudes towards globalisation and with some of its members lacking 
credibility in the eyes of the G-7. South Africa’s role in this is worth further exploring. With a form of 
credibility derived from Mbeki’s image as a philosopher-king (the ‘African Renaissance’ and the NEPAD 
is a vital part of this imagery), and his credentials as a neoliberalist and the architect of his government’s 
Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) programme gaining him sound points in G-7 capitals, 
Mbeki seemed ideally placed to pursue a reformist agenda at the various multilateral bodies that deal 
with global trade issues. Playing a leading role in both the G-20+ and the IBSA initiative fits perfectly 
within this analysis (Taylor 2005: 11). This role of South Africa is of paramount importance due to the 
fact that although India and Brazil are arguably stronger than South Africa the latter’s diplomatic skills 
and global position stresses its importance in the IBSA Dialogue Forum. 
 
Consequently, one sees that at the time of the formation a large part of the developing world had 
reached a point where their foreign policy was driven by the push to ensure justice in the international 
system. They had for many years been on the losing side of various international negotiations and had 
tried in various ways to change this – albeit without success. They realized that first of all; their position 
was too weak compared to their counterparts in the North. Secondly, when they attempted to join force 
with other equally weak states of the South, such cooperation tended to fail. One of the reasons for 
failure was the fact that they had difficulties aligning their interests, making it easy for the much richer 
and more powerful countries to hamper cooperation of the South if this served their self-interests. 
Especially in WTO negotiations there are many examples of how a relatively strong coalition from the 
South has been ruined when a powerful country of the North has managed to coerce a developing 
country to vote against the interests of the alliance, through pressurising the country to not stick to the 
promises it has made its allies. This kind of behaviour, and the subsequent feeling of powerlessness, 
has been one of the strongest factors motivating developing countries to collaborate in order to try to 
democratise the international system. So far, the IBSA Dialogue Forum seems to be the first successful 
attempt at achieving this goal.  
 
Less successful historical examples of collaborations of the South include, for example, the Zone of 
Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) and the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). New 
Regionalism explains such failures as a result of a lack of clear agenda leading to these countries not 
being able to serve national interests thus not allowing for a strengthening of the parts through a 
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strengthening of the whole – as the whole is far from being strengthened. A further reason for the failure 
of these (and others such as the G77) was the large membership base. Combined with a broad agenda 
no constructive progress was made and these initiatives became no more than annual talk-shops.  
Mokoena (SAIIA 2007: 141) argues that the experience of earlier attempts at South-South cooperation 
(such as the ones mentioned above) has shown that alliances without a specific mandate and a too 
broad membership base have neither advocated the interests of developing countries nor challenged 
the global power balance. It follows that much of the interest surrounding IBSA stems from its more 
focused approach to cooperation.  The IBSA Dialogue Forum differs from these previous versions of 
South-South cooperation not only due to a more clearly stipulated agenda, but also due to its narrow 
membership base. In addition, the political commitment to the IBSA Dialogue Forum is clearly evident 
and the member states seem prepared to invest more than only time and effort into its success.  
 
4.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE IBSA DIALOGUE 
FORUM 
 
4.3.1 The Brasília Declaration 
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum’s first official document was the Brasília Declaration of June 2003 (Appendix 
2). This meeting in Brasília was attended by the Foreign Ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa. The 
Brasília Declaration is a fairly short document, with relatively vague goals – a fact which will be 
illustrated below. It was highlighted in this document that all three governments needed to prioritize the 
promotion of social equity and inclusion through implementing effective policies to fight hunger and 
poverty, to support family run farms, and to promote food security, health, social assistance, 
employment, education, human rights and environmental protection (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). This 
illustrates a very important commonality between India, Brazil and South Africa: all three countries 
struggle with massive social and economic inequalities. This weakness, combined with a strong will to 
do something about this situation, unites them. In addition to this, they jointly have the capabilities to 
carry through this will of change. Furthermore, the IBSA members recognize that a way to improve the 
rather grave socio-economic statistics is through an alliance like the IBSA Dialogue Forum. This is 
accordance to New Regionalism viewing regional cooperation as an emerging phenomenon, 
ambiguously forming part of and driving, but also reacting against and modifying, the process of 
globalisation. Hence, New Regionalism offers an approach to altering the relatively marginalised 
 75 
position the IBSA Dialogue Forum members hold in the global system – a position that could otherwise 
become worsened by further globalisation.  
 
The third point of the Brasília Declaration states: 
 
‘The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India gave special consideration to the 
importance of respecting the rule of International Law, strengthening the United Nation Security 
Council and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace 
and security. They reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international peace and security in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the legal instruments to which 
Brazil, India and South Africa are parties’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
Two aspects are highlighted here. Firstly, that the initial focus of the IBSA Dialogue Forum was strongly 
political – a fact which is further emphasized by the delegates representing them being the countries’ 
Foreign Ministers. Secondly, the agreements reached in Brasília are relatively vague and open-ended.  
 
The second aspect, the lack of tangible goals, is further emphasised in point number 15:  
 
‘The Foreign Ministers noted with concern the increased economic vulnerability of developing 
countries to fluctuations in global prices of commodities. They affirmed the importance of a 
predictable, rule-based, and transparent international trading system, to enable the developing 
countries to maximise their development, through gains from enhanced exports of goods and 
services of their competitive advantage’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet).  
 
Although the goal is stipulated (in a relative vague way) point 15 is, like point three, open-ended and 
does furthermore not suggest a way in which this goal is to be attained. There are no suggestions of 
strategies for achieving these goals. This, however, is not surprising keeping in mind that this was the 
first meeting between representatives of India, Brazil and South Africa. As a consequence these actors 
seem to have rather made an attempt to steer future collaboration in certain directions and allowed for 
the specifics to be determined at a later stage. In other words, these representatives were merely trying 
to initiate a coalition with the short term goal of improving conditions of WTO negotiations and the long-
term goal were left open-ended allowing the actors more room for manoeuvre in the future.  
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New Regionalism highlights the fact that various variables should be included in an analysis of the 
integration process. These include, but are not limited to political, economic, cultural and social 
variables. Thus one sees that this Brasília Declaration is much aligned with New Regionalist theory 
where the initial cooperation is on political and social variables. Furthermore, one sees that the way the 
goals are defined easily allow for an expansion and inclusion of other, possibly more specific goals at 
some point in the future. In addition, the open-ended goals also allow for the complete cancellation of 
them on future Declarations – if the members should agree that these goals must either be altered or 
removed due to them not serving their national interests. Hence, the end goal of IBSA is not a RTA, but 
the goal is being created as the integration process develops. Again, this is aligned with one of the main 
tenets of New Regionalism; the way it allows the members to steer and control the integration process 
according to how it serve their interests – it is not a process that once started cannot be steered or 
stopped.  
 
4.3.2 The New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation 
 
The next meeting took place in New Delhi in March 2004, and the outcome was the New Delhi Agenda 
for Cooperation (Appendix 3). It is, however, worth noticing that between these two meetings the Heads 
of State and Government met in New York in September 2003, and the Defence Ministers of India, 
Brazil and South Africa met in Pretoria in February 2004. These two meetings are important due to the 
fact that illustrate not only a keen continuation of cooperation, but also a deepening of collaboration in 
the fact that the initial meeting in Brazil was carried out by the Foreign Ministers, while now the Heads of 
State and Government were also taking part.  Furthermore, a widening of the cooperation effort is 
apparent in the fact that the Defence Ministeries are meeting to discuss possible cooperation in this 
field. In other words, India, Brazil and South Africa seem to have gotten the first step right in accordance 
to what New Regionalism advocates. They are driving the process a step further towards regionness 
through this widening and deepening of integration. 
 
Point three of the New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation states that: 
 
‘The Ministers held a wide-ranging discussion in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and 
exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual interest as well as promotion of 
trilateral cooperation in accordance with the objectives set forth in the Brasília Declaration. They 
attached immense value to the beneficial spin-offs from their enhanced trilateral cooperation to 
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South-South cooperation. IBSA aspires to make a significant contribution to the framework of 
South-South cooperation and be a positive factor to advance human development by promoting 
potential synergies among the members’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
Although this point is vague, similar to the example used from the Brasília Declaration, one sees that 
there is a drive that has been stressed – a drive towards expanding this coalition and to make it a 
successful example of South-South cooperation and to furthermore ensure that cooperation between 
India, Brazil and South Africa becomes a way of furthering their national interests. This is one of the 
main arguments of New Regionalism; cooperation takes place where the various actors can benefit from 
it. Consequently, the area in which cooperation started is no longer the sole focus instead the focal point 
is expanded which allows other actors to take part in this process – in an attempt to further their own 
interests. Grant and Söderbaum argue (2003: 6) that regions are constructed, de-constructed and re-
constructed by collective human action and identity formation. As a consequence, the fact that 
regionalisation is a dynamic process, instead of static and linear, is highlighted. This process is likely to 
occur at various speeds in various sectors. In addition, integration and disintegration are closely 
connected and must be analysed within the same framework – making space for the entrance of new 
actors as well as the exit of established actors (which would, according to New Regionalism, occur 
when there are no more benefits associated with further cooperation).  
 
In more general terms, one sees that the New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation was divided into sub-
groups of cooperation, namely: 
• Multilateralism, with particular focus on reform of UN system;  
• Peace and Security; 
• Terrorism;  
• Sustainable Development; and  
• Social Development.  
 
Not only do this division indicate a direction as to where the actors want the cooperation to be steered, 
but one also sees that the goals are becoming more specific, often followed by a strategy as to how to 
best achieve these. One example of such is point number 20, stating: 
 
‘Recalling that the Brasília Declaration had identified trilateral cooperation among the three 
countries as an important tool for achieving the promotion of social and economic development, 
the Ministers agreed that the three countries, with rich untapped natural resources and 
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emerging infrastructural requirements, could in a spirit of South-South cooperation, share 
expertise in several areas. With this view, working level discussions for enhancing trilateral 
cooperation in the spheres of [Science & Technology] S&T, Information Technology, Health, 
Civil Aviation and Shipping, Tourism Trade and Investment, Defence, Energy and education 
took place during the Meeting. Specific programmes of action for trilateral cooperation in each 
of these sectors were identified based on these discussions and endorsed by the Ministers. 
These are annexed in the Plan of Action’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
4.3.3 The Cape Town Communiqué 
 
The New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation concludes with an agreement that the next meeting would be 
held in South Africa in 2005. The Cape Town Communiqué (Appendix 4) was the official document 
released following the Cape Town Ministerial Meeting taking place in March 2005. The main focal points 
at this meeting were: 
• the Millennium Review Summit; 
• the World Trade Organization; 
• Sustainable Development;  
• Climate Change;  
• Peace and Security;  
• Weapons of Mass Destruction;  
• Terrorism;  
• the Situation in the Middle East;  
• Disaster Management;  
• IBSA Sectoral Cooperation; and  
• IBSA facility for Hunger and Poverty Alleviation (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
 It is sufficient to look at these focal points to notice that the IBSA Dialogue Forum has managed to 
further narrow in on the goals and strategies of cooperation. While they have become more specific 
about how to cooperate they have also managed to widen the scope of cooperation to include aspects 
such as the ‘Situation in the Middle East’ which is tied to the IBSA view of the global structure and to 
what its members can do in order to work towards achieving peace as a mean to facilitate poverty 
alleviation and security. While intuitively one might argue that the ‘Situation in the Middle East’ is not 
related to either of the three IBSA member’s national interest. In this regard, it is however important to 
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keep in mind that according to New Regionalism and argued by Söderbaum (1996: 41) there is a strong 
interdependence between actors and structure. The actors – in this case the India, Brazil and South 
Africa – are influenced by the structure, the global political economy, but they are not ‘helpless victims’ 
of what is going on in the contemporary world.  At least they do not have to be; according to New 
Regionalism theory the states are capable of steering the development in directions that are beneficial 
to them, obviously within the constraint of the global structure. Hence, as much as India, Brazil and 
South Africa have to accept certain facts – such as instability in the Middle East – they can use their 
power to influence how the future global picture will look like.  
 
One very important and new aspect introduced in the Cape Town Communiqué is the inclusion and 
focus on IBSA Sectoral Cooperation. Sectoral Working Groups had been set up and in Cape Town, 
South Africa, the Ministers reviewed the work they had done and adopted their reports. In addition to the 
sectors suggested by the Sectoral Working Groups, Ministers decided to include two additional sectors, 
namely Agriculture and Culture. Consequently, the areas of cooperation included Agriculture; Culture; 
Defence; Education; Energy; Health; Information Society; Science and Technology; Tourism; Trade; and 
Transport (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). In other words, a wide, yet specific, spectrum of cooperation is 
visible in the Cape Town Communiqué. 
 
It was stressed by the Ministers that there is a greater scope for further intensifying cooperation 
between India, Brazil and South Africa and while one should continue to search for new opportunities it 
is important that these sectors receive the attention needed so that they can become areas in which the 
countries are able to work towards serving their national interests through the IBSA collaboration. At the 
time of the Cape Town meeting, the Health and Energy Sectoral Working Groups had not been able to 
convene, but otherwise, in the other sectors the first seeds of collaboration had been planted. Exploring 
the sectors of coordination and cooperation it should be fair to suggest that there is, much according to 
New Regionalist theory, a broad focus – allowing for the integration process to be driven by other than 
economic factors. In the case in question one sees that cultural, social and political variables receive 
just as much attention as the economic variable.   
 
4.3.4 The Rio Communiqué 
 
The next meeting between India, Brazil and South Africa took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in March 
2006, and the outcome was summarised in the Rio Communiqué (Appendix 5). Once again was the 
focus placed on the reform of the United Nations:  
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‘The Ministers reiterated their continued support for the reform of the United Nations to make it 
more democratic and responsive to the priorities of its Member States, particularly those of 
developing countries that constitute the vast majority of its membership. In that regard, they 
welcomed the decisions taken in the September Summit in New York in 2005 and expressed 
their full support for the implementation of those decisions as contained in the ‘Summit Outcome 
Document’’ (IBSA 8June 2009: internet).  
 
Consequently, one sees that the IBSA members have not achieved what they set out to at inception. 
However, a task like reforming the UN system, which arguably has not changed much since 1945, is not 
something which will be done in a couple of years. Mokoena (SAIIA 2007: 125) argues that: ‘While IBSA 
may not yet pose a challenge to current global power structures, this type of sectoral interaction has the 
potential to bring real economic benefits to the countries involved and their respective regions. IBSA has 
the potential to become the first South-South initiative to translate diplomatic declarations into real 
results.’ Reform of the UN system and other major global structures might take some time, but India, 
Brazil and South Africa seem to have the patience to keep on working – until a democratisation has 
been achieved hence ensuring that the decision-making bodies better represents the current, real world.  
 
It is often argued – particularly by scholars representing old theories of integration – that trade is the 
way forward for regionalism and regionalisation. This is, however, one aspect in which New Regionalism 
differs from other forms of regional integration theory. Instead of narrowly focusing on trade as the main 
variable of the integration process, New Regionalism allows for a broader focus suggesting that the 
integration process can be driven by other factors – such as for instance investment, as suggested in 
this study. Yet, it is useful to briefly examine trade between India, Brazil and South Africa. In ‘Potential 
for Greater Trade between South Africa, India and Brazil’, Willcox and van Seventer (2004: 18) illustrate 
that the trade between the three countries is low although these are some of the world’s largest 
economies – certainly if one look at them in comparison with other economies of the South. They 
consequently suggest that there is room for improvement. They reached this conclusion after discussing 
the various countries’ exports to the rest of the world, and the IBSA Dialogue Forum’s member’s imports 
of the same goods. Especially between India and Brazil, the trade has the potential of increasing 
drastically. They furthermore argue that out of the three members, the trade between India and South 
Africa is, without a doubt, the most saturated field. Additionally, they suggest that the greatest potential 
for trilateral trade exist in areas including, but not limited to machinery, vehicles, mineral products, 
chemicals and precious metals.  
 81 
 
Although trade can, and should, be expanded, Willcox and van Seventer’s argument is that this is not 
the field in which India, Brazil and South Africa have the most to gain. This does not mean that trade as 
a possible field of cooperation should be completely ignored, on the contrary; the coalition member’s 
should continue to explore this aspect of cooperation, but a further facilitation of trade should not be the 
main focus of the IBSA policy-makers. The focus needs to be on other fields of cooperation – fields that 
are less explored and have a potentially higher gain. This study suggests that ‘investment’ is an 
example of such a field – a fact that will be discussed in Chapter Five.   
 
The Brasília Declaration, the official document from the founding meeting of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, 
does indeed touch on the topic of trade, but it is not done in terms of making an effort to increase trade 
between India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). Instead the topic of trade in the 
Declaration mentioned in terms of pressurising their trading partners in the North to move away from the 
heavy protectionist stance and allow countries of the South to explore the comparative advantage they 
have on most of these markets.  
 
The Cape Town Communiqué of 2005 discusses trade in point number 48 and notes: 
 
‘On the issue of trade, the Ministers decided to promote coordination and cooperation in several 
areas including on the convergence of Preferential Trade Agreements and/or Free Trade 
Agreements, in the G-20 and on WTO related issues. They further agreed to conduct joint 
studies and research on trade-related matters. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that 
preferential trade agreements had already been concluded between Mercosur-SACU and 
Mercosur-India and further noted that discussions will commence in June 2005 on an 
agreement between India and SACU. A study was circulated on ‘The Potential for Greater 
Trade between South Africa, India and Brazil’ and the Member States undertook to conduct 
IBSA seminars on trade and investment in their respective countries as well as in key 
developed markets’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet).  
 
It is apparent that first of all, similar to the Brasília Declaration, trade is an important aspect of 
cooperation and secondly that the focus is not first and foremost on increasing trade between the three 
members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, instead the attention is on improving the terms of trade of the 
three countries, and other countries of the Southern Hemisphere, as a means of economic growth of 
development. In other words, focus is not on improving market access within the IBSA Dialogue Forum, 
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rather it is on pressurising on the larger markets such as the US and EU to improve the market access 
for countries of the South – a fact which corresponds with the aim of democratisation of the global 
system.  
 
The Rio Communiqué of March 2006 however focuses especially on intra-IBSA trade and investment. 
Point number 46 states: 
 
‘The Ministers noted with satisfaction the results of the Trade and Investment Forum. The forum 
was divided into four panels: a) Trilateral trade analysis; b) implementation of the preferential 
trade agreements between Mercosul, India and Southern African Customs Union (SACU); c) 
challenges to the growth of the trilateral trade (barriers, logistics and financing); and d) 
organization of the trilateral business meeting on the occasion of the IBSA Meeting of Heads of 
Government and State in September 2006. The delegations of India, Brazil and South Africa 
presented data and facts concerning trade issues that thrusted fruitful discussions among the 
businessmen attending the meeting’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet).  
 
Attention was drawn to the possibilities associated with increased cooperation in the automobile 
industries of the three countries – evidence of trilateral cooperation gaining momentum. There are now 
more details regarding what should be going on between these three countries, as opposed to the 
earlier focus of what front these three countries should face the developed world. In other words, 
another step is taken towards what New Regionalism refers to as regionness. The actors have 
broadened the scope of integration in order to allow inclusion of a wider group of their populations so 
that more people can use this platform to promote their self-interests. In addition, one also sees a more 
specific focus – the integration process has thus been deepened.  The results of this communiqué and 
the Delhi Summit will be further discussed in the next chapter which analyses the achievements up to 
date and the potential of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. 
 
In order to determine the potential of the IBSA Dialogue Forum it is useful to explore the outcome of the 
more recent Summits – the Tshwane Summit of October 2007 and the Delhi Summit of October 2008. 
This allows one to ascertain where the IBSA Dialogue Forum currently finds itself. While the previous 
sections looked back and offered a brief overview of historical events, this section will focus on the 
current situations and will examine the two previous meetings – held in Tshwane 2007 and New Delhi in 
2008. The aim is to establish which changes have occurred over time and where this coalition seems to 
be headed and to also suggest possible directions in which it should be heading.  
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4.4 A REVIEW OF THE TSHWANE AND DELHI IBSA SUMMITS 
 
4.4.1 Tshwane Summit  
 
Womack (2005: 17) suggests that: ‘an organization like the IBSA Dialogue Forum is in itself an 
expression of macro-regional consciousness, and it provides the venue and the referent for discussions 
of common attitudes towards global issues as well as shared problems.’ Examining the recent 
Communiqués resulting from IBSA Summits suggests that he is correct. After the 2nd
 
 IBSA Summit, the 
Tshwane Summit in October 2007 in Pretoria, South Africa, for instance, the official document  the 
‘Tshwane IBSA Summit Declaration’ (Appendix 6) states:  
‘The leaders recommitted themselves to vigorously pursue the deepening of South-South 
cooperation for sustainable development. They reaffirmed their shared commitment to the 
eradication of poverty through sustained and inclusive economic growth. They highlighted the 
importance of implementing the principles adopted in the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
particularly the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and emphasized that 
capacity and institution building is a key to global sustainable development’ (Department for 
International Relations & Cooperation 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
It is apparent that the awareness of building a strong coalition of the South is first priority. At the same 
time they acknowledge that what mainly the North has decided in terms of environmental needs is 
important, but that such cooperation can only take place if the consequences are adjusted to meet the 
developing world’s needs and capabilities. Yet another example of the fact that, while fighting for their 
national interests, these states are not only creating beneficial results for India, Brazil and South Africa. 
Rather, the whole developing world is (with more or less conscious intention) actually benefits from this 
united stance amongst the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. This also corresponds with the IBSA 
countries’ role as middle powers. According to Cox (in Taylor 2005: 3) the role of middle powers is ‘to 
affirm the principle of adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all powers, great or small.’ In other 
words, one sees that the IBSA Dialogue Forum promotes the idea that the rules must be followed, but 
they do want the rules to be changed so that the global system becomes more democratic and works 
not against, but for the developing countries as well. In other words, the role played by the structure is of 
paramount importance – a fact which is also argued by New Regionalism scholars. This framework 
highlights the effect of the structure in which the actors operate, but argues that the actors are also able 
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to alter this structure, even if they do not have the power to do so alone. As middle powers the IBSA 
members knows and advocates the importance of following the current rules and regulations, but they 
do also stress the need for fairer rules – not only for themselves, but for the developing world in general.  
 
An important event at the Tshwane IBSA Summit was the launch of the Women’s Forum, which aim to 
strengthen participation of women in the IBSA coalition. The establishment of such a forum is viewed as 
a sign of strong commitment amongst the members to promote gender equality and women’s rights. 
Furthermore, point five states that:  
 
‘The leaders acknowledge with appreciation the continued participation by academia and 
business leaders. The leaders are satisfied that the participation by civil society contributed to 
the enhancing the visibility of IBSA. They also applauded the commitment by the peoples of the 
three countries to participate at the Music and Dance Festival in Brazil later in October 2007’ 
(Department of International Relations & Cooperation 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
Again, we see a strong focus on relatively unconventional aspects of integration. Instead of purely 
focusing on economic and political variables, the members rely on culture as one of the promoters of 
cooperation and integration. This is aligned with New Regionalism arguing that the driver of the regional 
integration process includes, but are not limited to economics, politics, social, cultural and security 
aspects. Additionally, these events suggest that that the process of integration is being driven forward 
and that IBSA cooperation leads to tangible results, it is not only talk about what should happen some 
time in the future.  
 
Moreover, Point 35 of the Tshwane IBSA Summit states:  
 
‘The leaders expressed the importance of regular interaction among businesspersons of the 
three countries, with Government authorities playing a facilitating role in the process, for sharply 
enhancing the momentum of trade and investment with a view to fully utilising the large and 
growing opportunities in their markets. For the continued expansion of trade, investment and 
economic ties, the leaders encouraged the implementation of further initiatives amongst IBSA 
countries on standards, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, small and medium 
enterprise development, business-to-business linkages and participation in trade exhibition.’ 
(Department of International Relations & Cooperation 8 June 2009: internet). 
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This is an example of how the goals, and strategies behind these goals, have become much more 
explicit than what they were in the initial Communiqués – a fact which will according to New 
Regionalism lead to increased regionness as a result of a more intense version of integration where 
more actors take part and more specified topics are up for debate. During the Tshwane IBSA Summit, 
intra-regional trade was centrally placed on the agenda (after having been highlighted during the Rio 
meeting which preceded the Tshwane Summit). During previous Meetings trade debate has been 
centred around the WTO and trying to make the trading condition more fair and beneficial for the 
developing world, there was now, in addition a strong focus on trilateral trade between India, Brazil and 
South Africa.  
 
It has, according to the Communiqué, been made progress; this progress is also visible in more 
practical examples. One sees, for instance that, numerous South African firms have set up business in 
India. Amongst them are Shoprite, Anglo American, De Beers, Ceres, Old Mutual, South African 
Breweries, Interpark, Group 5, LTA Grinaker and Eskom (Soko 2006: 12). Furthermore, by the end of 
2004, a total of 35 Indian companies had established a presence in South Africa, covering as diverse a 
spectrum as computer software, IT, banking, pharmaceuticals and automotive. An example of the latter, 
is the Tata Group, which is the leading Indian investor in South Africa and had by 2005 invested R300 
million and had plans to invest another R1.5 billion over the following two years. Other Indian companies 
in South Africa are Mahindra, Sahara Computers, the State Bank of India, Ranbazy, Cipla and Hetro 
(Soko 2006: 12-13).  
 
South African companies operating in Brazil include Sappi Trading do Brazil, Banco Standard de 
Investimentos SA, AngloGold, Safmarine Anglo American Brazil, Alexander Forbes Financial Services, 
Dex Brazil and Macsteel International. South Africa’s imports from Brazil, on the other hand increased 
over a two-year period, from 2002 to 2004 from just under R 5million to almost R 6.5 million (Soko 2006: 
14).  
 
One of the focal points of further integration has been the automotive sector. One of the constraints in 
this sector includes, according to Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) (15 August 2009: internet), the 
differences in consumer preference in the three countries. This is a constraint that remains, but others, 
such as tariffs reduction and removal of non-tariff barriers have been dealt with. Consequently, one sees 
that in terms of the automotive industry, achievements have been already been made, although further 
benefits exists. This latter point is highlighted by van Seventeer and Willcox (2004: 17), suggesting that 
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the automotive industry is indeed one of the sectors in which further integration will prove beneficial for 
India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 




 IBSA Summit was held in New Delhi, India, in October 2008. The Delhi Summit Declaration 
(Appendix 7) is, as the Tshwane Summit Declaration, a much more extensive document than the 
earliest Declarations, suggesting that the areas of cooperation have expanded significantly. One also 
sees that it is not only the number of areas that have changed, more importantly there is also a 
deepening of issues in the way that more aspects of coordination and cooperation are included and the 
goals have become more specific and hence more easily to create strategies for.  
The main aspects of the Delhi Summit Declaration were: 
• Global Governance;  
• Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);  
• South-South Cooperation;  
• Sustainable Development;  
• UN Reform;  
• Human Rights;  
• Intellectual Property;  
• Gender;  
• Disarmament and Non-Proliferation;  
• Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy;  
• Terrorism;  
• Doha Development Round & International Trade;  
• International Financial Crisis;  
• Energy;  
• Food Security;  
• Regional Issues;  
• IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger; and  
• IBSA Sectoral Cooperation (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
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It is apparent when looking at this list of topics that the areas of cooperation within the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum have become very broad. It is interesting to see that although a broad focus has been kept as an 
important feature of cooperation, the members have simultaneously been able to be specific about 
possible achievements. A few examples will be mentioned in order to highlight this.  
 
Of the fields of cooperation mentioned above, the first one that should be highlighted is ‘Sectoral 
Cooperation’. The reason for sectoral cooperation being of paramount importance is that it illustrates a 
shift towards technical cooperation. In sectoral cooperation one brings in the expert in order to see what 
can be improved in various fields. This promises an increase speed of integration in the fields elected. In 
terms of sectoral cooperation the leaders  
 
‘reviewed the activities under sectoral cooperation and while acknowledging the meetings of the 
Working Groups and concurring with their reports, expressed satisfaction on progress made. 
The leaders welcomed the signing of (i) Tripartitite Agreement on Tourism, (ii) MoU 
[Memorandum of Understanding] on Trade Facilitation for Standards, Technical Regulations 
and Conformity Assessment, (iii) MoU on Environment, (iv) MoU on Human Settlements 
Development, (v) Five Year Action Plan for Maritime Transport, (vi) Five Year Action Plan for 
Civil Aviation, and (vii) MoU on Women’s Development and Gender Equality Programmes, to 
enhance cooperation in these sectors. They urged time-bound and concrete deliverables, in all 
sectors’ (IBSA 8 June 2009: internet).  
 
Again, a clear determination to drive this integration process as far as possible is apparent. The leaders 
show commitment to working towards the IBSA Dialogue Forum being more than an annual diplomatic 
gathering lacking in tangible outcome. Rather they seek to ensure that the coordination and cooperation 
is enhanced so that it becomes an as wide as possible platform on which the members can stand while 
promoting national interests. Furthermore, even if the focus of cooperation is widening it is 
simultaneously becoming more specific, more detailed. This is a fact that is stressed by the scholars of 
New Regionalism: the integration process is dynamic and thus forever changing – and with time 
integration will increase, but at different speeds in the different fields. This process will also experience 
disintegration which can be the outcome of many factors – one being that the actors do not manage to 
enhance their self-interest through the chosen focus and decide to rather concentrate their efforts on 
other, more beneficial, sectors.  
 
Point number 29 refers to the WTO:  
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‘The leaders acknowledged that while substantial progress was made during the informal 
ministerial meeting of the WTO in July this year, the final modalities in agriculture and NAMA 
could not be achieved. They agreed that there must be a concerted effort by all member 
countries to take the process forward towards a successful conclusion of the Round. They 
emphasized the importance of concluding the Round to achieve its development objectives, 
which had assumed even greater significance in the wake of the global financial and food crisis’  
(IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
Once more it is apparent that regional cooperation is forming part of and driving the globalisation 
process, but is also reacting against it and modifying in an attempt to make the consequences of this 
process more beneficial for the developing world – which is aligned with the New Regionalist view on 
regionalism and globalisation.  
 
Energy was also an important aspect of the Delhi Summit as point number 34 notes: 
 
 ‘The leaders recognized that energy resources are a vital input upon which the socio-economic 
development of states rests. The recent price volatility of crude oil has posed a challenge to the 
economic growth and stability of emerging and developing economies. Increasingly, energy 
markets have become susceptible to political considerations, driving energy security concerns 
into strategic and foreign policy agendas. They agreed to collaborate in diverse policy and 
technology areas to strengthen energy security in the three countries. They also look forward to 
working towards the diversification of energy baskets for a larger share of renewable, alternate 
and clean energy. Towards these common aims, IBSA will deepen regular exchanges, to further 
knowledge and know-how  in the areas of biofuels, nuclear, hydro, wind and solar energy. They 
recognized that fossil fuels continue to be a primary source of energy supply and any reduction 
of emissions would be considered within the framework of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
They also encouraged the sharing of best practices in energy conservation and efficiency’ 
(IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
Energy, as a scarce resource, is a controversial topic which is of great importance to the developing 
world in general, and if the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum manage to better the developing 
world’s terms on which energy negotiations take place, a large step is taken towards improving 
production efficiency and subsequently economic growth. This also illustrate a relatively brave stance of 
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the IBSA members, it highlights the fact that these three countries attempt to be proactive when 
attending to global issues. They no longer want to be the marginalised ones that take whatever they get 
offered, instead they seek to be ahead and to work towards dealing with an issue before it comes a 
major problem – and to furthermore, show the rest of the world that they are serious about obeying rules 
and regulations already existing, but they are simultaneously calling for a reviewed version of these 
rules and regulations.   
 
Another topic which has received increased attention is that of global financial and investment structure. 
Of particular dissatisfaction with the management of the global system is the unequal representation 
within the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which IBSA views as particularly damaging to the 
developing world. Especially African countries have very little influence on decisions taken by IFIs – 
decisions that carry immense consequences for them. Forty three African countries share 4.38 percent 
of the shareholding (and vote) in the IMF, while the G-7 countries have a total of 47.69 percent of 
shareholding and vote. As a result, according to Trevor Manuel (in Taylor 2005: 5), at the time Minister 
of Finance for South Africa, ‘the biggest fault-line is in the decision-making process. The constitution 
requires that a number of decisions require 85% of the shareholders to back it. This gives the US and 
Europe an effective veto—no US, no decision. No Europe, no decision’. It is thus in effect impossible for 
the developing world to get a voice in these decision-making processes – this is what the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum is seeking to change. As of yet, they have not been able to alter the structure, but their effort has 
been noted and the leaders seem committed to continue the struggle for more justice in the decision 
making process. The importance of India, Brazil and South Africa as middle powers and even more so 
united middle powers is highlighted by the fact that they are actually getting those that are able to 
control the structure to listen. Having said that, it is important to stress the fact that the steps taken so 
far are baby steps and the road is long, but there is reason to believe that with the continuous efforts 
made by the IBSA Dialogue Forum changes will happen.  
 
Although the achievements in terms of reform are small, one sees that goals have been attained in 
other fields. For instance, several memoranda of understanding (MoUs) have been signed thus far on:  
 
• agriculture and allied fields, 
• bio-fuels,  
• merchant shipping and other maritime transport, 
• trade facilitation, and  
• a framework for cooperation on ‘information society’ (Mokoena in SAIIA 2007: 125).  
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These steps indicate an important move towards a more integrated IBSA due to the involvement of a 
larger range of actors who are handling more specific topics.  
 
Improved relations between the three countries are seen in, amongst other aspects, the meeting of the 
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Business Council. A workshop was held in Somerset West, South 
Africa in May 2008, and focus was on identifying opportunities and challenges for strengthening the 
trade and investment relationship between the three countries. The sectors discussed at this workshop 
included tourism, energy, mining, air transport, maritime transport and automotives (BUSA 15 August 
2009: internet). The potential for tourism between India, Brazil and South Africa was highlighted; it was 
stressed that a major obstacle for improvements in this sector as well as in terms of trade and 
investment was the lack of direct air links between the IBSA member states. Consequently it was 
decided that effort would be put into establishing the necessary links – through cooperation between 
private sectors and governments of India, Brazil and South Africa. Furthermore, the fact that mining is a 
large industry in all three countries was pointed out and the need to ensure a development of these 
industries was emphasised. Currently a substantial amount of the trade in this industry is of raw 
material, a fact that needs to be altered in order to ensure that greater beneficiation takes place. 
Through an enhancement of infrastructure, including ports and railways, trade and investment could 
increase. Linked to this is the importance of competitive financial services sectors. Access to capital is 
fundamental for growing investment levels across all sectors. The members suggested that the 
regulatory restrictions that hamper linkages must be removed and that closer cooperation with the 
working group on trade and investment is needed (BUSA 15 August 2009: internet). These are just a 
few of the topics that were discussed during the Somerset West meeting in 2008. The mere fact that this 
meeting took place suggests that the integration process has been driven forward and that, through the 
involvement of private sector actors dealing with private sector issues, there has been a deepening of 
integration and a broadening of issues – this, of course, is aligned with what is advocated by New 
Regionalism scholars when they highlight the fact that a healthy regionalisation process should include 
a multiplicity of actors which makes the focus broad, and the fact that the actors involved are considered 
experts in their field allows for a more efficient deepening of the integration process.  
 
In the long run, South Africa stands to gain considerable strategic and economic advantages from 
cultivating closer links with the far more populous Brazil and India, as both countries are expected to be 
among the world’s six largest economies within the next 10 to 15 years (Taylor 2005: 14). However, as 
discussed earlier, it is not only beneficial for South Africa to be part of this coalition. India and Brazil also 
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seem able to further their national interests through this collaboration and South Africa’s role seems to 
be of particular importance in the coalition building due to the close and strong ties it has with both India 
and Brazil. Consequently, South Africa is a uniting force, one which is known to punch above its weight 
in international fora.  
 
It is clear that the benefits involved in furthering cooperation in terms of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are 
immense for all the three countries involved – and even to a certain extent for their respective regions. 
There have been significant achievements to date, despite the fact that the coalition is a mere six years 
old. In the search for tangible results, the members have managed to widen the scope of cooperation as 
well as deepening it through a more specific focus. Some fields of cooperation such as UN Reform still 
requires a substantial amount of work, but the leaders of the IBSA Dialogue Forum seem committed to 
continue working in order to level the playing field for themselves as well as for other developing states.  
 
4.5 NEW REGIONALISM AND THE IBSA DIALOGUE FORUM 
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum cannot be easily compared to other regional integration projects. One 
noticeable divergence is the fact that the member states are not situated geographical close to each 
other. As a consequence of this, most old versions of regionalisation theory would be obsolete; this is 
not so for New Regionalism – which suggests that although most regional integration efforts occur 
between countries with geographically proximity, this is not a necessary requirement. This is perhaps 
the most obvious way in which the IBSA Dialogue Forum does not fit the mould of preceding regional 
integration attempt. There are other variables that highlight how the IBSA Dialogue Forum differs from 
the rest; these will be further discussed below. However, the use of this one example heralds that 
something new is in the making – and this new concept cannot be understood in the light of an old 
framework. Hence there is a need for scholars that dare to do what the members of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum have done: to think new and to use these fresh ideas to meet the objectives they have set for 
themselves. Scholars of New Regionalism have done what the IBSA members have done; gone their 
own ways, building on historical parts that they deem to still be useful in the current world, but leaving 
behind ideas and methods that have grown stale and that do not have a place in the world that has 
been altered by globalisation (as the strongest determinant). In the words of Grant and Söderbaum 
(2003: 192):  
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‘Global, regional and local changes have in the past decades forced scholars to reconsider 
many of the established assumptions about the durability and the desirability of regional 
relations and institutions. In addition the studies of regionalism has had great difficulty 
discerning which level of analysis – global, inter-regional, national or local – is of paramount 
importance. Many scholars have found comfort in New Regionalism, which allows for an 
analysis accepting that processes at the various levels interact and that their importance differs 
depending on time and which region is in question’. 
 
A further way that the IBSA Dialogue Forum differs from preceding integration efforts of the South is that 
they do not narrowly focus on the establishment of regional trade agreements. Even though trade 
integration features on the agenda, it is neither the only aspect nor the most central one. As established 
in this chapter, developing countries were encouraged by economists to create RTAs. It was argued that 
the diversification of their economy, the development of intra-industry trade and South-South trade were 
the only feasible means of economic growth. In addition to this, small, weak and relatively poor 
economies considered RTAs as their only way of strengthening their bargaining position in international 
trade negotiations (Gavin & Van Langehoven in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 284). However, many 
schemes of regional economic integration, particularly in Africa and Latin America, were built on closed 
economy principles and insulation against outside competition, and, as a consequence, these regional 
trade agreements failed to deliver on any of the objectives they set out to achieve  (Gavin & Van 
Langehoven in Sampson & Woolcock 2003: 278-279). One of the reasons behind this failure is, without 
a doubt, the nature of these states. However, de La Torre and Schmukler (2007: 162) argue that it is 
more complex than just closed economy principle and insulation against outside competition. They 
highlight that there are two stylised views on this topic. The first view suggests that the quality of these 
agreements is too poor, that impatience and imperfection is allowed to cause incomplete agreements. 
The second view focuses on the implementation process and argues that the developing states often do 
not have the capacity to implement complex RTAs. In other words, they highlight the fact that there is a 
need to re-think regional integration in the South, that it is of no use to seek to copy regional integration 
efforts between developed countries. Developing countries differ fundamentally from the countries of the 
North, and if one wants to build a successful coalition of the South, this must be done based on 
principles and assumptions that are realistic for developing states. 
 
This is what the IBSA Dialogue Forum seeks to do, and this is, according to Bøås, Marchand and Shaw 
(2005: 4-5), one of the important contributions of New Regionalism. This theory has been challenging 
existing Western or Eurocentric bias in theorising about regionalism and regionalisation. Söderbaum 
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(1998: 91) concurs, and notes that New Regionalism is based on ‘the recognition that the Eurocentric 
and unrealistic assumptions of orthodox theory do not apply in the industrialised world and certainly do 
not apply in the developing world.’ Thus, the argument is that IBSA diverges from previous 
regionalisation attempts of the South due to, first of all, the lack of a narrow focus on trade, and 
secondly, due to the acceptance of being a product of the South, which is a recognition of the fact that 
they need to create something new, something unique, something which suits them (as opposed to 
being Eurocentric) and their position (in the global system as well as in comparison to their neighbours 
and each other). Until now, New Regionalism is the only framework that is flexible and eclectic enough 
to adequately analyse and explain such events.  
  
One further aspect linked to the argument above is the broad focus of both the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
and the New Regionalism framework. Although human security is not the focus of this dissertation per 
se, it is worth mentioning this fact since it further highlights how New Regionalism differs from preceding 
theories of IR or IPE and illustrates how useful New Regionalism is as an analytical tool in terms of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum. In addition, it is useful as it contrast the narrow focus of earlier integration efforts 
with the broad and inclusive focus of the IBSA Dialogue Forum – much according to New Regionalist 
theory. In the current world order new threats to security has risen, mainly resulting from the changes 
that the globalisation process has carried with it. New security issues include migration, gun-running, 
gangs, domestic crime, HIV/AIDS, transnational crime and poverty. These issues do not fit into the state 
against state model – it is no longer the states that are threatened, but instead people are threatened 
(Grant & Söderbaum 2003: 188). As a consequence, one sees that old version of regionalisation theory 
– which tends to be state-centric – is obsolete and that parties involved in a regional coalition-building 
process need to be aware of the fact that many actors are involved. These actors all have different 
interests and a varying degree of power. Consequently, a coalition cannot be built on principles that no 
longer apply to the real world (such as the Westphalia Principles) – instead, focus must be on current-
day obstacles, problems, possibilities and opportunities. A New Regionalism analysis of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum allows for the use of such principles and it therefore offers a realistic outcome of 
cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 
Dunn and Hentz (in Grant & Söderbaum  2003: 190) argue, aligned with what has already been 
discussed, that at an increasing degree, New Regionalism seems to offer a new and innovative way to 
conceptualise and analyse processes that are occurring in the post-Cold War era. They advocate that 
New Regionalism provides a potentially rewarding alternative to the numerous IR/IPE paradigms that 
are too limited to be of much use for discussing the trends taking place in the current global order – 
 94 
especially in the South. This is maintained by Söderbaum (1996: 43) when he argues that the New 
Regionalism approach goes beyond the idea of a free market, and includes economic, political, social 
and cultural aspects. He recommends that, due to the fact that these variables are all interdependent, 
one should not attempt to take them apart and analyze one of them in separation from the others. The 
significance of the fact that there is an interlinkage between variables and that they are all equally 
important is illustrated in Kgalema Motlanthe’s (South African President at the time) speech during 
IBSA’s New Delhi Summit in October 2008: 
 
‘It is indisputable that without an understanding and appreciation of each other’s peoples, 
cultures, business environment and the issues that we have in common as developing 
countries, efforts by the three IBSA governments to advance our collective global agenda, will 
always be incomplete. It is imperative that we, as leaders be cognisant that civil society’s views 
and contributions can enrich the quality of our engagements as IBSA’ (Department of 
International Cooperation &Cooperation 12 May 2009: internet).  
 
Another characteristic of this speech is that Motlanthe recognizes the fact that there is formal and 
informal integration taking place. What is often referred to as regionalism and regionalisation, where the 
former is the political, state-led process, while the latter refers to what is actually going on between the 
people; developments that are not necessarily initiated by state actors. Shaw (2000: 401) notes that the 
fact that New Regionalism’s inclusion of ‘non-state and non-formal interactions between the national 
and global levels enables it to treat the interconnections between more and less statist relations, as well 
as to transcend the official by recognising how the latter relates to the unofficial in a myriad of ways: the 
multiple conceptions of ‘regions’, as well as diversity of issue areas, from ecologies and ethnicities to 
civil societies and private armies. In terms of the IBSA Dialogue Forum one sees that despite the fact 
that these countries are situated far from each other they have important social and cultural links. These 
links could manifest themselves in for instance businessmen in India choosing to focus on increased 
cooperation, in various fields, with members of the Indian population in South Africa. Similarly with the 
large population of African decent in Brazil, they might be eager to tie closer bonds with people in South 
Africa that they feel they are closer related to than, for instance, people in Northern Europe which are 
substantially different to them in terms of culture. This feeling of familiarity cannot be over-emphasised 
since it, in many cases, can be an as strong determinant of actions as more concrete variables.  
 
When using the New Regionalism framework to analyse a regional integration initiative it is important to 
keep in mind that New Regionalism scholars view the integration process as an open-ended goal as 
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opposed to earlier version of integration theory which focused on the fact that an integration effort 
should have a concrete outcome. Instead of focusing on a set outcome, New Regionalism is concerned 
with ‘the multitude of strategies and ideas about a particular region, which merge, mingle and clash’ 
(Söderbaum  2002: 4). In addition to this, New Regionalism views regions as always being in the 
making. According to Bøås, Marchand and Shaw (2005: 1) regions are constructed, deconstructed and 
reconstructed – through social practice and discourse. Not only states, but also non-state actors, 
participate in the process of constructing regions and giving each its specific content and character. 
Consequently, according to New Regionalism theory there is no end goal for the IBSA Dialogue Forum. 
There is not one point which the members should be working towards, where one can conclude, in 
hindsight, that yes, the objectives were met since the outcome is what the actors set out to achieve. 
Instead, one sees that the focus is rather on what the actors can achieve, how they can further their 
interests, rather than about the institution building. Consequently, in terms of IBSA cooperation some 
significant objectives have been met. Hence, it should be fair to argue that the whole is indeed greater 
than the sum of its part – since India, Brazil and South Africa have achieved, jointly, goals that they 
would not have been able to achieve on their own. However, there is much more that these regional 
giants of the South could achieve through closer integration. This, however, will only take place if the 
actors view further integration as being in their interest. According to New Regionalism, the moment 
further integration does not yield benefits to the parties involved it will come to an end. As a 
consequence, the regional integration process is better viewed as a dynamic process, one which will 
constantly change, both in scale and deepness, depending on the interests of the actors involved. As 
long as there are still goals to be achieved cooperation will continue, and since, as it has already been 
established, the whole is strengthened this will likely give a new momentum to the continuing integration 
process, both in terms of motivation to continue, but also since the strengthening of the whole has made 
the parts more influential – and thus more likely to be able to easier further their interests. 
 
A last note worth highlighting is that the success of the IBSA Dialogue Forum in the future depends on 
whether it is able to focus on clear and possible areas of cooperation and to steer clear of (or at least 
delay) areas of controversy that tend to hold up the process of integration. This aspect is of paramount 
importance due to the fact that it emphasises one of the benefits of applying New Regionalism to a 
framework such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum. According to New Regionalism the regionalisation 
process comes from below and within and is thus not steered from above and outside, consequently the 
actors involved are able to choose which areas to focus on – areas that will be the most beneficial to the 
actors involved – and leave out the controversial aspects, or in other words, to steer the coalition clear 




This chapter has examined the Communiqués and Declarations resulting from meetings of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum since its establishment in 2003 to the Summit held in New Delhi in October 2008. This 
has been done in order to determine the achievements of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. When analyzing 
these documents one sees that while the 2003 Brasília Declaration has only 20 points, the 2008 Delhi 
Declaration has 50. More important than the quantitative differences are the qualitative differences. The 
2008 Delhi Declaration is not only more extensive in length, it is also more specific in content, goals are 
made clearer and strategies are made more explicit. Aligned with New Regionalism the integration 
process is dynamic and allows for expansion in fields deemed to be particularly beneficial for the actors. 
All these improvements suggest that important steps towards enhancing the collaboration between 
India, Brazil and South Africa have been made.  
 
It has been established that compared to previous attempts of South-South cooperation the real 
strength of the IBSA coalition is found in the fact that they share a common position in international fora 
and the fact that all three are important actors in their own right, and the low number of members allow 
for an efficient cooperation with a substantial amount of leverage on the global arena. Knowing that 
these states are powerful on their own, through a successful collaboration these countries’ power will be 
amplified.  
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum has already carried through on some of their promises, and much aligned to 
New Regionalism one sees that integration has occurred in fields beneficially to the member states. 
India, Brazil and South Africa have however not been successful in reforming global decision-making 
bodies. In this regard it is important to keep in mind what was stressed in the beginning of this chapter; 
the fact that the IBSA Dialogue Forum is a young coalition and that reforming global decision-making 
structure is a mammoth task – which these ambitious middle powers could possibly achieve, but that 
would have to be a long-term goal. As for the short to medium term goals it is apparent that some have 
been met and that continuous effort is put in place to ensure that further objectives are met. The use of 
the New Regionalism framework, allows for a view of integration as a dynamic process – a process that 
moves in varying speeds and that continuously alters its scope. This is what the members of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum do when they relentlessly look for new areas of cooperation – areas in which all the 
members have a shared interest in further cooperation.  
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The IBSA coalition views itself as more than just an alternative to previous South-South initiatives. It 
recognizes its position as a constructive stepping stone to a broader and deeper cooperation in the 
South. Although the IBSA Dialogue Forum was initially established to improve political cooperation in 
the South and to ensure UN Security reform, a new momentum has emerged, one that focuses on 
economic and social development through economic reform of the global system. The IBSA Dialogue 
Forum strives to facilitate effective engagement in the Southern hemisphere in an effort to address 
globally relevant issues from a development perspective. The members are committed to create a 
successful South-South collaboration capable of delivering over and above the rhetoric that has 
characterized previous collaborations of the South.  
 
The next chapter will look at one of the aspects in which the IBSA Dialogue Forum has a potential for 
growth – both as individual countries as well as a coalition. The topic of the next chapter is investment – 
chosen from a range of promising sectors – and the topic is, for the purpose of this study, seen in the 
light of emerging markets, and will explore the potentials associated with an increased focus on 

















INVESTMENT AND EMERGING MARKETS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) have become concrete examples of the historic success of the 
international development community during the past 50 years in significantly improving the social and 
economic well-being of a very large number of human beings throughout the world. It is however, over 
the past two decades that we have seen an increased focus on the topic of EMEs. In the same time 
period, financial markets have grown considerably in developed and developing economies. This growth 
has, however, been far from homogeneous across regions and countries – it took place in a context of 
growing financial globalisation, increased cross-border capital flows and substantial foreign direct 
investment in the financial sector (de la Torre & Schmukler 2007: 83). While some have benefited from 
this, others have not. In order to determine how more people can benefit from these developments, this 
chapter will explore the concept of investment – and since all three IBSA member countries are 
considered emerging markets, investment will be seen in the light of possibilities that exist for EMEs. 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of the concept EMEs. Both Kohli (2008: 122) and Kolodko 
(2003: 13) agree that the notion of EME is blurred and that various ideas of the concept exist. Kolodko 
(2003) argues that it is easier to say what is not an EME, than what is. He suggests that EMEs ‘do not 
include, by definition, either those highly developed market economies which have long evolved mature 
institutional systems, or those countries which have yet to set out on the path of market development’. 
The European Central Bank (16 August 2009: internet) agrees on the difficulties associated with 
defining EMEs, but suggests that the notion, coined by the World Bank more than a quarter of century 
ago, is aptly defined as: ‘a number of rapidly growing economies [that have] gained, or regained, access 
to international financial market. […] economies [that] have liberalised their financial systems, at least in 
part, and have become broadly accessible to foreign investors’.  In other words, EMEs are those 
markets, or countries, which do not yet classify as a developed country, but that is more developed than 
the poorest countries in the world. Furthermore, they tend to have a rather exceptional growth trajectory 
and are, through amongst other complex facets, experiencing rapidly increasing financial integration. 
They are hence becoming more like a developed country, but the future holds the secret as to whether 
their growth process will eventually lead them to one day being considered a developed country.  
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The focus of this chapter is on investment, seen in the light of EMEs. The reason for this is that 
discussing investment without paying special attention to the fact that India, Brazil and South Africa are 
all considered emerging markets would not offer a complete picture. The reason for choosing 
investment as the focal point of this chapter is the increased absolute flow of investment, and more 
importantly, the significance and consequences of the growth of such flows. One sees, for instance, that 
private capital flows have now, according to Kohli (2008: 29), replaced Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) from multilateral and bilateral institutions as the dominant source of foreign capital to EMEs. 
Such a development has ramifications stretching further than just an increase in a countries balance of 
payments books. It is these ramifications this study – and in particular this chapter- will explore. 
 
In terms of structure, this chapter will first of all, offer an introduction which deals with EMEs and 
investment. The concept EMEs has already been defined, but the rest of the chapter will look at 
differences and similarities between them. Furthermore, a definition of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
will be offered. FDI is the necessary driving force (alongside other types of investment) behind economic 
expansion. The next section will offer a general overview of recent financial development in EMEs. This 
is followed by a section focusing more specifically on the topic of this thesis, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, 
and the role the increased investment opportunities –both in terms of inflow and outflow could come to 
play. The last section applies the New Regionalism framework to analyse investment as a sector of 
cooperation within IBSA. In other words, the last section will illustrate how, according to New 
Regionalism,  the various sub-sectors – in the context of this dissertation; investment – plays an 
important role since it allows for inclusion of a multiplicity of actors and illustrates that integration will 
occur where – and for as long as – actors benefit.  
 
5.2 EMERGING MARKETS ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT 
 
The concept investment includes a broad range of capital flows, but this thesis will focus specifically on 
FDI. FDI is generally considered the least volatile component of capital flows between countries – and is 
thus the type of investment which should be considered most desirable. This study uses the concept 
international private capital flow to cover all types of private investment flows which are cross-border. In 
other words, this dissertation uses either the total amount of investment, which is referred to as 
international private capital flow, or it will specifically focus on FDI, which is according to UNCTAD 
(2009) defined as:  
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‘an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a 
resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in 
an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor’. 
 
FDI implies that the investor exerts a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise resident in the other economy. Such investment involves both the initial transaction between 
the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among foreign affiliates. FDI may be 
undertaken by individuals as well as business entities. As a result of this influence exercised by the 
investor, one can, if the investment is large enough, be faced with a sovereignty dilemma. In other 
words, the consequences of a FDI growth can in certain cases lead to the need to redefine the host 
state’s sovereignty (a topic explored in Chapter Two).  
 
In order for an economy (emerging or not) to grow, it needs investment – foreign as well as domestic 
investment. This thesis focuses on cross-border investment, rather than domestic. Well-developed 
domestic financial systems are important in order to attract greater volumes of foreign private capital 
flows. Well-developed financial markets allow foreign investors greater confidence in a country’s 
economy, allow them to leverage foreign capital with domestic finance, provide more robust and multiple 
exit strategies, and permit opportunities to the institutional investors for equity and debt portfolio 
investments. Thus, from the policy-makers’ point of view, deep domestic financial markets increase the 
ability of the domestic financial system to absorb the volatility in international capital flows (Kohli 2008: 
35-36). In other words, a deeply integrated, advanced domestic financial market is better equipped to 
work as a buffer for external factors – such as the current global financial crisis. The reason being that, 
even if they cannot control the externalities that could potentially severely affect the economy, a well-
functioning domestic financial market allows them to more easily respond to these externalities – and 
consequently minimise the harmful effect of them. This also holds for domestic crises; the further 
developed a financial market is the more easily it will be able to remain stable when facing unexpected 
changes. 
 
On a general level, growth and development in EMEs are heavily dependent on the following economic 
and financial variables: 
• International private capital flow; 
• Development of financial markets;  
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•  The countries ability to integrate successfully with the global economy through trade and 
investment; and 
•  Their ability to forge public-private partnerships (PPPs) including in infrastructure (Kohli 2008: 
25). 
 
De La Torre and Schmukler (2007: 85- 92) take on a broader view and argue that there are four other 
variables that are very important in terms of the growth of financial markets: the income level; 
macroeconomic policies; institutions; and size. The developed countries tend to have larger financial 
markets than the developing countries. They illustrate that there is a strong correlation between the 
development of financial markets and the size of the countries’ GDPs. Furthermore, richer states tend to 
have higher-quality institutions, including better property rights and rule of law, which affects financial 
development. In addition, less developed countries generally have more volatile investment 
environments and a larger government involvement in the economy, which could affect financial 
markets. Monetary and fiscal policies, as well as overall macroeconomic stability are also positively 
related to capital market development. The reason is that financial contracting becomes more difficult in 
high-inflation environments. Firms and individuals find it more difficult to plan when future real values 
are uncertain and they are therefore less likely to engage in financial contracting when inflation is 
imperfectly predicted. High inflation rates also distort relative prices and create incentives in favour of 
short-term projects, discouraging long-run investments. Large fiscal deficit can cause macroeconomic 
volatility which reduces incentives to engage in financial contracting. 
 
It is possible to turn the situation around and suggest that these prerequisites are creating a dilemma. In 
order for their economies to grow they need investment, but in order to attract private investment they 
need to show that the economy is not only growing, but is performing well according to a broader 
macro-economic measuring tool which includes an examination of their monetary and fiscal policies as 
well as general infrastructure. As a consequence, it is apparent that many developing countries are 
struggling to reach the desired level of development due to the fact that they do not have what it takes to 
attract investment and they do not have the funds to do what is needed to get ‘what it takes.’ The 
consequence of this is, of course, that the states remain poor and marginalised.   
 
The topic of institutions needs to be further discussed. Legal and broader institutional environment plays 
an important role in the development of financial markets. Laws and enforcement mechanisms that 
protect investors, clearly defined property rights and support private contractual arrangements are 
crucial to an adequately functioning financial market. Empirical evidence shows that regulations that 
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protect creditors and minority investors are associated with deeper and more active financial markets, 
increased valuations, lower concentration of ownership and control and greater dividend payouts. A last 
aspect which might affect the capital market development is the size of the economy. More information 
is available in larger economies, which reduces information costs to all investors – foreign as well as 
local. Large economies tend to have large firms which are more likely to meet the minimum size 
threshold necessary to achieve adequate liquidity. Economies of scale might also be important in 
creating the infrastructure for financial markets, because the costs of establishing clearing and 
settlement systems and developing the legal framework for issuing and trading are mostly fixed (de la 
Torre & Schmukler 2007: 85- 92). Hence one sees that the four variables highlighted by de la Torre and 
Schmukler are indeed relevant and should be receiving attention from EMEs seeking to further develop 
their financial markets. It is however important to keep in mind that in many cases increased investment 
is needed in order to adequately meet these goals. This fact emphasises a dilemma which weighs 
heavily on many EMEs’ shoulders. 
 
EMEs are often treated as one entity, it is however important to note that, while there are many 
similarities between EMEs, there are also significant differences. First of all, a concept like the macro-
economic policy varies from country to country. Furthermore, depending on external global events some 
countries might be enjoying an exhilarating investment climate while others are suffering under a 
drought. Consequently, one is left with a situation where although it might be in EMEs interests to 
cooperate in order to draw investment to the South in general, they might also find themselves in a 
position where they have to compete with their supposedly allied economies in order to be the recipient 
of the larger proportion of investment inflows. In addition to this, it is important to keep in mind that a 
substantial amount of the investment flows are considered to be of high liquidity, a fact which suggests 
that it could easily be moved and one cannot trust that all that is required in order to ensure a 
continuation of a ten year growth period is to leave the major macro-economic policies unaltered. Brazil 
can be used as an example of this. Out of all EMEs, Brazil was in 1994-95 the largest recipient of 
private capital flows. However, by 2004-05 China, Hong Kong and Taipei (Taiwan) were the top three 
recipients while Brazil was now number ten on the list. This is only one example of how the investment 
climate can change rapidly over a relatively short period of time, another change that commonly occurs 
is the change in composition of these flows. FDIs- which traditionally have been the largest and the least 
volatile component- have risen steadily from US$ 191 billion in 1998 to US$ 316 billion in 2005 (63% of 
total net flow). Equity flows have increased from US$ 46 to US$ 178 over the same period, while debt 
flows have grown from US$ 35 billion to US$ 56 billion. Thus a general increase is apparent and for the 
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stability of relatively fragile economies it should be positive news that the largest growing component is 
in fact the least volatile one – the FDI (Kohli 2008: 30-31). 
 
India, Brazil and South Africa are amongst the EMEs that are performing well in terms of these 
variables. In all countries the income levels are relatively high, they are generally perceived to have 
sound macroeconomic policies and well established (compared to other countries of the South) 
institutions. In addition, they are large economies. However, they all need investment in order to 
continue expanding and this chapter will explore how IBSA could facilitate such an expansion. 
 
5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING MARKETS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
Financial globalisation has, similarly to other forms of globalisation, expanded to a degree that it has 
become difficult to ignore. Many new developments have taken place in the last three decades, bringing 
about significant changes to financial markets in both developed and developing nations. However, 
despite the perception of widespread financial globalisation, the international financial system is far from 
being perfectly integrated, and there is evidence of persistent financial market segregation both across 
and within countries (de la Torre & Schmukler 2007: 8). In the past decade, there has been a notable 
increase in international private capital flows to EMEs. Most of these flows were, until the 1990s, 
concentrated in a few countries situated in Asia and Latin America. However, in the past few years this 
phenomenon has changed and a much larger number of developing countries are currently recipients of 
substantial private capital flows. These capital flows are significant both in absolutely terms as well as 
relative to the countries gross national products. Simultaneously, the net capital flows to EMEs from 
official sources – multilateral and bilateral financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
regional development banks, the EU and national aid agencies – have dropped considerably since 
1998. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only exception being the only region still receiving an increasingly large 
capital flow from official sources (Kohli 2008: 24). 
 
The low interest rate environment and generous liquidity conditions in the US and most other 
industrialised countries have led to an increase in the private capital flows to the EMEs, due to the fact 
that investors are likely to receive higher returns on investments in EMEs with relatively high interests 
rates (Kohli 2008: 66). Due to the fact that the pay-offs on investments in the relatively saturated 
markets of the North were decreasing investors were looking for new investment opportunities that 
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could yield larger pay-offs – this they found in the developing countries, or more specifically the 
emerging markets. Emerging markets have the added benefit in comparison with the poorest countries 
that they have better infrastructure in place as well as at least some beneficial macro-economic policies 
that allow investors to maximize their yields while still not investing in markets where the risk is 
considered excessively high. Although there is a forever present risk involved in the increasing financing 
of the emerging markets, these are smaller than in many other, especially underdeveloped, economies. 
In order to minimise the risks involved, capital market development policies need to take into account 
the intrinsic characteristics of developing countries such as small size, illiquid markets, lack of risk 
diversification, presence of weak currencies, and prevalence of systemic risk (de la Torre & Schmukler 
2007: 23). The fact that policies which aims at minimising the risk involved, have been constructed has 
created a tendency of growing interests in the EMEs – this carries with it immense opportunities of 
economic growth and the subsequent upliftment of the markets in question. The EMEs have managed 
to improve their attractiveness as an asset class and the investor base has been broadened so that 
currently more dedicated and longer-term investors are operating in EMEs (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 72). 
 
The risks associated with investing in EMEs are generally higher than investing in a developed country. 
From a policy-maker’s point of view, as already mentioned, deep domestic financial markets increase 
the ability of the domestic financial system to absorb the volatility in international capital flows. 
Therefore, it is of paramount importance for the developing world to ensure a continuous integration of 
their financial markets into the global economy. De la Torre and Schmukler (2007: 4-5) argue that the 
failure to develop deep and efficient capital markets have important consequences since financial 
development is not just correlated with a healthy economy; it actually causes economic growth and has 
a positive impact on poverty alleviation and income distribution as well. Consequently, a better 
understanding of the drivers of capital market development and the reasons for the perceived failure of 
reform efforts in many emerging economies can provide useful guidance to policy-makers. 
  
In terms of the IBSA Dialogue Forum and its members, one sees that the level of integration of their 
respective financial markets varies substantially. Even within the different regions one sees a strongly 
varying degree of financial market integration. Similar reforms have been applied to most developing 
countries, but the result has not been the same. East Asia, for instance, shows a higher payoff for 
reforms compared to Latin America and Africa, in terms of local capital market development, though a 
lesser impact with respect to integration with global financial markets. Possible reasons for this includes 
differences in savings rates, degree of macroeconomic volatility, degree of ‘home bias’ and time zones 
to mention some (de la Torre & Schmukler 2007: xii). These are important aspects especially in terms of 
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stability since an undeveloped, yet integrated financial market will be highly vulnerable to events in the 
global financial market. Consequently, in order to achieve economic growth and development, 
integration of financial markets must be coupled with a drive towards developing the domestic markets. 
This need has been highlighted during the current global financial crisis. This crisis has made it more 
difficult for EMEs to attract investors. There are various reasons for this, the first one being the fact that 
like many other economies most EMEs are facing, or are in the middle of, a recession. In addition to 
this, in times of crisis investors will naturally tend to invest as safe as possible – a time of crisis is not 
when investors are likely to take chances – and most EMEs are considered to be high risk markets, and 
are thus less attractive in the eyes of investors than what they would otherwise be.  
 
A number of factors underpin the overall historic expansion of FDI into EMEs. These factors include the: 
• continued robust global economic growth (until 2008) and its offshoot in the commodity price 
boom;  
• strong corporate profits in EMEs and the resulting re-investment of a large proportion of those 
profits in the host country (according to the World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2008: internet) 
reinvested earnings accounted for about 30% of total FDI inflows to the developing world in 
2007);  
• changing nature of the multi-national corporation from home-country centric to what has been 
termed ‘the globally integrated enterprise’ (reflected for instance in the greater willingness of 
multinational companies to fund research and development (R&D) in subsidiaries in the EMEs); 
and 
• the much improved macro-economic climate in many of EMEs; and 
• generally improved investment climate.  
 
All these positive developments have been complemented by significant financial innovations, including: 
• structured financial instruments, such as credit default swaps and other derivatives, which have 
allowed for improved risk management of EMEs investments; 
• the development of local financial markets that have created a synergy with FDI inflows; 
• increased privatisation and cross-border mergers and acquisitions; and  
• the ongoing scramble for natural resources (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 73).  
 
All these factors have allowed for great changes in emerging market economies. International private 
capital flows have now become the primary source of foreign capital in well-performing developing 
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countries (Kohli 2008: 26). The positive effect of this on a country’s GDP is undisputed; however, the 
effect of this on a country and its citizens in general is a completely different question all together. In 
other words, it might result in economic growth, but it might not result in social development. Unless the 
policy-makers manage to find ways to ensure that increased FDI inflows benefits a larger group than the 
people directly involved, full advantage of this positive development is not taken, and one should revisit 
the policy-making processes.  
 
So far the opportunities and necessities for economic growth have been highlighted. However there are 
also common weaknesses which are associated with EMEs’ financial systems. These include: 
• Low savings rates that have hindered the deepening of domestic financial markets. An example 
of this is Latin America in the 1990s; 
• unstable macro-economic environment which hinders financial system development, with 
chronic inflation, periodic external crisis, and intermittent deposit freezes, imposing heavy 
losses on holders of financial assets; 
• structural factors, mostly micro-economic and institutional in nature, deters bank lending and 
the creation of a strong credit culture; and 
• highly volatile capital inflows are always a concern in an economy – whether considered 
emerging or not (Sheng in Kohli 2008:181). 
 
Despite these negative aspects, the overall developments over the past decade have been positive. It 
is, however, essential to highlight the fact that there are no guarantees that it will continue being a 
positive experience. Some EMEs are at risk under the current global financial developments. Some 
countries have large external imbalances that seem to be fuelled by rapid credit growth to the private 
sector- this was a characteristic of some of the countries in East Asia before the crisis of 1997. In 
addition to this, large fiscal deficits are a problem and large short-term external debt have been built up, 
most of it in foreign currency, and, additionally, many EMEs have large net international investment 
liabilities. A key question here is whether these developments have made the EMEs vulnerable to 
sudden stops in the flow of foreign capital. In this regard it is worth highlighting that some of the 
countries most severely affected by the Asian crisis were enjoying good credit ratings, which dropped 
sharply and suddenly as foreign capital flows reversed (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 71). Consequently, it 
should be made explicit in an analysis that there is a substantial amount of volatility associated with the 
concept of investment. Through a conscious effort, where taking precautions is of paramount 
importance, it is however possible to diminish the risk involved, and to ensure more stability than what is 
the case in the current financial markets.  
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In the years to come, external risks could prove challenging as investors will increasingly differentiate 
among EMEs. In particular, as external financial conditions become less benign EMEs with macro-
economic imbalances and those that still rely heavily on external financing face a narrower margin for 
policy slippages. Therefore, with the current global economic crisis a word of caution is necessary when 
discussing emerging markets and their ability to attract international private capital flows. Although a 
majority of EMEs, especially the IBSA members, are considered to have stable macro-economic 
policies in comparison to many other countries of the South, this is not so when compared to for 
instance the US, the EU and Japan. Consequently, in ‘credit crunch’ times investors are likely to be 
more hesitant to invest in emerging market economies and will rather invest where the risk is as small 
as possible (knowing that the yield will not be what it could have been if invested in an emerging market 
economy). 
 
In this regard, it is important to highlight the concept ‘reputation’. A state’s reputation is of greater 
importance when discussing investment, than when discussing for instance trade – the reason for this 
is, among other things, that trade has more tangible outcomes than investment. A good reputation is of 
paramount importance since it will increase the chances of investors not pulling out. If the IBSA 
members manage, through cooperation in the financial sectors, to create markets which are perceived 
to be stable, high-yielding and relatively risk free they should be able to easily attract new and larger 
amounts of FDI. It is even possible that they could create a reputation for themselves, in which financial 
cross-border activity with any of them is viewed as beneficial and almost have a ‘IBSA seal’ which 
ensure lower risks and higher pay-offs than what other countries can offer.  
 
EMEs that still have sizeable vulnerabilities in the fiscal position, and public sector balance sheets are 
more susceptible to pressures in their external accounts (and to crises more generally). On top of this, 
policy-makers in both mature markets and in EMEs are facing renewed challenges. Central banks need 
to communicate effectively to financial markets their assessment of inflation risks and their resolve to 
contain inflation. Furthermore, financial institutions need to boost their efforts to monitor and manage 
risk, especially counterparty risk vis-à-vis hedge funds, private equity firms and those selling credit 
default swaps. Active debt management policies should continue as part of an overall plan to develop 
and strengthen local capital markets and deepen the institutional base (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 71-72).  
 
So far it has been established that EMEs have, on a general level, experienced exceptional growth 
rates, but that there is no guarantee that this will continue and that external factors could end up 
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severely hampering further growth in many EMEs. This is true when discussing EMEs as one unit, it is, 
however, important to keep in mind that although there is a rapid increase in FDI flows to EMEs, there 
are strong limitations to which sectors and countries that are benefiting from this growth. The top 10 
recipient countries account for approximately 65 percent of total FDI flows to EMEs. East Asia and the 
Pacific remain the largest regional FDI destination. However, both Latin America and Eastern European 
countries as well as Central Asia have seen a rapid increase in FDI inflows. The Middle East, South 
Asia and Africa are all regions that attract only a modest share of the FDI (roughly 15 percent of the 
total), the share has however, increased by over 50 percent since 2000 (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 74). 
Consequently, one sees that there is a large disparity within the countries referred to as EMEs. One 
very essential aspect in this regard is the fact that although there is a general growth of investment flows 
to EMEs it is possible that certain EMEs could be experiencing large degrees of disinvestment. All that 
is need is for one country, for instance, South Africa to experience a decrease in investment inflow lower 
than the increase of investment inflows to, for instance, India. 
 
A further break-down of the investment figures in terms of regions is necessary in order to understand 
the development that has taken place in relatively recent history. FDI flows to EMEs have increased 
more than 10-fold from a modest US$ 20 billion in 1990 to about US$ 237billion in 2005. Including all 
developing countries, and looking at this figure two years later one sees that it has reached more than 
US$ 500 billion (which was a 21 percent increase from 2006) (UNCTAD 12 August 2009: internet). In 
this regard it is however vital to keep in mind that in the period following the Asian crisis there was a 
sharp decline of FDI flow to EMEs. An empirical example of the fact that in times of crisis investors 
choose, as discussed above, to go the ‘low risk and yield’ route. Furthermore, it emphasizes the fact 
that EMEs are often treated as one (investors do not distinguish between the various EMEs) and that 
crisis in one region will flow into other (unrelated) regions and influence development there. Another 
significant aspect, especially in the context of this paper is the fact that FDI (and capital flows in general) 
between countries situated in the South has increased relatively rapidly and has partly offset the decline 
in North-South flows. In other words, while the global FDI figures (US$ 1833 billion in 2007) have 
increased in the past decade, the majority of the increase in developing countries comes from capital 
inflow from other developing countries. The South-South FDI flow increased from US$ 14 billion in 2003 
while North-South FDI declined from US$ 130 billion in 1999 to US$ 82 billion in 2003. The change in 
these figures has led to an increase in the share of South-South FDI in total FDI to developing countries 
from 16 percent to 36 percent over the same period. Furthermore, along with the increase in FDI, there 
has been a surge in external flows into the equity markets in EMEs. This has contributed to the 
unprecedented rise in market indices since the late 1990s (Boorman in Kholi 2008: 72-75). 
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These changes are driven by many of the same factors that have led to closer integration across much 
of the world in the past decade. As an example, the majority of developing countries, led by the EMEs, 
have become more open to foreign investment over the past 10 years. These changes, however, reflect 
the increasing share of world trade that is taking place between developing countries and the even more 
rapid growth of trade between developing countries within the same region- spurred in part, by the 
explosion in regional trade arrangements (as discussed in Chapter Four) – suggesting that FDI often 
follows, or runs parallel with trade (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 74).  
 
Another aspect in terms of South-South FDI is the fact that it used to generally flow between countries in 
the same region. However, a recent development is that China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Russia 
(as well as other developing countries) are breaking this tendency as their search for (especially) natural 
resources has become an increasingly important motivation for expansion of FDI flows. As an example, 
in 2004, 50 percent of China’s outward FDI was directed towards Latin American natural resource 
projects.  One of the reasons for this development in China and other developing countries is the 
increasingly larger role played by state enterprises, or by inducements provided by export-import banks 
and various subsidy mechanisms, in the search for natural resources (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 75-76). 
This phenomenon of EMEs investing in other EMEs outside their respective regions is, as mentioned, 
relatively new, and has not received much attention as of yet – which suggest that it is a possible focus 
area for the IBSA members, allowing them to achieve great benefits. The reason behind the fact that not 
much attention has been paid to EMEs investing in other EMEs which are geographically further a field 
is that the size of such outward flows is minute (and there is a lack of consistent data), since this kind of 
FDI has historically been intra-regional rather than global. However, now that both the scope and size 
has increased dramatically it is a development worthy of attention. Such attention has been given to this 
development by the Emerging Markets Forum (EMF) and they have focused on providing a venue for 
policy-makers and private business leaders to understand, debate and analyze this new concept (Kholi 
2008: 32). The members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum should investigate findings done by the EMF in 
order to best establish a way forward for these three states. In other words, they should focus on 
determining how they could benefit from the possibilities attached to enhancing and expanding their 
financial markets.  
 
One cannot discuss the topic of outward FDI flows from EMEs without offering some figures that can 
illustrate just how rapid this growth had been. In 1995, South-South FDI flows were only at 16 percent, 
but by 2003 it was 36 percent and in 2005 it constituted half of the total flow.  In 2005, outward FDI flows 
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from EMEs were valued at US$ 133 billion, which equals 50 percent of total inward FDI flows to EMEs. 
Keeping in mind the developing world’s traditional role as a recipient, rather than the investor, one 
realizes the magnitude of the changes that have occurred in the past 15 years. This recent emergence 
of large-scale outward FDI from EMEs shows that the time cycle within which countries change from 
being capital importers to major capital exporters has been considerably shortened, and relatively low 
per capita GDP does not have to be an obstacle for FDI outward flows (Kholi 2008: 32-33). This is 
promising for the IBSA members in terms of further integrating their financial markets and to 
subsequently ensure economic growth. Yet again, one sees evidence of the fact that changes occur 
rapidly and that most of these capital flows can, and in most cases will, be moved rapidly according to 
which markets are considered more beneficial by the investors- this is generally a trade off between the 
risk and the yield factor, where the emerging markets are viewed to be riskier, but offering better pay-
offs than the developed countries’ markets.  
 
Similar to the fact that not all EMEs are equally attractive to the investors, some sectors are generally 
more attractive than others, in terms of South-South FDI flows these include: pharmaceuticals, shipping, 
steel, textiles and information technology services. According to Hauser (in Kohli 2008: 34) the main 
drivers of South-South FDI flows do not differ much from the factors fuelling FDI inflows to the EMEs: 
• strong growth and maturing of domestic markets;  
• rise in regional trade, production networks and related FDI;  
• liberalisation and privatisation of infrastructure sectors;  
• comparative advantage of emerging markets Multinational Cooperations (MNCs) in investing in 
other developing countries; and  
• the countries’ desire to secure markets and sources of essential energy and other raw 
materials. 
 
It is thus fair to argue that the investors in the South are not all too different from the investors from the 
North. They do however in many cases have one very important advantage. The investors based in the 
South often have a better understanding of the workings of the host economy; as a consequence they 
are better equipped to take on the challenge of investing in a foreign developing country and are hence 
also more likely to be successful at it. This is an aspect that is of paramount importance in terms of this 
thesis. According to New Regionalism, regionalisation occurs in various speeds and scopes and it 
includes a wide array of aspects such as for instance culture and similar socio-economic situations. It is 
evident that the fact that there is a deep understanding (an understanding that will only continue to grow 
as the IBSA members are becoming increasingly integrated) between investors from India, Brazil and 
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South Africa works in their advantage as it increases the likelihood of a more successful interaction 
between investors from the respective countries.  
 
This section has explored investment in relation to EMEs and has established that investment in these 
markets is growing and more importantly that an increasingly large percentage of this growth comes 
from investors situated in other emerging markets. It is however necessary to draw attention to the fact 
that although there has been some positive development in the past 15 years a word of caution is 
needed due to the fact that when the global financial markets are struggling, emerging market 
economies are generally the ones feeling the crunch first. The next section will place these facts in the 
context of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. 
 
5.4 IBSA AND INVESTMENT 
 
In terms of the focus of this dissertation, India, Brazil and South Africa, one sees that these countries 
and their respective regions’ financial systems have reached differing levels of integrations. Looking at 
the various regions it is clear that on a general level the Asian financial systems are deeper than those 
in Latin America and Africa. Asia has been more willing to integrate with global financial markets and 
subsequently there has been a focus on transformation of existing institutions and on accelerating 
development of regional markets. Latin America, on the other hand, is more inward looking and 
uncertain (or indecisive) as to how to handle globalisation. Most African countries are still too 
underdeveloped to have financial markets that can compare to the ones found in Europe, the US and 
other more advanced areas of the developing world. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is the only 
exception in this regard, with a well-established financial market and relatively sound infrastructure 
(Kohli 2008: 38). These varying levels of integration are of paramount importance due to the fact that 
they correspond to the level of investor interests received as well as to the benefits associated with 
investing in these regions. Additionally, it opens up a more rapid economic growth in the economies with 
more integrated financial markets.  
 
The state of financial markets in many emerging economies looks particularly poor when considering 
the amount of efforts that have been taken to improve the macroeconomic environment and reform the 
institutions believed to foster financial development. This disappointing performance has made the 
conventional policy recommendations for capital market development questionable and policy-makers 
are left without clear guidance on how to revise the reform agenda, and many of them do not envision a 
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bright future for domestic capital markets, particularly for the smaller emerging economies (de la Torre & 
Schmukler 2007: 1). India, Brazil and South Africa are all among the more powerful and larger EMEs, 
and it is thus vital that these countries set an example for its small, poorer and less powerful neighbours. 
Not only should an example be set that could function as an inspiration for the weaker neighbour, but 
development of these three countries’ financial markets would bring down the cost of knowledge 
transfer, it will also decrease the cost of such transfer and it is likely that some sort of trickle down effect 
will occur, where the smaller neighbours indirectly benefits from the achievements of the IBSA 
members.  
 
It seems as if the IBSA members have already started this process of initiating increased cooperation on 
the Southern hemisphere. South-South trade has grown steadily during the past few years. According to 
Soko (2006: 5), developing countries accounted for (in 2006) 32% of global trade, and 41% of the 
exports of developing countries go to other developing countries. It is estimated that two-thirds of South-
South trade takes place in Asia. However, countries of  other regions are also strongly represented, next 
to China countries such as South Africa, Chile, Mexico and Brazil are also key sources of investment 
outflows (Soko 2006: 6). South-South trade remains hampered by North-South trade. This is arguably 
due to the fact that many developing nation states produce similar products and therefore compete for 
access to developed country markets. These are areas where focus should not be placed, as it has the 
potential to hamper the integration process – as the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum will be 
competitors rather than allies.  
 
It has been established that after four consecutive years of growth, global FDI inflows rose in 2007 by 
30 percent reaching US$ 1833 billion, substantially above the previous all-time high set in 2000. Despite 
the financial and credit crises, which began in the second half of 2007, all the three major economic 
groupings – developed countries, developing countries and the transition economies of South-East 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – saw continued growth in their inflows. 
FDI inflows into developed countries reached US$ 1248 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD 12 August 2008: 
internet). 
 
In the developing world, FDI inflows reached their highest level ever of US$ 500 billion – which is a 
21percent increase since 2006. Simultaneously, developing countries continued to gain importance as 
sources of FDI, with outflows reaching a new record level of US$ 253 billion – which was mainly a result 
of the outwards expansion by Asian MNCs. The three largest recipients were China and Russia – the 
former illustrated in Figure 3 (UNCTAD 12 August 2008: internet).  
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The graphs below illustrate the FDI outflows and inflows associated with India, Brazil, South Africa and 
China since 1994 to 2006. The reason why China is included in these charts is that the Chinese 
economy has, in the past decade, experienced growth rarely surpassed in history. Hence it is a 
yardstick illustrating that even though there is room for improvement, the IBSA members are indeed 
large emerging markets with substantial FDI activities.  
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Source: IMF (www.imf.org)  
 
FDI has already been defined, but it is worth re-capturing: FDI inflows and outflows comprise capital 
provided (either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI 
enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor from a FDI enterprise. FDI includes, according 
to Beyond 20/20 (UNCTAD 15 August 2009: internet), the following three components: equity capital, 
reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. These figures are net, which means that it is capital 
transactions’ credits less debits between direct investors and their foreign affiliates. Therefore, when the 
figures are negative (as seen in these graphs) it means that one of the three FDI components is 
negative, and this is not offset by positive amounts of the remaining components. This is referred to as 
disinvestment or reverse investment (UNCTAD 15 August 2009: internet). Since the purpose of this 
chapter is not to perform an in-depth analysis of India, Brazil, South Africa and China historical financial 
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sector trajectories, but rather to offer a brief look at the recent historical trends of these financial sectors, 
focus will not be on explaining what internal and external variables that triggered the disinvestment at 
certain points, but disinvestment is an important concept (due to the consequences it has for the 
economy) and thus this concept had to be briefly explained in order to avoid confusion on this topic.  
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Source: IMF (www.imf.org) 
 
The first graph shows that, from 1994 to 2000, all four countries were relatively similar in terms of FDI 
outflows, and they were all fairly low – ranging from approximately US$ -3.5 billion to US$ 6.5 billion. 
Brazil has, although more unstable than its counterparts, increased their FDI outflows drastically in the 
last couple of years. Suggesting that Brazil has, in recent years, altered focus (as discussed in Chapter 
Three) and is now more active on foreign markets than it has historically been (currently exceeding even 
China). India’s FDI outflow was the lowest of the four from 1994 to 2000 and continued to remain low 
thereafter, despite the fact that the other countries started focusing on investing in foreign markets. 
India’s FDI outflow only started increasing substantially in 2005, peaking at almost US$ 10 billion in 
2006 (IMF 17 August 2009: internet).  
 
South Africa’s FDI outflow is more volatile than that of its counterparts. It reached a low point in 2001 
(China actually reached a then-record high FDI outflow of almost US$ 7 billion), but has subsequently 
been increasing leading to a FDI outflow level of approximately US$ 7 billion by 2006 (the lowest of the 
 115 
four). China’s FDI development has, like South Africa’s, been somewhat volatile since 2000 – growing 
from then on, peaking in 2001, before dipping and reaching its lowest point in 2003. Since 2003, the 
Chinese FDI outflow has been growing relatively rapidly sitting above US$ 20 billion by 2006, as figure 2 
indicates. Consequently, one sees that it is, based on the four countries illustrated in figure 2, difficult to 
make prediction as the development up till date has been anything but stable. However, one thing can 
be established, is the fact that all countries are investing a substantially larger amount of FDI today than 
what they did in 1994-5. The smallest increase has been experienced by South Africa – over the time 
period in question FDI outflows increased by approximately US$ 5 billion – while Brazil went from just 
over US$ 1 billion in 1994 to US$ more than US$ 28 billion in 2006 (IMF 17 August 2009: internet).  
 
The Foreign Direct Investment inflows are shown in figure 3. In this chart it is evident that China has a 
clearly stronger ability to attract foreign investment. Although not always very stable, there has been a 
continuous growth in FDI inflows experienced in the Chinese economy. By 2006 the value of FDI inflows 
reached almost US$ 80 billion. Brazil’s FDI inflow history since 1994 has been much more unstable than 
the one of China, reaching a record high between 1998 and 2000. By 2006 however it has decreased to 
less than US$ 20 billion, which is barely higher than India’s FDI inflow the same year. India’s FDI inflow 
history from 1994 to 2005 is stable and very low; however, a sharp increase was seen from 2005 to 
2006, arguably spurred by the vague optimistic trend from 2001 to 2005. South Africa had, due to 
political reasons, close to zero FDI flowing into the country in 1994, and it took three years before this 
changed – in 1997 a small peak is visible. This was followed by a decrease before a new boom in FDI 
inflows was registered in 2001 – again followed by a contraction before booming again in 2005. 
However, between 2005 and 2006 a large decline was experienced, leaving South Africa below where it 
started – in the context of this chart – at below zero, in other words, the South African economy was 
experiencing a disinvestment in 2006. One sees from figure 3 that, with the exception of South Africa, all 
these countries have experienced periods of both growth and contraction. However, the periods of 
growth seem to have been stronger than the contracting periods; suggesting that all but South Africa is 
better capable of attracting FDI than what they were 15 years ago. In terms of further collaboration of 
the IBSA Dialogue Forum this illustrates how South Africa could actually benefit from knowledge 
transfer, it suggest that through closer cooperation between the three countries they could actually 
increase both each other’s FDI inflows and outflows and that a regional integration initiative like the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum could end up having immensely positive consequences for these countries’ 
abilities to attract FDI – and to subsequently ensure an economic expansion.  
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Similarly to these two figures illustrating strongly varying FDI flows, it has also been established that the 
financial markets vary greatly from one EME to another. Asian financial systems are generally deeper 
than those in Latin-America; despite the fact that the latter’s GDP per capita is a multiple of that of Asia. 
The same holds for Africa; there is much room or improvement, even more so than both in Latin 
America and Asia. Furthermore, although Asia was hit hard by the crisis in 1997, the region as a whole 
has managed to rebound strongly and is today much sounder than its counterparts in Latin-America and 
Africa (Kohli 2008: 38). These two facts illustrate that high GDP per capita is not needed in order for a 
country to become an important source of FDI outflow – a fact that was discussed in the previous 
section when exploring the increase of South-South FDI. Moreover, it suggests that deeper integration – 
while it could be potentially damaging in times of crisis – allows for a rapid increase when the global 
economy is moving out of crisis. In other words, economies with less integrated financial markets will, as 
discussed earlier, still suffer in time of crisis, but they tend to suffer under the double disadvantage of 
taking longer to pick up the pace after the being hurt by a crisis.  
 
This emphasise both the need for India, Brazil and South Africa to focus on improving their financial 
systems and it suggests that in time of crises (as is experienced at the moment) it is important for 
emerging markets to work together in order to minimize the adverse effect of such a crisis. This latter 
aspect is more important to EMEs than to certain other economies due to the fact that they often seem 
to suffer under the arguably unfair perception that crisis in one region of the world increases the risk 
associated with investing in another region.  
 
As the name suggests, the achievements made by EMEs are considerable, and India, Brazil and South 
Africa are ahead of many other developing countries. However, the fact that financial markets’ 
development tend to not keep pace with the respective real sectors suggests that there is still a long 
way to go, before these financial markets are sufficiently developed (Kohli 2008: 35). An example of this 
is found when exploring the financial markets in Latin-America – these markets are, as already 
mentioned, known to be ahead of African markets, but behind many Asian markets. One sees that 
Latin-America counts for five percent of global GDP, but only two percent of global financial assets 
(Kohli 2008: 37). Therefore, one may argue that through focusing on enhancing the investment climate 
Latin-America, as well as other emerging markets, will fuel economic growth. This is an important 
aspect for the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum – as leading countries of the South they could 
work towards creating a trend where their reputations are enhanced, and consequently, investors’ 
confidence will increase. In addition, through a drive towards facilitating increased investment by 
focusing on improving their infrastructure, these EMEs are likely to become more attractive in the eyes 
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of the foreign investors. What is important here is that it is countries like India, Brazil and South Africa 
(along with China, Russia and a few other powerful EMEs) that need to initiate such changes, since they 
are the only ones with the capabilities and the resources to do so.  
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum has the potential of playing a paramount role in improving the member’s 
financial markets and to subsequently attract a larger amount of international capital flows. In terms of 
regions, Southern Africa and Latin America could look to Asia for lessons as to how to enhance their 
already existing financial markets. Through cooperation (in the shape of, for instance, knowledge 
transfer) these regions, but more specifically India, Brazil and South Africa could build solid, well-
functioning financial markets which would allow them to attract foreign private capitals flow, which again 
would lead to general economic growth. A further aspect is that the three member countries could be 
used by poorer less developed countries as ‘role models’ in the process of improving financial markets. 
Consequently, one sees that as more advanced EMEs India, Brazil and South Africa have separately an 
important role to play, through a solid group effort the gains available could be amplified.  
 
It is not only in terms of attracting private foreign capital flows that a coalition such as the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum could have an important role to play. As already established above, the amount of South-South 
FDI has increased rapidly in recent years. Various possible explanations have already been mentioned. 
However, one reason will be further discussed here; namely that developing country multinationals are 
possibly enjoying some advantages over industrial country businesses when investing in developing 
countries due to their familiarity with technology and business practices suitable for the various markets 
in the developing world. In fact, the forces driving South-South FDI appear sufficiently powerful to 
overcome the greater impediments sometimes faced by developing country multinationals in their home 
country, including bureaucratic and financial constraints on outward investment. Additionally, close ties 
such as for instance the large Indian population in South Africa or Brazil’s population’s ties with Africa 
could come into play and open doors that would otherwise be closed. In other words, one sees that 
even the cultural aspect of integration comes into play (much aligned with New Regionalist theory). 
While investors from industrial countries should intuitively be enjoying a benefit due to more firmly 
established practices this is often not so, instead multinationals from other developing countries are 
benefiting from an if not shared, at least similar business culture and socio-economic situation. In 
addition to this, a fellow ‘Southerner’ might meet more cooperative policy-makers, civil servants and 
host people in general, especially when they are able to better interpret and adjust to what is going on 
around them (Boorman in Kohli 2008: 75).  
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According to the Delhi Summit Declaration of October 2008 the IBSA members have the following to 
say on the financial system and the international financial crisis: 
 
‘The leaders took note of the very serious financial crisis that has spread from the United States 
to the European Union and has begun to impact development countries. This unprecedented 
turbulence in financial markets and the resulting instability threatens global prosperity. The 
explosion of new financial instruments, unaccompanied by credible and systemic regulation, 
has resulted amongst others in a major crisis of confidence for which those responsible should 
be held accountable and liable. Developing countries are not immune from this and many would 
be very seriously affected. The leaders, therefore, stressed the need for a new international 
initiative to bring about structural reforms in the world’s financial system. The new initiative must 
take into account the fact that ethics must also apply to the economy; that the crisis would not 
be overcome with palliative measures and that the solutions adopted must be global and ensure 
the full participation of developing countries. The reform must be undertaken so as to 
incorporate stronger systems of multinational consultations and surveillance as an integral part. 
This new system must be designed to be as inclusive as possible and must be transparent’ 
(IBSA 8 June 2009: internet). 
 
One must keep in mind that, at the time of the IBSA Summit, the global financial crisis of 2008-09 was 
only in its beginning stages, and it is sure to be further discussed in the next Summit, when indeed the 
countries have felt more of the adverse effect of it. However, it is included here due to the fact that this 
could be the introduction to a much broader focus on financial systems, investment and the role these 
three emerging markets could come to play in the strive to enhance the position of the South in the 
global financial markets.  
 
Investment is but one sector of cooperation that could end up being of paramount importance to the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum. Much potential exists in terms of first of all, investing in each other’s countries, 
and subsequently not only help building each other’s economies, but also making themselves less 
dependent on FDI from developed states – a fact that will make them more independent when it comes 
to negotiation in international organisations such as the WTO and the UN. Secondly, when it comes to 
cooperating in the process of attracting investment to the EMEs, as the more advanced EMEs these 
three countries can help build both the reputation of the EMEs as a group as well as assisting other less 
integrated EMEs in building financial systems which will allow them to increase their attractiveness in 
the eyes of foreign investors. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that movement of private 
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capital flows is largely dependent on reputation and expectations. All IBSA members are countries that 
enjoy better reputations and higher performance expectations than most countries of the South- an 
opportunity that they should not ignore. IBSA countries could possibly enhance both the reputation and 
expectations of EMEs in general through an increased focus on improving their respective financial 
markets and hence make them more attractive to foreign investors. 
 
5.5 NEW REGIONALISM AND INVESTMENT 
 
While New Regionalism does not offer many thoughts on the concept of investment per se, it is 
necessary to discuss this concept in terms of the framework of this thesis. This section applies the New 
Regionalist framework and analyse investment as a sub-topic of the IBSA Dialogue Forum – allowing for 
a more generic analysis, one that could be applicable to other sub-topic of cooperation as well. The 
reason for choosing this angle is the fact that the focus of this dissertation is not on the concept of 
investment – instead investment is used to illustrate opportunities associated with a further integration of 
the IBSA Dialogue Forum – and investment should thus be viewed as only one of the sub-sectors where 
further integration could be beneficial.  
 
This study argues that the most important potential of the IBSA Dialogue Forum is not found in an 
increased focus on trade integration. Rather IBSA’s strength is found in, first of all, political issues, like 
reform and democratisation of the international structure – an ambition one of the countries cannot 
achieve on their own, and which is a long-term process even when India, Brazil and South Africa join 
forces and put all their might behind this goal. Secondly, a concept which might prove to carry greater 
benefits for India, Brazil and South Africa (and the developing world in general) is investment. Through 
improving the investment climate in the three member states the subsequent increase in investment and 
economic growth will augment the IBSA Dialogue Forum global leverage – a fact which will assist in 
achieving the first goal. This is what New Regionalism refers to as a re-conceptualisation of a region. 
That these three countries need to determine what factors should be included in their cooperation efforts 
and what form the coalition should take. Consequently, one sees a need of ensuring that the focus is 
not too narrow, in order to allow the various fields to influence, and be building blocks, for each other. 
However, at the same time the focus should be specific enough to allow for tangible goals to be set – 
and to be achieved. A too wide focus will lead to inefficiency and difficulties in making strategies that 
can effortlessly be translated into easily achievable goals. Thus a balance must be created – which New 
Regionalist allows with their eclectic approach towards regional integration – where the focus is broad 
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and flexible enough to allow for a dynamic integration, but simultaneously specific enough to avoid 
inefficiency and to create clear, tangible goals. An additional aspect that is important to highlight in 
terms of New Regionalism is that due to the fact that it has an eclectic approach to regionalisation it also 
allows for the members of IBSA to choose which variables to focus on at any given time, and it thus 
allows for a constant re-conceptualisation of the coalition and the integration process. Therefore, it is up 
to the members to decide, operating within the constraints of the global structure, in which way and to 
what extent the integration process will be driven by integration of their financial markets. 
 
States have, as argued by Hettne (in Hettne et al 2000: xx), accepted, on a general level, that there are 
threats to their survival that they are not capable of handling on their own. As a consequence of this, 
most states have realized that in order to cope with the global transformation which is continuously 
taking place it is necessary for them to cooperate, across borders. As the world is going through 
changes the states have been forced to make adjustment in order to handle these changes. The topic of 
investment in the current global economy is only one example illustrating this. As the definition of 
‘national security’ changed – or rather broadened – one sees that protecting and attracting investment is 
indeed one aspect of national security, due to the fact that it potentially brings about economic growth, 
social development – and subsequently, socio-economic stability. Many countries (including the IBSA 
members) are unable to efficiently adjust to the global transformation on their own and a coalition like 
the IBSA Dialogue Forum could be used as a platform advocating the interest of EMEs – or more 
specifically of India, Brazil and South Africa – in the current global economic crisis. Regions are 
therefore, as argued by Hettne et al (1999: 11), an emerging phenomenon, and this phenomenon must 
be understood in the context of globalisation. In other words, the poorer and more marginalised the 
country is, the more difficult it is for the country to adjust to, and benefit from globalisation. A tool that 
can make this process easier is cooperation between countries with similar interests – this study has 
used the topic of investment to illustrate on a practical level the opportunities associated with increased 
integration between these three states. One must, however, note that investment is only one of many 
possible sub-sectors that clearly illustrate the possible gains associated with increased cooperation and 
integration between India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 
Investment is an interesting sector to due to the fact that an increase in investment allows for an 
expansion of the economy, this is especially important for emerging markets such as India, Brazil and 
South Africa. Many of the sectors that have been highlighted in for instance the Communiqués are 
important and deserve to receive further attention; however, this thesis will only explore the possibilities 
associated with a drive to improve the investment climate in the IBSA member states – and the South in 
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general. The mere fact that these three countries are all referred to as EMEs suggest that they all have 
relative high levels of investments – compared to their neighbours. Consequently, if they are able to 
improve the current situation and to attract an increasingly growing amount of FDI this is likely to also 
benefit their neighbours. One must keep in mind that the emerging markets are attractive for foreign 
investors due to the fact that the yield received on these markets are general higher than investments in 
a developed country. However, the risks involved are also higher. This risk is an important aspect since 
it is this factor that hampers the investment rate to be as high as it could potentially be – thus creating 
an obstacle to economic growth. It is therefore vital that the members of the IBSA coalition are able to 
facilitate changes that diminish the risk factors associated with investment in these markets. It is equally 
important that they are able to ensure that the perceived risk associated with investment in India, Brazil 
and South Africa is diminished. If the IBSA members manage to do this, they are likely to attract more 
investment and should thus be able to speed up their growth curves. Such a development will also have 
positive influence on their respective neighbours – if one country is perceived to be safer and is able to 
attract more investment the positive effects will eventually reach their neighbours. This further highlights 
the New Regionalist argument of regionalisation being a necessary tool for marginalised states in the 
globalised world. It also accentuate the New Regionalist argument that regionalisation is simultaneously 
both a stumbling-block as well as a stepping stone to the globalisation process. Globalisation and 
regionalisation are going on concurrently and a regionalisation effort by IBSA members should not be 
seen as an attempt to control the globalisation process. Rather it is an effort to control the 
consequences it has for the IBSA members (and the developing world). In addition to this, it also give 
emphasis to great amount of power that lies in the hand of the actors in terms of shaping the integration 
process – it is the actors who determine whether investment and financial market integration should 
receive further attention – attention that could lead to it becoming a future driving force of IBSA’s 
integration process.  
 
In terms of this thesis, investment has been chosen as a sector of cooperation worth exploring for 
various reasons. Figure 1 offered a comparison of the last decades’ levels of foreign direct investment in 
the IBSA member states, as well as in China. Using investment as a measuring stick is not done 
because it is necessarily more important than other sectors (although the positive effects it could have 
on an economies growth potential must not be under-estimated), but rather because it makes it easier to 
measure the changes that have occurred over the years. Investment is also a sector of particular 
interests due to the fact that it is one of the sectors actively involving both public and private actors. At 
the first stage the politicians will need to agree on policy implementations that facilitates increased 
investment. The second stage belongs to the private actors and it is here that real integration occurs. 
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This is what is referred to as the regionalisation process by New Regionalist scholars – this is where the 
real integration occurs, or what is sometimes referred to as de facto integration, as opposed to first 
stage which is termed de jure integration. In addition, a large number of investors are likely to be 
involved and this is aligned with New Regional theory focusing on, first of all, the involvement of a large 
and broad array of actors, and secondly it is a good example of how New Regionalism advocates that 
integration will occur as long as the benefits are there. When this sector is saturated – when there are 
no more gains involved in investment (which is a highly hypothetical state) the actors will move to other 
fields of cooperation – and the integration process will then be moving faster in the new focal area.  
 
It is essential to note that it is not the changes in investment between these countries that are 
highlighted in this dissertation, instead attention is also paid to ways of facilitating increased investment 
and changes in the amount of investment these three countries have the potential of jointly attracting. 
An increase in investment carries with it immense possibilities in terms of economic growth and social 
development. These two aspects could then subsequently lead to an enhancement of India, Brazil and 
South Africa’s international influence; as it implies that these countries are becoming ‘forces to be 
reckoned with’. Furthermore, a successful investment trajectory would allow these countries to, through 
knowledge transfer and trickle-down effect; positively influence the growth potential of their neighbouring 
economies. Closely linked to this, is the fact that according to New Regionalism, regional politics is an 
aggregation and ‘concentration’ of national interests (Hettne in Hettne et al 2000: xxv). What is 
conceived as ‘national interests’ does not disappear in the process of regionalism, but because of the 
strength of global interdependence, it becomes inseparable from various shared transnational interests 
and concerns, which are manifesting themselves in the regionalisation process. In other words, India, 
Brazil and South Africa can use the IBSA Dialogue Forum to further their joint national interests – in this 
case, facilitation of deeper and more integrated financial markets, which is one way in which they could 
reach their goals of economic growth, social development and poverty alleviation.  
 
Although India, Brazil and South Africa are, compared to many developing countries, relatively stable 
and powerful, it is important to emphasise that they are, in the process of analysis, not treated as 
developed states.  Financial market development policies need to take into account the intrinsic 
characteristics of developing countries such as small size, illiquid markets, lack of risk diversification, 
presence of weak currencies, and prevalence of systemic risk (de la Torre & Schmukler 2007: 23). 
Although some of these variables are not relevant for India, Brazil and South Africa, it is important that 
the ones that are applicable are made explicit in an analysis. New Regionalism allows for the inclusion 
of these, more realistic, variables of financial markets of the South. Only through a constant awareness 
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of these imperfect characteristics in an analysis will one be able to ensure that they do not limit the 
scope for developing deep domestic capital markets. Again the usefulness of New Regionalism as an 
integration framework is highlighted. As a theory that allows for these imperfect variables and more 
realistic assumptions it offers an analysis of IBSA and of investment in EMEs that is closer to reality. 
 
Bøås, Marchand and Shaw (2005: 1) argue that regions are always in the making. Regions are, 
irrespective of their geographical positions, continuously constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed. 
Not only states, but also non-state actors, participate in the process of constructing regions and giving 
each its specific content and character. The private spheres are the prime actors in terms of financial 
markets, however, it is important to keep in mind that in terms of this dissertation the focus is financial 
market development – and there is consequently a need for a close cooperation between private and 
public spheres in order to achieve this goal. The state actors need to facilitate the growth, in terms of 
depth and size, of the IBSA members’ markets through enhancing the infrastructure, allowing for 
knowledge transfer, implementing sound macro economic policies and generally ensure stability which 
will enable the private actors to what they do best – increase investment flows (which, of course, serve 
their self-interests). In addition, when the investors of India, Brazil and South Africa investment in each 
other markets they are likely to be more successful in this task than investors of the North due to an 
almost intuitive understanding (due to important similarities) of how these markets operate. This place 
emphasis on the contribution of a non-conventional variable in terms of integration analysis, namely 
culture. New Regionalism argue that it is not the only the old, conventional variables such as economics 
that come into play in an integration process, instead an aspect such as culture is given equal 
importance – a fact which offer a fuller analysis, an analysis that is likely to closer correspond with 
reality. 
  
Consequently, the focus of strengthening one of the sub-sectors – in this case investment and the 
financial markets – has the potential of strengthening the whole coalition. Prosperous financial sectors in 
India, Brazil and South Africa hold promises of economic growth which could lead to social 
development. The higher the developmental level of the state, the more likely it is to increase its global 
leverage. Therefore, a strengthening of the parts will indeed lead to a strengthening of the whole – 
which again will be beneficial for the parts, in this case: the financial markets, due to the fact that the 
improved relative and absolute positions of the IBSA member states in the global system will attract 






There is a complex set of variables influencing a country’s potential for economic growth. One of these 
is investment, and in order to attract foreign capital flows a country needs, amongst other things sound 
macro-economic policies and solid financial institutions. Solid financial institutions must be coupled with 
an attention on integration of a country’s financial markets. Through the building of these institutions and 
a focus on integrating its financial markets a country is likely to become more attractive in the eyes of 
the investors. The reason for this being important is that investment carries with it promises of economic 
growth and the subsequent social upliftment. Therefore, closer cooperation between the IBSA members 
is likely to offer great opportunities for India, Brazil and South Africa. It has been highlighted that a 
closer integration of their financial markets might lead to them also becoming competitors in the quest 
for the attention from the investors of the North. However, the loss in terms of competition is likely to be 
outweighed by the benefits found in not having to face unilateralism as separate entities. New 
Regionalism stresses the importance of regionalisation as a counter measure to the harmful effect of 
globalisation for the marginalised countries of the world, and the topic of investment aptly illustrate this 
point. Furthermore, a closer collaboration between the IBSA members as well as a continuous focus on 
further integrating their financial markets into the world economy could offer great benefits. Moreover, 
the trickledown effect could also broaden the scope of these benefits to include other emerging markets. 
Because of this, investment is, amongst other very important sub-sectors of focus in terms of IBSA 
cooperation, one of the most important one – both in terms of benefits for the individual countries, but 
also due to what a successful cooperation could come to mean for the developing world in general. 
 
The next chapter, the conclusion, will draw together the various discussion of this thesis in order to 
highlight the arguments put forward and to suggest ways forward for the IBSA coalition, as well as 










CHAPTER SIX:   
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has sought to determine whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts – 
whether states in close cooperation can achieve more than what these states could individually achieve. 
In other words, will the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum allow its members more political, 
economic and social leverage on the global scale than the level of leverage that India, Brazil and South 
Africa would operating in their own capacity have? In order to answer this question, this thesis has used 
the New Regionalism framework to analyse the IBSA Dialogue Forum. In doing so, one of the sub-
sectors of cooperation has been explored – investment. Due to the fact that all three member states are 
middle powers and emerging markets special attention has been paid to these two concepts. The New 
Regionalism framework was selected on the onset due to the fact that this theory aims at using more 
realistic assumptions in an analysis of regional integration efforts. Examples of such realistic 
assumptions include, but are not limited to, the presence of market and government failures, imperfect 
and asymmetric information and competition and externalities. These less restrictive and more realistic 
assumptions make the New Regionalism approach more applicable to nation states of the South. It has 
however been determined that these are not the only features that make New Regionalism particularly 
applicable to the IBSA Dialogue Forum. New Regionalism is, amongst other aspects, one of the few 
theories that allows IBSA dialogue forum to be analysed as an example of a regional cooperation where 
the region is not based on geographical proximity. Instead, geographical proximity is one of the many 
aspects – alongside culture, social, economic and political variables – which may or may not be present 
in an area which is referred to as a region. In other words, one sees that the fact that these three 
countries are situated far from each other does not prevent them from creating territorial identity and 
regional coherence. A gap was identified in the literature review in terms of highlighting the fact that 
although New Regionalism argues regions do not need to be in geographical proximity most of the work 
done has indeed focused on regional integration of neighbours. IBSA members are clearly not 
neighbours and it is interesting to apply this theory to IBSA and analyse a regional cooperation effort 
which stretches over three continents.  
 
The content of the regionalism has changed radically over the last couple of decades. New Regionalism 
is a worldwide phenomenon that is taking place in more areas of the world than ever before. Old 
Regionalism was generally specific about objectives and content and often had a simple and narrow 
focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances, whereas the number, scope and diversity of 
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New Regionalism has grown significantly in the last two decades. Regionalisation is thus viewed as a 
multidimensional process which takes place at many levels of the world system: the system as a whole, 
the level of interregional relations, and the international structure of the single region, the latter including 
nation states, subnational ethnic groups and microregions. It is argued that it is not possible to state 
which of these levels are the most influential. The reason for this being that changes on the various 
levels interact and the relative importance of them varies from one region and one period to another and 
from one sector to another. In addition to this, New Regionalism is unique in the way that it gives 
importance to formal as well as informal variables of integration, often referred to as de jure and de facto 
integration. This is also tied to the fact that New Regionalisation draws a divide between the concept 
‘regionalism’ which tends to be politically, state-driven and ‘regionalisation’ which is the actual process 
where the people of the states take part in the integration process. In terms of this thesis, the private 
sphere is represented by actors in the financial sector. Chapter 5 illustrated the important role these 
actors could potentially come to play in the integration process, and the benefits associated with closer 
integration of financial markets. When ‘regionalism’ occurs without being accompanied by 
‘regionalisation’ the process is often accused of being an elitist idea of cooperation where no real 
integration occurs. This thesis has illustrated that while the IBSA Dialogue Forum could initially be seen 
as an elitist idea, it has through its short existence come to include a great number of actors, from the 
private spheres of India, Brazil and South Africa. This also illustrated a vital feature of New Regionalism 
theory, the fact that state and non-state actors are given great importance, and is in effect viewed to be 
in some sort of dependency relationship, where the one without the other will lead to a failure of regional 
cooperation. 
 
The reason why old theories of integration should not be used in current analyses is that these theories 
do no longer apply to, nor explain the current global system. The old theories are out-dated and do not 
aptly offer a realistic view of the world. The IBSA Dialogue Forum is a new version of South- South 
cooperation which is not narrowly focusing on for instance trade integration and the building of security 
alliances. The IBSA Dialogue Forum strives to facilitate effective engagement in the South in an effort to 
address globally vital issues from a development perspective. The members are committed to creating a 
successful South-South collaboration capable of delivering over and above the rhetoric that has 
characterized such previous partnerships. Similarly to how the actors behind the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
had to think of new ways of achieving their objectives the scholars of regional integration theory had to 
find ways of reinventing themselves in order to achieve their objectives- to come up with a theory that 
accurately explains the current world system and that suggests ways forward for the actors involved – 
this is how the theory of New Regionalism came about. This is one of the main aspects suggesting that 
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New Regionalism is a theory that has something to offer those who dare to think along new lines of 
reasoning in order to achieve their goals, and the actors behind the IBSA Dialogue Forum seem to, thus 
far, have the courage and the drive to explore the path less treaded.  
 
India, Brazil and South Africa differ greatly in terms of size, population, military capabilities and GDP. 
This does not necessarily mean that these countries are incompatible in terms of a regional cooperation 
effort – New Regionalism highlights the fact that variables such as cultural, social and military 
capabilities are just as important in an analysis of regionalism as economic variables. Consequently, 
New Regionalism, allows for the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum to be viewed as compatible 
despite the fact that they differ in size, population, military capabilities and GDP. The reason for this 
being that while they all differ; it is not one country who is always ahead of the other two –instead they 
are all leaders in different aspect. A couple of examples of this, India is superior to Brazil and South 
Africa in terms of military capabilities, the same goes for GDP and population size; however, South 
Africa and Brazil far outweighs India when it comes to GDP per capita. In addition to this, South Africa 
holds a strong position in international fora, and Brazil has shown leadership capabilities in multilateral 
negotiations. As a consequence of this, this dissertation suggests that although socio-economic data 
vary significantly between the three countries, they are still compatible and their differences actually 
work in their advantages since it allows them to jointly – as the IBSA Dialogue Forum –practice leverage 
on the global level on a wide spectrum of issues. In fact, due to New Regionalism allowing for the 
inclusion of various variables in an analysis of an integration initiative, the unequal features of India, 
Brazil and South Africa do not become an issue that can hamper a positive development of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum.  This dissertation has argued that compared to other previous attempt of South-South 
cooperation, IBSA’s real strength is found in the fact that they share a common position in international 
fora and the fact that all three are important actors in their own right. Furthermore, the low membership 
number allows for an efficient cooperation between these three powerful actors of the South.  
 
It has been illustrated in this thesis that although there was an initial drive towards an increase in trade 
cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa, this focus has now been altered. That is not to say 
that work is not being done in order to achieve further trade integration, instead a broader agenda has 
been adopted – of which trade forms a part. This broadening of focus is of paramount importance in 
New Regionalist theory. It is argued that a successful integration process cannot be viewed as static 
and one should always allow for the scope, size and depth of integration to expand (and to, at times 
contract – depending on the interests of the actors involved). The reason why trade has not received 
more attention in the context of this thesis is that the opportunities in terms of closer trade integration 
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are relatively saturated due to India, Brazil and South Africa being competitors on the major global 
markets such as the EU and the US when it comes to many industries, the most important one arguably 
being agriculture.  
   
In terms of the consequences of a more integrated IBSA Dialogue Forum on the developing world in 
general the answer are rather vague. It has been highlighted that where, for instance India and 
Pakistan’s interests clash, the former will do nothing to further the interest of its neighbour – on the 
contrary it will aim at achieving India’s national interest at the cost of Pakistan’s national interests. 
Therefore, in situations where India, Brazil and South Africa’s interests contrast those of other 
developing world, the IBSA Dialogue Forum is not likely to be good representatives for the interests of 
the developing world. However, it is vital to keep in mind that most of the countries of the South are first 
of all, in a position where they carry close to no leverage in global fora, and secondly, the developing 
states in for instance, Southern Africa are more powerful, relatively, in a negotiation with South Africa, 
than when facing a developed world such as the US. Thirdly, the interests of, for instance, Uruguay are 
more likely, by definition, to correspond with the interest of Brazil than with those of, for instance, 
Germany. Therefore, the achievements of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are likely to benefit not only India, 
Brazil and South Africa, but also the South in general. However, one must be clear in the fact that this 
will not be their main goal. In other words, it is the unintended positive consequences the South stand to 
gain in a further integration, and strengthening, of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
In terms of benefits of a closer IBSA collaboration for the developing world the conclusions of this thesis 
needs to be further emphasised. An important aspect connected with the question of beneficiaries of a 
sound IBSA Dialogue Forum is the drive towards achieving a more democratic and just environment for 
the developing countries. Central to the motivation behind establishing the IBSA Dialogue Forum’s was 
the goal of democratising global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization. This is a goal that the members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum is far from realizing, 
however, a giant, ambitious task like reform of these institutions would in most eyes be viewed as taking 
more than six years – which is the amount of time the IBSA Dialogue Forum has existed. Hence, it is not 
fair to say that India, Brazil and South Africa have not reached the goal of a more just global structure; 
rather, it is more appropriate to state that, as of yet, this goal has not been achieved, but the members 
of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are continuously working ambitiously towards one day accomplish this 
objective – an objective these middle powers believe can only be obtained through a continuous strive 
using multilateral means. This is a vital aspect of the question of what the consequences of a successful 
IBSA Dialogue Forum will be for the developing world. If the IBSA coalition managed to bring about 
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reform of the UN, the WTO and other organization whose decision-making processes carries enormous 
consequences for the developing world (sometimes without members of the developing world taking 
place in these decision-making processes) it will, without a doubt, have immense benefits for the entire 
developing world. In other words, while the answer to the benefits of IBSA for the  developing world in 
most cases are ambiguous; this is not so when it comes to the question of reform of global powerful 
organisations – in this connection, the case is clear; the IBSA Dialogue Forum can indeed be beneficial 
for other developing countries.  
 
There is a total of 11 sub-sectors within the IBSA Dialogue Forum; agriculture; culture; Defence; 
education; energy; health; information society; science and technology; tourism; trade and investment; 
transport. This dissertation has looked at ‘trade and investment’, or more specifically investment – after 
having argued that ‘trade’ integration is first of all, already taking place, and secondly, that trade is not 
the aspect that has the greatest potential in terms of an extension and deeper integration of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum. One aspect which is vital to mention regarding trade is the fact that investment tends 
to follow (and sometimes run parallel with) trade development. Therefore, it is important to establish the 
level of trade in order to explore the consequences this has for investment. The conclusion reached by 
this thesis is that while there is some space for trade expansion (and these possibilities should be 
explored) trade should not be the focus of further cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa. 
Consequently, this thesis explored the possibilities associated with further integration in the form of 
enhanced cooperation in the field of investment.  
 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum has, like most other regional integration initiatives been criticised for being an 
elitist idea of cooperation. However, this thesis has illustrated that the coalition is at an increasing 
degree incorporating actors from a wide spectrum of spheres – it is in other words both regionalism and 
regionalisation. Some of the new actors getting involved are from the IBSA members’ financial markets. 
The level of investment has been increasing in all these three Emerging Markets Economies, both in 
terms and outflows as well as inflows. While a substantial amount of work remains before these 
countries financial sectors can show performances like those in the developed world they are also 
progressing fast. This means that they are becoming increasingly integrated in the global economy and 
their financial markets are, in most cases, becoming more stable, and the IBSA members are able to 
enhance their reputations – a necessary prerequisite to attract further foreign investors. Instead of going 
into details on developments that have occurred, this dissertation only highlighted the most important 
aspect and rather focused on illustrating how closer integration through increased cooperation in terms 
of investment development is one of the possible ways forward for the IBSA Dialogue Forum. It was 
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also stressed that although they IBSA members might become competitors – fighting to attract the 
attention of the same foreign investors – the loss they might suffer in this process is highly likely to be 
less than the gain associated with further integration of their financial markets. Consequently, one sees 
that in terms of the IBSA Dialogue Forum the whole is greater than its components – since the benefits 
the three countries stand to gain through cooperating are greater than what they could separately 
achieve. 
 
Investment and a focus on the integration of financial market is only one way in which IBSA might 
enhance its members’ position in the global system. It is possibly not even the most important sector 
and future research should thus focus on the various sub-sectors identified by the IBSA members and 
examine which of these 11 sub-sectors that carries with it the greatest potential in terms of achieving 
objectives such as poverty alleviation, economic growth and social equity. A more balanced view on the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum is likely to be proven beneficial. Through a thorough examination of all three 
countries and their needs and interest, one should be able to determine more specifically which fields of 
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APPENDIX 2: BRASÍLIA DECLARATION, JUNE 2003. 
1. The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Celso Amorim, of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, and of 
India, Yashwant Sinha, met in Brasilia on June 6, 2003, following ongoing consultations and after the 
respective Heads of State and/or Government of their countries held conversations during the G-8 
meeting, in Evian. 
 
2. This was a pioneer meeting of the three countries with vibrant democracies, from three regions of the 
developing world, active on a global scale, with the aim of examining themes on the international 
agenda and those of mutual interest. In the past few years, the importance and necessity of a process 
of dialogue amongst developing nations and countries of the South has emerged. 
 
3. The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India gave special consideration to the importance 
of respecting the rule of International Law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council 
and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace and security. They 
reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international peace and security in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and with the legal instruments to which Brazil, India and South Africa are parties. 
 
4. They agreed on the need to reform the United Nations, in particular the Security Council. In this 
regard, they stressed the necessity of expanding the Security Council in both permanent and non-
permanent member categories, with the participation of developing countries in both categories. They 
agreed to combine efforts in order to enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 
 
5. They noted that new threats to security – such as terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, drugs 
and drug-related crimes, transnational organized crime, illegal weapons traffic, threats to public health, 
in particular HIV/AIDS, natural disasters, and the maritime transit of toxic chemicals and radioactive 
waste – must be handled with effective, coordinated and solidary international cooperation, in the 
concerned organizations based on respect for the sovereignty of States and for International Law. 
 
6. The Ministers highlighted the priority placed by the three governments on the promotion of social 
equity and inclusion, by implementing effective policies to fight hunger and poverty, to support family run 
farms, and to promote food security, health, social assistance, employment, education, human rights 
and environmental protection. They recalled that social empowerment makes better use of human 
potentials, contributing to economic development in a significant manner. The Ministers recommended 
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that the exchange of experiences in combating poverty, hunger and disease in the three countries would 
be of immense use to all of them. They recognized the importance of international effort to combat 
hunger. The three countries recognized and undertook to explore a trilateral food assistance program. 
 
7. The Foreign Ministers stressed the importance, for equity reasons as well as for development goals, 
to address issues related to the elimination of all kinds of racial discrimination and to promote gender 
equality and mainstreaming a gender perspective in public policies. 
 
8. The three Foreign Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the approval of the Convention on 
Tobacco Control, in the 56th Health World Assembly, and committed themselves to make every effort to 
ratify the Convention on the shortest period of time. They also committed themselves to promote the 
main objective of the Convention – to protect present and future generations against the devastating 
consequences of the consumption of tobacco and against exposure to tobacco smoke. 
 
9. The Foreign Ministers identified the trilateral cooperation among themselves as an important tool for 
achieving the promotion of social and economic development and they emphasized their intention to 
give greater impetus to cooperation among their countries. While noting that their societies have diverse 
areas of excellence in science and technology and offer a broad range of potential opportunities for 
trade, investment, travel and tourism, they stressed that the appropriate combination of their best 
resources will generate the desired synergy. Amongst the scientific and technological areas in which 
cooperation can be developed are biotechnology, alternative energy sources, outer space, aeronautics, 
information technology and agriculture. Avenues for greater cooperation in defence matters should also 
be explored. The Ministers agreed upon putting forward to their respective governments that the 
authorities in charge of the portfolio for science and technology, defence, transportation and civil 
aviation, among others, also hold trilateral meetings, aiming at the creation of concrete cooperation 
projects. 
 
10. The Ministers noted that the new information and communication technologies are transforming the 
world at a rapid speed, and in a fundamental way. At the same time, a vast digital divide exists between 
the developed and developing countries, which is adversely affecting the capacity of developing 
countries to derive optimum benefits from the globalisation process. They agreed to intensify their 
cooperation in ICT, including in international efforts and initiatives towards narrowing the digital divide.  
11. With respect to environmental issues and sustainable development, they recognized that the Rio 
Conference and its Agenda 21, the Millennium Summit and the Monterrey and Johannesburg Summits, 
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and the Program for the Implementation of Agenda 21, contain fundamental guidelines to orient the 
action of their governments and cooperation initiatives. They reaffirmed that Agenda 21 identifies the 
major causes of continuing deterioration of the global environment as unsustainable patterns of 
consumption and production and call for the necessary action as contained in the Johannesburg 
Program of Implementation. They also highlighted their concern over the results of atmospheric 
warming due to the emission of greenhouse gases and encouraged countries having emission reduction 
goals in the Kyoto Protocol to work to bring them into force and fully implement them, as well as urged 
the countries that have not signed or ratified the Protocol to do so. 
 
12. They also reiterated their efforts for the effective implementation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, especially the rights of countries of origin over their own genetic resources, as well as the 
protection of associated traditional knowledge. The fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
access to, use and management of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge must be 
assured as a way to stimulate social and economic development, as well as the adding of value and the 
processing of biodiversity-based resources in mega diverse countries. In this context, they placed 
special significance on the negotiation of an international instrument on benefit sharing under the 
auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity, as agreed at the Johannesburg Summit. They thus 
expressed their agreement that the activities of the Group of Like-minded Mega diverse Countries, of 
which Brazil, South Africa and India are founding members, should gain even greater importance. They 
also emphasised the need to render the relevant parts of the TRIPS Agreement compatible with the 
Biological Diversity Convention. 
 
13. While welcoming the expansion of economic growth, employment, and social development, and the 
accompanying rise in standards of living, in several developing countries as a result of freer movements 
of trade, capital, and technology, the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, India and South Africa expressed their 
concern that large parts of the world have not benefited from globalisation. They agreed that 
globalisation must become a positive force for change for all peoples, and must benefit the largest 
number of countries. In this context, they affirmed their commitment to pursuing policies, programmes 
and initiatives in different international forums, to make the diverse processes of globalisation inclusive, 
integrative, humane, and equitable. 
 
14. The Ministers regretted that major trading partners are still moved by protectionist concerns in their 
countries' less competitive sectors. They stressed the need to fully carry out the Doha Development 
Program and emphasized how important it is that the results of the current round of trade negotiations 
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provide especially for the reversal of protectionist policies and trade-distorting practices, by improving 
the rules of the multilateral trade system. They reiterated their expectation that negotiations will gain 
new political impetus and that it will be possible to overcome deadlocks on issues of fundamental 
interest to developing countries, before the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun. Furthermore, Brazil, 
India and South Africa decided to articulate their initiatives of trade liberalisation. 
 
15. The Foreign Ministers noted with concern the increased economic vulnerability of developing 
countries to fluctuations in global prices of commodities. They affirmed the importance of a predictable, 
rule-based, and transparent international trading system, to enable the developing countries to 
maximise their development, through gains from enhanced exports of goods and services of their 
competitive advantage. 
 
16. They drew attention to the economic and social impact suffered by many developing countries in 
recent years, as a result of volatile global financial flows. They agreed to strengthen their cooperation 
towards making the international financial architecture responsive to development, and towards 
increasing its effectiveness in preventing and addressing national and regional financial crises. 
 
17. They reiterate their belief that success in globalisation with equity requires good governance, both at 
the national and in particular at the international levels, in recognition of the fact that, as a result of 
globalisation, external factors have become critical in determining the success or failure of achieving 
sustainable development. 
 
18. The Ministers recommended to their respective Chiefs of State and/or Government the convening of 
a summit meeting of the three countries. They also decided to further intensify dialogue at all levels, 
when needed, to organize meetings of top officials and experts responsible for issues of mutual interest. 
 
19. They decided to hold regular political consultations on international agenda items, as well as to 
exchange information on areas of mutual co-operation in order to coordinate their positions on issues of 
common interest. To give expression to issues discussed and all other matters emerging out of 
consultations, the Ministers further agreed to establish a Trilateral Joint Commission. The Foreign 
Ministries will be the focal points of the Trilateral Joint Commission and the meetings will be co-chaired 
by the three Foreign Ministers. The secretariat facilities will be co-ordinated by the Secretary in charge 
of this area in the Foreign Ministry of the host country. 
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20. The Ministers decided to call this group "India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum" (IBSA). At 
the invitation of the Indian Government, the next meeting is going to take place in New Delhi, within 
twelve months. The Ministers of India and South Africa thanked the Brazilian Minister for convening this 
first trilateral meeting. 
 
APPENDIX 3: NEW DELHI AGENDA FOR COOPERATION, MARCH 2004 
 
1. The Minister of External Affairs of India, H. E. Mr. Yashwant Sinha, Foreign Minister of Brazil, H. E. 
Mr. Celso Amorim, and of South Africa, H. E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma met in New Delhi on 4th and 
5th March 2004 for the first Meeting of the Trilateral Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
2. The Foreign Ministers reviewed developments in the trilateral initiative that began with their meeting 
in Brasilia in June 2003 and the meeting of the three Heads of State and Government in New York in 
September 2003. They appreciated the progress achieved so far and stressed the importance of 
carrying forward the multi-faceted dialogue and of registering tangible results in the operational areas 
already agreed upon. The Ministers noted the significant steps already envisaged at the trilateral 
meeting of the Defence Ministers of the three countries (held in Pretoria on 1 February 2004) for 
stepping up cooperation. 
 
3. The Ministers held a wide-ranging discussion in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and exchanged 
views on regional and international issues of mutual interest as well as on promotion of trilateral 
cooperation in accordance with the objectives set forth in the Brasilia Declaration. They attached 
immense value to the beneficial spin-offs from their enhanced trilateral cooperation to South-South 
cooperation. IBSA aspires to make a significant contribution to the framework of South-South 
cooperation and be a positive factor to advance human development by promoting potential synergies 
among the members.  
 
4. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their determination to play a constructive role in international affairs 
and to maintain friendly relations with all countries. Their approach to IBSA dialogue aims at imparting a 
new synergy to these interactions.  
 
5. The Ministers agreed to work together to strengthen the multilateral system. They expressed support 
for early reform of the United Nations to make it more democratic and responsive to the priorities of its 
Multilateralism – Reforms of UN  
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member states, particularly those of the developing countries that constitute the vast majority of its 
membership. They agreed that their respective delegations to the UN and its specialised agencies as 
well as other multilateral bodies would remain in close touch with each other and would consult on all 
issues of significance.  
  
6. The Ministers expressed the view that the UN Security Council, as configured today is not 
representative of present-day realities. They highlighted the need for reform which would impart greater 
balance and representativeness to the Council and reflect contemporary reality and emphasised the 
need for expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories. They reaffirmed that the 
decisions of the Security Council should be seen as serving the interests of the global community. They 
agreed to jointly explore innovative solutions to the issues relating to the reform of the Security Council 
in order to accelerate the decision making process. 
 
7. The Ministers noted that primary focus on human development, the fight against poverty, and 
measures to promote a better quality of life, should underpin and provide for greater guarantees for 
international peace and stability. The three Ministers took stock of the global security situation -
concerning disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They took note 
of avowed commitments of Governments regarding the transfer of technology related to the 
manufacture of WMDs and expressed hope for observance of these commitments unequivocally. They 
also underlined that implementation of and compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament 
commitments suffered from serious inadequacies, which should be redressed through appropriate 
forward looking multilateral actions. They agreed to intensify their cooperation at the IAEA and other 
forums with a view to ensuring unimpeded growth and development of peaceful use of atomic energy 
through supply of technology, equipment and material under appropriate safeguards.  
Peace and Security  
  
8. On the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the three countries urged an immediate resumption of dialogue on 
the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Arab League Peace Initiative and the 
Quartet roadmap so as to achieve a peaceful and lasting solution thereby ending the current cycle of 
violence. They specially affirmed their full support to the vision of the settlement postulated in the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1397 of two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within 
secured and recognised borders. The three countries expressed their willingness to play a constructive 
role to bring about just, durable and comprehensive peace in the region. 
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9. The three countries noted the convergence of their views on Iraq. They stressed the maintenance of 
unity and integrity of Iraq as well as the restoration of security and stability in the country and called for 
transfer of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people as soon as possible. In this context, they agreed that the 
UN must play a vital role. They also emphasised the urgency of reconstruction in Iraq under a 
democratically elected sovereign government. 
 
Terrorism
10. The Ministers agreed that international terrorism was one of the most significant threats faced by the 
world today and that it can only be tackled collectively. They further agreed that terrorism should only be 
considered with reference to the terrorist act and its consequences. There can be no justification for 
terrorism- political, religious or any other. The Ministers emphasised that it was imperative today for the 
international community to come together to combat terrorism, in a sustained and comprehensive 
manner, with the ultimate objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions.  
  
 
11. The Ministers reaffirmed their full support to implementing all the measures to combat terrorism 
outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. They called on the international community to work 
together in a spirit of cooperation and accommodation with the objective of an early conclusion of 
negotiations and the adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.  
 
Globalisation  
12. Recalling their commitment to pursuing policies, programmes and initiatives in different international 
forums, to make the diverse processes of globalization inclusive, integrative, humane, and equitable, the 
Ministers noted with concern that the current global economic structures and mechanisms continued to 
be marked by inequities. The Ministers felt that an important challenge before the international 
community was to maximise the benefits of globalisation and to ensure that it becomes a positive force 
for sustained economic growth in all developing countries. They emphasised that developing countries 
need to have their own agenda which would set out their goals in the context of globalising world. They 
must carry this agenda into multilateral processes with a view to influencing negotiations and arriving at 
results which are beneficial to the South. In this context, the Ministers took note with appreciation the 
conclusions and recommendations of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation 
which called for steps to achieve a fairer form of globalisation that created opportunities for all. 
13. The Ministers agreed to intensify cooperation in areas of mutual interest in the current round of 
multi-lateral trade negotiations as exemplified by the G-20 to realise the Doha Development Agenda and 
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enhance trade opportunities commensurate with the development needs of developing countries under 
a fair, equitable and transparent rules-based multilateral trading system.  
 
Sustainable Development
14. India, Brazil and South Africa have similar concerns with regard to the protection of environment 
while they march ahead on the path of socio-economic development in their respective countries. In this 
context the three sides agreed to work together to promote practical cooperation in ensuring sustainable 
development. The Ministers also agreed to coordinate positions on climate change, bio-diversity, and 
other related issues at the concerned multilateral fora.  
  
 
15. The Ministers reaffirmed the validity of the principles contained in the Rio Declaration, particularly on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, the Programme of Action contained in Agenda 21, and the 
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, and 
called for the implementation of these outcomes through the mobilization of new and additional financial 
resources and transfer of environmentally sound technologies within an agreed time-frame. They 
stressed that an international environment supportive of development would be critical to this process. 
They called for a specific focus on capacity building and on transfer of financial resources and 
technology to developing countries. 
 
16. They underscored the importance of the decision taken at the WSSD to negotiate within the 
framework of Convention on Bio-diversity, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of utilization of genetic resource. The Ministers agreed on the 
need for ensuring that the benefits arising out of the commercial use of genetic resources accrue to the 
countries of origin. They reiterated in this context their commitment for effective implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. They also called for the establishment of a legally binding instrument 
for protecting intellectual property rights to traditional knowledge and folklore. India, Brazil and South 
Africa who are also the founding members of the Group of Like-minded Megadiverse Countries, agreed 
to strengthen cooperation and coordination with emphasis on multilateral negotiations and in fostering 
activities related to South-South Cooperation. 
 
Social Development
17. The Ministers in the context of the approaching 10th anniversary of the World Summit for Social 
Development, recalled that the Summit had sought to put people at the centre of development. They 
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emphasised the need to have the well-being of people as the focus of efforts to assess and address the 
gaps in the commitments made and results achieved.  
 
18. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of strengthening of cultural ties of the three countries. With 
that aim in mind, they discussed the possibility of organising a trilateral cultural fair of music, dance and 
cinema in Brazil as soon as possible and agreed to take the necessary steps. 
 
19. The Ministers reiterated their earlier commitments as contained in the Brasilia Declaration to 
address issues related to elimination of all kinds of racial discrimination and to promote gender equality 
and mainstreaming a gender perspective in public policies. 
 
20. Recalling that the Brasilia Declaration had identified trilateral cooperation among the three countries 
as an important tool for achieving the promotion of social and economic development, the Ministers 
agreed that the three countries, with rich untapped natural resources and emerging infra-structural 
requirements, could in a spirit of South-South cooperation, share expertise in several areas. With this 
view, working level discussions for enhancing trilateral cooperation in the spheres of S&T, Information 
Technology, Health, Civil Aviation and Shipping, Tourism, Trade and Investment, Defence, Energy and 
education took place during the Meeting. Specific programmes of action for trilateral cooperation in each 
of these sectors were identified based on these discussions and endorsed by the Ministers. These are 
annexed in the Plan of Action. 
 
21. The Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to contribute actively and 
concretely to the implementation of internationally agreed development goals, particularly that of 
combating hunger and poverty. Following the Heads of State/Governments announcement in 
September 2003, they reviewed and approved the Guidelines for Operationalisation of the IBSA Facility 
for Hunger and Poverty Alleviation contained in the Plan of Action. The Ministers decided that a meeting 
be held before the end of March 2004, to consult with UNDP on certain operational issues. The meeting 
would also finalise operational guidelines for the Board of Directors and commence discussions on 
projects for implementation under the Facility. 
 
22. The Ministers also reiterated the invitation for the participation of interested parties in the South-
South initiative, including the private sector and civil society. To stress their political commitment, Brazil, 
South Africa and India announced that they have made fiduciary contributions to the Facility.  
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23. The Ministers also endorsed the proposal by Brazil to host a seminar on “Economic Growth with 
Social Equity” with the aim to promote better knowledge among IBSA members of their national policies 
and strategies to promote economic and social development and exchange views on international 
development challenges. The organisation of the seminar would be jointly coordinated by the three 
countries.  
 
24. The Foreign Ministers of Brazil and South Africa thanked the Minister for External Affairs of India for 
convening the first Meeting of the Trilateral Commission. The three Ministers agreed that the next 
meeting would be held in South Africa in the first quarter of 2005. 
 
APPENDIX 4: CAPE TOWN COMMUNIQUÉ, MARCH 2005 
 
1. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, H. E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the Minister of 
External Affairs of India, H. E. Mr. K Natwar Singh and the Foreign Minister of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Celso 
Amorim, met in Cape Town on 10 and 11 March 2005 for the Second Meeting of the Trilateral 
Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
 
2. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their determination to play a constructive role in international affairs 
and to maintain friendly relations with all countries. The IBSA Dialogue Forum serves as a mechanism 
for political consultation and co-ordination as well as for strengthening co-operation in sectoral areas 
and to improve economic relations between India, Brazil and South Africa.  
 
3. They confirmed their support for a strong multilateral system as a means towards addressing issues 
of global concern, in particular the pre-eminent role of the United Nations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion of sustainable development.  
 
4. The Ministers noted that the Trilateral Ministerial Commission has also proved to be an excellent 
environment to exchange views on regional and global developments. 
 
5. The Ministers agreed to work together, within the UN processes in New York, towards the successful 
conclusion of the Millennium Review Summit scheduled to take place from 14 to 16 September 2005. 
They looked forward to the Report to be issued by the Secretary-General in March 2005 in preparation 
for the Summit. The Ministers expressed the hope that the Summit outcome would reflect a balance 
Millennium Review Summit 
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between development and security concerns and emphasised that development was an indispensable 
foundation for a new collective security system. In this regard they noted that the Report of the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Report of the United Nations Millennium 
Project 2005 provided useful inputs towards this end.  
 
6. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of developing countries successfully achieving, 
at the minimum, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a core strategy in the international fight 
against underdevelopment, hunger and poverty. They reiterated their support for the New York 
Declaration, issued at the World Leaders’ Meeting on Action Against Hunger and Poverty, and 
reconfirmed the importance of obtaining new and additional financial resources for fighting poverty and 
financing development. 
 
7. The Ministers noted that the MDGs should not be seen in isolation, as they cut across every aspect of 
international co-operation. Considerably more international progress was needed, therefore, in areas 
such as improved market access for developing countries, increased Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and more extensive debt relief as well as additional resources and new approaches to 
development financing.  
 
8. The Ministers emphasised that South-South co-operation was an essential and fundamental 
component of international co-operation for development, especially in terms of global, regional and 
country-level efforts to achieve the MDGs and reaffirmed cooperation under IBSA to promote these 
objectives.  
 
9. The Ministers committed themselves to work together to strengthen the political will of the UN 
membership to maintain the momentum of the 2000 Millennium Summit, in order to translate 
commitments into concrete action, in particular, in the areas of development and poverty eradication.  
 
10. The Ministers recognised the strong multiplier effect of poverty eradication strategies targeting 
women and children and agreed to reflect this approach in IBSA programmes and initiatives. They also 
highlighted in this regard, the importance of linking the MDGs to the Beijing Platform for Action. 
11. The Ministers re-iterated their continued support for the early reform of the United Nations to make it 
more democratic and responsive to the priorities of its Member States, particularly those of developing 
countries that constitute the vast majority of its membership. They agreed to utilise fully the window of 
UN Institutional Reform 
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opportunity afforded by the Millennium Review Process for a serious effort at the long-needed UN 
reform, in particular the institutional reforms relating to the UN General Assembly, the Economic and 
Social Council and the Security Council.  
 
12. The Ministers expressed the view that the composition of the UN Security Council no longer 
represented present-day realities. Bearing in mind that decisions of the Council should serve the 
interests of the broader United Nations Membership, they highlighted the need for the urgent reform of 
the Council that would include its expansion in both categories of membership, permanent and non-
permanent, in order to render it more democratic, legitimate and representative. Towards this end, 
developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America would need to be included as permanent 
members on the Security Council. The IBSA countries agreed to exchange information and work 
towards this common purpose in the coming months.  
 
13. The Foreign Ministers voiced their full support for the capable manner in which the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, had been conducting the work of the organisation, and expressed 
confidence in his efforts to enhance the UN’s role in international relations. 
 
14. The Ministers recommitted their respective delegations to the UN and its specialised agencies, as 
well as other multilateral bodies, to remain in close touch with each other and to consult on all issues of 
significance. 
 
15. The Ministers committed themselves to developing a common vision for enhanced South-South co-
operation and the realisation of the development agenda of the South during the 21st Century. They 
agreed to work together on economic development with social equity in the context of a globalizing 
world. IBSA would examine ways to adopt a pro-active approach to channel the forces of globalisation 
in this direction. They re-affirmed the principle that IBSA was dedicated to the strengthening of the 
international framework of South-South co-operation and the advancement of human development 
through the promotion of potential synergies among its members. 
South-South Cooperation and South Summit  
16. The Ministers welcomed the offer by Qatar to host the second South Summit in Doha, from 12-16 
June 2005, as an opportunity to provide an important platform to assess the present economic, social 
and political situation in the South and to propose measures at the national, regional and international 
level that would enable developing countries to fulfill their developmental potential.  
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17. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the socio-economic development programme of the 
African Union and committed the IBSA partnership to seeking practical and concrete measures to be 
pursued in support of the implementation of NEPAD. The three countries shared a common experience 
in the struggle against poverty and underdevelopment, as well as complementary levels of 
development. There was therefore much to gain from sharing information and best practices in dealing 
with common challenges and in identifying areas of common concern, need and benefit.  
NEPAD 
 
18. Numerous opportunities existed in the promotion of trade, investment, science and technology 
exchanges, and in the fields of energy, ICT, agriculture, bio-technology, health, tourism and education in 
support of the African agenda. In this regard the Ministers pledged to explore opportunities for trilateral 
cooperation. 
 
New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) 
19. The Ministers noted the decision made during AASROC II, held in Durban in August 2004, to launch 
a New Asian-African Strategic Partnership during the Asia-Africa Summit, scheduled to be held in 
Jakarta, Indonesia in April 2005. They made a commitment to focus on practical ways of addressing the 
developmental needs of Asia and Africa by focusing on economic issues, trade, investment, health, 
human resource development and infrastructure. 
 
20. The Ministers expressed their support for the creation of an Asian-African Business Summit which 
would focus on exploring business opportunities, promoting trade and investment and identifying 
measures to strengthen the African private sector. They undertook to investigate ways in which to 
facilitate closer co-operation with South America. 
Latin and South American Integration 
 
21. The Ministers welcomed the efforts towards integration in the Latin America and Caribbean region 
and in this regard recognised the significance of the creation of the South American Community of 
Nations (CASA). 
 
Reform of the International Financial Architecture 
22. The Ministers agreed that the existing international financial system must be renewed and 
strengthened to promote adequate and appropriate financing for the development of countries at widely-
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differing levels of development. The Ministers emphasised the need for greater participation by 
developing countries in international economic decision-making and norm-setting processes, including 
those of the Bretton Woods Institutions and other economic and financial institutions. Developing 
countries had a stake in multilateral financial institutions and therefore should be fully involved in policy-
making and decision-taking processes in these institutions in order to make them more accountable and 
responsive to the community of nations. 
 
23. The Ministers committed themselves to working together to devise means to make the multilateral 






24. The Ministers agreed to intensify co-operation in areas of mutual interest in the current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, in the lead-up to the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 
December 2005. This co-operation, as exemplified by the G-20 in agricultural negotiations, aimed to 
realise the Doha Development Agenda and to enhance trade opportunities under an open, fair, 
equitable and transparent rules-based multilateral trading system.  
25. The Ministers expressed their conviction that the incoming Director-General of the WTO should be a 
candidate best suited to advancing the development agenda in the WTO negotiations. 
 
26. The Ministers reaffirmed the validity of the principles contained in the Rio Declaration, particularly on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, the Programme of Action contained in Agenda 21, and the 
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
Johannesburg. IBSA would continue its efforts to mobilise new and additional financial resources and 
the transfer of environmentally-sound technologies within an agreed time-frame in order to implement 
the outcomes of these conferences.  
Sustainable Development 
27. The Ministers stressed that an international environment supportive of development would be critical 
to this process. They also called for a specific focus on capacity-building as well as on the transfer of 
financial resources and technology to developing countries. 
 
28. They underscored the importance of the decision taken at the WSSD to negotiate, within the 
framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, an international regime to promote and safeguard 
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the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. The Ministers 
agreed on the need for ensuring that the benefits arising out of the commercial use of genetic resources 
accrued to the countries of origin.  
 
29. They reiterated, in this context, their commitment to effective implementation of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. They also called for the establishment of a legally-binding instrument for protecting 
intellectual property rights related to traditional knowledge. India, Brazil and South Africa, as the 
founding members of the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries, agreed to strengthen co-
operation and co-ordination, with an emphasis on multilateral negotiations and in fostering activities 
related to South-South Co-operation. 
 
Climate Change 
30. The Ministers expressed their pleasure at the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 
2005. They further urged developed countries to meet their own commitments and undertakings under 
the Protocol not only in terms of complying, with current targets for Green House Gas (GHG) emission 
reduction, but also in terms of the expansion of technology transfer, capacity-building and financial 
support to developing countries. 
 
Peace and Security 
31. The Ministers reaffirmed the view that the primary focus on human development, the fight against 
poverty, and measures to promote a better quality of life, should underpin and provide for greater 
guarantees for international peace and stability. The three Ministers took stock of the global security 
situation concerning disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and 
noted the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1540 (2004) on 28 April 2004. They 
expressed their conviction that structures such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which had already been established 
in accordance with international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements, should 
not be duplicated and that these organisations be utilised as the primary institutions in the international 
community’s endeavours to combat the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including to non-
State actors. They took note of avowed commitments of Governments regarding the transfer of 
technology related to the manufacture of WMDs and expressed hope for the observance of these 
commitments unequivocally. They agreed to further intensify their cooperation at the IAEA and other 
forums with a view to ensuring the unimpeded growth and development of the peaceful use of atomic 




32. The Ministers reaffirmed that international terrorism continued to constitute one of the most serious 
threats to peace and security and that acts of terrorism were criminal and unjustifiable whatever the 
considerations or factors that might be invoked to justify them. The Ministers emphasised the need for 
concerted and co-ordinated action by the international community, with the ultimate objective of 
eradicating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.  
   
 
33. The Ministers reaffirmed their full support for the implementation of all the measures to combat 
terrorism outlined in relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. They welcomed the Council’s efforts to 
increase co-operation and co-ordination among all the role-players in the fight against terrorism and 
called on the international community to work together in a spirit of co-operation and accommodation to 
eliminate terrorism. In this regard, the Ministers noted the importance of the conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and called on all States to co-operate in 
resolving the outstanding issues with the objective of an early conclusion of negotiations and the 
adoption of this Convention. The Ministers welcomed the adoption by the UN General Assembly of 
resolution 59/80 on “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.  
 
34. The Ministers emphasised that international co-operation to combat terrorism should be conducted 
in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and relevant 
international conventions, including international human rights conventions. 
 
Situation in the Middle East
35. The Ministers expressed their full support for the new positive spirit that had emerged in the Middle 
East following the Palestinian elections of 10 January 2005, which resulted in the election of Mr. 
Mahmoud Abbas as the new President of Palestine. They welcomed the outcome of the Sharm Al 
Sheikh Summit between the Palestinian President Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon on 8 
February 2005, especially the undertaking of both leaders to work to effect a cease-fire. 
   
 36. The Ministers also welcomed the outcome of the London Conference in support of the Palestinian 
National Authority held on 1 March 2005. They noted with pleasure the call for a Donor Conference on 
Palestine. They committed themselves to work together to assist both the Israelis and the Palestinians 




37. The Foreign Ministers expressed their deepest sympathies and condolences to the victims and 
survivors of the devastating tsunami that occurred in South and South-East Asia and East Africa on 26 
December 2004. This natural disaster of unprecedented scale underlined the importance of the adoption 
by the international community of pro-active measures to address the issues of disaster reduction, 
mitigation and management. In this regard, the Ministers expressed their recognition for the cooperation 
extended by the developing countries to the countries affected by the tsunami. The three Governments 
should seek to co-operate in the strengthening of capacity and the implementation of development 
programmes at national and local levels to reduce the impacts of “sudden-onset” natural disasters. In 
this regard, the Ministers recalled the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) at the 
January 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan.  
 
38. The Ministers reviewed the work of the Sectoral Working Groups and adopted their reports. While 
appreciating the progress made thus far, they recognised that greater scope existed for further 
intensifying co-operation amongst the three countries.  
IBSA Sectoral Cooperation 
 
39. The Ministers decided to initiate trilateral cooperation in two additional sectors, namely Agriculture 
and Culture. While noting that the Health and Energy Sectoral Working Groups had been unable to 
convene, they welcomed the proposals for the convening of both these Working Groups in the near 
future.  
 
40. As regards Science and Technology, the Ministers agreed on areas of co-operation for research and 
development and decided that each country would champion research areas through a system of 
coordinators. A work plan was developed for 2005/06, reflecting milestones in implementing projects, a 
schedule of relevant events as well as a process to finalise a working document to be signed at the next 
meeting of the Science and Technology Ministers, scheduled from 8 to 10 June 2005 in Brazil.  
 
41. In the context of the Information Society sector, the Ministers noted that their countries had national 
e-government and Information Society Development Plans that had many similarities and decided to 
share information, best practices and identify projects for cooperation. 
 
42. Recognising that digital exclusion constituted a critical obstacle to development and that Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) should be harnessed to address the needs of the poor, the 
Ministers stressed the importance of cooperation in this area, especially with regard to the availability of 
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low-cost equipment, multi-purpose community public access centres, their sustainability and Free/Libre 
Open Source Software (FLOSS). 
 
43. The Ministers agreed that they should continue to coordinate positions, particularly on Internet 
Governance, and collaborate on the preparations for the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). 
 
44. They noted that the hosting by South Africa of the FIFA Football World Cup in 2010 created a good 
opportunity, particularly for the IBSA ICT sectors, to collaborate on the ICT needs for the event. 
 
45. The Ministers further welcomed the decision on the establishment of the IBSA website which will 
facilitate interaction on, and follow-up of, IBSA decisions. The website will be operationalised by the end 
of June 2005. 
 
46. The Ministers decided to formalise an IBSA sectoral working group on Agriculture. It was agreed to 
maintain the momentum that resulted from the launch of the IBSA Funding Facility for Hunger and 
Poverty Alleviation. They also agreed to form a closer partnership between IBSA and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) on the implementation of the Agriculture and Livestock Development 
project in Guinea Bissau. A Technical Monitoring Committee (TMC) would also be established for the 
project.  
 
47. The Ministers agreed that consultations between the Ministries and Departments of Agriculture 
would be strengthened in support of the IBSA and G-20 trade consultation processes. They decided that 
a meeting of IBSA experts would be convened in India to define areas for trilateral research and training 
in agriculture. 
 
48. On the issue of trade, the Ministers decided to promote co-ordination and co-operation in several 
areas including on the convergence of Preferential Trade Agreements and/or Free Trade Agreements, 
in the G-20 and on WTO-related issues. They further agreed to conduct joint studies and research on 
trade-related matters. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that preferential trade agreements had 
already been concluded between Mercosur-SACU and Mercosur-India and further noted that 
discussions will commence in June 2005 on an agreement between India and SACU. A study was 
circulated on “The Potential for Greater Trade between South Africa, India and Brazil” and the Member 
States undertook to conduct IBSA seminars on trade and investment in their respective countries as 
well as in key developed markets. 
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49. The Ministers welcomed the launch of the IBSA Business Council. It was agreed that the Business 
Council and the Working Group will have an active working relationship, and also work jointly in areas 
such as Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises.  
 
50. The Ministers welcomed the preparations for the IBSA Education Ministerial meeting scheduled 
preferably for July 2005, in New Delhi. Thematic areas previously identified in the New Delhi Plan of 
Action will form the basis of discussions at this meeting and include issues of higher education, distance 
education and basic education. A draft agreement on an Exchange Programme on Higher Education is 
also expected to be signed at this meeting.  
 
51. The Ministers noted preparations for the second IBSA Defence Ministers meeting scheduled to be 
held in Brazil, as well as possible areas of mutual cooperation such as the exchange of personnel, 
training opportunities, the exchange of experiences in peacekeeping operations and Defence Industry 
co-operation. The above possible areas of mutual cooperation will be considered during the Ministerial 
meeting. Matters relating to the preparations for the proposed Defence Industry and Technology 
Seminar were also discussed.  
 
52. The Ministers expressed the view that enhancing co-operation in the tourism sector was vital in 
order to foster people-to-people contact as well as to contribute to economic development. They 
highlighted that statistics of inbound tourism from among the IBSA member countries showed an 
encouraging upward trend. They recommended that for tourism purposes, competent authorities in the 
three countries examine the possibility of visa waiver or the issuing of visas on arrival for IBSA 
nationals. 
 
53. The Ministers noted the possibility of arranging a meeting of IBSA Tourism Ministers to coincide with 
the South African Tourism Indaba in May 2005, at which discussions would be conducted on the IBSA 
tourism action plan, a trilateral tourism agreement, as well as the bilateral agreement between South 
Africa and Brazil. They also noted a number of related meetings to be arranged, amongst others, for 
leading IBSA private sector stakeholders in the travel, tourism and hospitality industry, on topics such as 
eco-tourism and conservation as well as cultural and heritage tourism. 
 
54. The Ministers took cognisance of the importance of the transport sector in promoting trade and 
tourism and welcomed the progress made towards the finalization of a trilateral agreement on Civil 
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Aviation. They encouraged the competent authorities to meet within three months to finalise this work 
and to continue the negotiations on a Maritime Transport Agreement. 
 
55. The Ministers for the first time included the cultural sector in the agenda of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum. They decided to coordinate their positions within UNESCO, amongst others, on issues such as 
the contribution of culture to a country’s economy, the protection of intellectual property rights keeping in 
view the development dimension, and the potential of creative industries to alleviate poverty and 
generate income.  
 
56. They agreed to commence their collaboration by organizing a music and dance festival in Brazil in 
November 2005, a meeting in India on the audiovisual sector in 2005 and a conference in South Africa 
on indigenous knowledge systems at the beginning of 2006. 
 
57. The Ministers agreed that an IBSA seminar on Economic Development and Social Equity will be 
held in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 5 August 2005. The seminar will examine the contribution of the IBSA 
Forum towards a new paradigm for South-South dialogue and cooperation, and seek to promote a 
better understanding among IBSA members of their national policies and strategies in order to 
encourage economic and social co-operation. 
 
58. The Ministers expressed their expectation that the seminar will deliver concrete outcomes towards 
fostering trilateral engagement. They agreed that in order to guide the discussion on the overarching 
theme of poverty alleviation, the seminar will concentrate on economic development, social equity and 
science and technology. 
 
59. The Ministers emphasised the need for co-operation in the Energy Sector. They noted that the areas 
of non-conventional energy, bio-diesel energy, hydrogen energy and fuel cells, exchange of experience 
in generation, transmission and distribution of power as well as energy conservation and reforms had 
been identified for co-operation.  
 
60. The Ministers noted that the IBSA Health Sector Senior Officials meeting will be held in Brazil, from 
28-29 March 2005. This meeting will develop a framework for an IBSA Implementation Plan on Health. It 
was further agreed that the IBSA Health Ministers will meet on the margins of the upcoming World 
Health Assembly (WHA) meeting in Geneva, in May 2005. The Ministers will consider adopting a 
framework for an IBSA Implementation Plan on Health.  
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61. The Ministers reviewed progress made with regard to the operationalisation of the IBSA Facility for 
Hunger and Poverty Alleviation. They furthermore reviewed progress that had been made in addressing 
certain operational issues aimed at strengthening project implementation and future delivery. The 
criteria for the submission and evaluation of projects were discussed, as were certain practical 
guidelines for the functioning of the Board of Directors of the Facility.  
IBSA Facility for Hunger and Poverty Alleviation 
 
62. The Ministers once again emphasised the financial commitment of their Governments to the Facility 
and agreed that they would extend invitations for participation in the funding of this South-South 
initiative. They noted with approval that the implementation of the Guinea-Bissau project was on 
schedule and discussed the possibility of initiating other projects. The Ministers expressed optimism that 
the launching of the project in Guinea-Bissau would help raise the profile of the Fund, especially among 
the private sector and civil society, and thereby encouraged further participation. 
 
63. The Ministers agreed that IBSA would approach the Palestinian Authority with an offer to assist it 
with its reconstruction efforts. 
 
64. The Ministers also agreed that each member country would commit an additional amount of US$ 1 
million to the IBSA Fund.  
 
65. The Foreign Ministers of Brazil and India expressed their deep gratitude to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of South Africa for convening the Second Meeting of the Trilateral Commission and noted the 
special privilege of having had the opportunity to meet and interact with President Thabo Mbeki. The 
three Ministers agreed that the next meeting will be held in Brazil in 2006. 
 
 
APPENDIX 5: RIO COMMUNIQUÉ, MARCH 2006 
1. The Minister of State for External Affairs of India, H. E. Mr Anand Sharma, the Minister of External 
Relations of Brazil, H. E. Mr. Celso Amorim, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, H. E. Dr. 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, met in Rio de Janeiro on 30 March 2006 for the Third Meeting of the 
Trilateral Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.  
  
 160 
2. The Ministers discussed a wide range of critical global issues and reconfirmed their shared vision and 
determination to play a constructive role in international affairs and to maintain friendly relations with all 
countries. They reaffirmed the IBSA Dialogue Forum as an important mechanism for political 
consultation and co-ordination as well as for strengthening cooperation in sectoral areas and to improve 
economic relations among India, Brazil and South Africa.  
  
 3. They confirmed their support for a strong multilateral system as a means towards addressing issues 
of global concern, in particular the pre-eminent role of the United Nations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion of sustainable development. 
  
4. The Ministers recognized the successful conclusion of the Millennium Review Summit, which took 
place in September 2005. The Ministers expressed their hope that the UN reform processes continue to 
reflect a balance between development and security concerns and, in this regard, reiterated their 
perception that development matters remain an indispensable foundation for a new collective security 
system.  
Millennium Review Summit 
  
 5. They reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of developing countries successfully achieving, at the 
minimum, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a core strategy in the international fight 
against underdevelopment, hunger and poverty. They reiterated their support for the Action against 
Hunger and Poverty initiative and, in particular, the Declaration issued by the promoters of the initiative 
on the occasion of the UN Millennium Review Summit. They reconfirmed the importance of obtaining 
new and additional financial and other resources for fighting poverty and financing development.  
  
6. Within the framework of the Monterrey consensus, the Ministers acknowledged that the MDGs will not 
be achieved without also resorting to additional and innovative sources of financing for development. 
The Ministers confirmed their willingness to support and promote innovative financing mechanisms and 
in this regard reiterated their intention to take active part in the work by the Leading Group on Solidarity 
Levies, created at the Ministerial Conference on Innovative Financing, held in Paris in February/March 
2006. 
 
7. The Ministers reiterated their continued support for the reform of the United Nations to make it more 
democratic and responsive to the priorities of its Member States, particularly those of developing 
UN Institutional Reform 
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countries that constitute the vast majority of its membership. In that regard, they welcomed the 
decisions taken in the September Summit in New York in 2005 and expressed their full support for the 
implementation of those decisions as contained in the “Summit Outcome Document”.  
  
 8. The Ministers emphasised that the Security Council must, in its composition, represent contemporary 
realities and not those of 1945. Keeping in view that the decisions of the Security Council should serve 
the interests of the larger United Nations Membership, they emphasised the need for the urgent reform 
of the Security Council that would include its expansion in both categories of membership, permanent 
and non-permanent, in order to render it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive. 
Towards this end, the representation of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, as 
permanent members of the Security Council, is essential. The IBSA countries agreed to continue to 
exchange views on this issue, which they feel is central to the process of the reform of the United 
Nations, and work towards this common purpose in the coming months, with the view to achieving 
concrete results by the end of the 60th General Assembly.  
  
9. They welcomed the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission as an important intergovernmental 
advisory body through which international community could provide long term support to countries 
emerging from conflict, including capacity-building efforts. IBSA countries reiterated their commitment 
towards working for an early operationalisation of the Peacebuilding Commission.  
  
10. They welcomed the creation of the Human Rights Council and expressed their commitment to 
ensuring that it fulfils the expectation of the international community. Now that the Peace Building 
Commission and the Human Rights Council have been created, the UN reform process must 
concentrate on the Security Council reform.  
  
11. They voiced their full support for the capable manner in which the United Nations Secretary-
General, Mr. Kofi Annan, has been conducting the work of the organisation, and expressed confidence 
in his efforts to enhance the UN’s role in international relations.  
 
12. They recommitted their respective delegations to the UN and its specialised agencies, as well as 
other multilateral bodies, to remain in close contact with each other and to consult on all issues of 
significance.  
  
South-South Cooperation  
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13. The Ministers reaffirmed that South-South cooperation is an essential and fundamental component 
of international cooperation for development, and stressed their support for mainstreaming of South-
South cooperation and of the pursuit of the development of Technical Cooperation amongst Developing 
Countries (TCDC) to its full potential. In this regard, they recommitted themselves to work together for 
the enhancement of South-South cooperation and emphasized the establishment of the IBSA Fund as 
an example of cooperation among three developing countries for the benefit of the neediest nations of 
the South.  
 
14. They noted with satisfaction the adoption of the Doha Plan of Action at the South Summit, held in 
Doha, between 12 and 16 June 2005. They emphasized the importance of strengthening South-South 
cooperation in order to promote growth and development. 
 
15. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the socio-economic development programme of the 
African Union and committed the IBSA partnership to seeking practical and concrete measures to be 
pursued in support of the implementation of NEPAD. The three countries share a common experience in 
the struggle against poverty and underdevelopment, as well as complementary levels of development. 
There was therefore much to gain from sharing information and best practices in dealing with common 
challenges and in identifying areas of common concern, need and benefit.  
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
  
16. The Ministers welcomed the consolidation of the South American Community of Nations, which held 
its first Presidential Meeting in Brasilia, on 30 September, 2005, and recognized it as a major 
achievement in the process of strengthening the political coordination and economic, commercial and 
infrastructural integration among South American countries.   
 
South American Integration 
17. The Ministers reaffirmed that international terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to 
peace and security and that acts of terrorism were criminal and unjustifiable whatever the 
considerations or factors that might be invoked to justify them. The Ministers emphasised the need for 
concerted and co-ordinated action by the international community, with the ultimate objective of 
eradicating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. 
 
18. They reaffirmed their full support for the implementation of all the measures to combat terrorism 
Terrorism 
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outlined in relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. They welcomed the Council’s efforts to increase 
cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism and called on the international community to 
work together in a spirit of cooperation and tolerance to eliminate terrorism. Recalling that the Outcome 
Document of the World Summit 2005 had called upon the member states to conclude a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism during the current Session of the UN General Assembly, the 
Ministers stressed the importance of finalising the convention on international terrorism and called upon 
all States to cooperate in resolving the outstanding issues with the objective of an expeditious 
conclusion of negotiations and the adoption of this Convention.  
 
19. They emphasised that international cooperation to combat terrorism should be conducted in 
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and relevant international 
conventions, including international human rights, humanitarian and refugee instruments.  
 
20. The Ministers reaffirmed the view that the primary focus on human development, the fight against 
poverty, and measures to promote a better quality of life, should underpin and provide for greater 
guarantees for international peace and stability. The three Ministers took stock of the global security 
situation concerning disarmament and non-proliferation, and expressed their concern over the lack of 
progress in multilateral fora related to the field, and voiced their hope that the international community 
will show the necessary resolve and political will to reinforce the international disarmament and non-
proliferation regime by means of multilaterally-negotiated, transparent, balanced and effective 
measures.  
 
21. The Ministers expressed their conviction that multilateral institutions set up under multilateral 
disarmament agreements should remain the primary institutions and mechanisms, in the international 
community’s endeavour to achieve common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-
proliferation.  
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control 
 
22. They took note of the positive continuing cooperation among their countries at the IAEA and other 
fora, with a view to ensuring the unimpeded growth and development of the peaceful use of atomic 
energy, through the supply of technology, equipment and material, under appropriate safeguards, and 
reaffirmed their will to intensify such cooperation. In this regard, the Ministers called for a peaceful 
resolution of the Iranian nuclear programme within the context of the IAEA. 
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23. They highlighted that nuclear energy can play an important role in meeting growing global energy 
requirements while at the same time addressing concerns related to global warming. In this regard they 
agreed to consider further enhancing international civilian nuclear cooperation, with countries who share 
the objectives of non-proliferation and have contributed to them, as well as having concluded 
appropriate safeguard agreements with IAEA. 
 
24. The Ministers expressed concern over the continuing impasse in the Conference on Disarmament 
and called upon member states to intensify efforts to reach an agreement on a programme of work. In 
this context, they reiterated that the Five Ambassadors proposal as revised in 2003 still remained a 
viable basis for a programme of work.  
 
25. They also expressed their commitment to the universalisation of the Convention for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as to the goal of ensuring its 
balanced, transparent and effective implementation.  
 
26. They also agreed on the pressing need to adopt measures aimed at strengthening the Convention 
for the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons, in order to consolidate its role as a key 
disarmament instrument of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and expressed 
their will to intensify the cooperation and consultations in relation to the Convention, in particular in the 
context of its 6th Review Conference, scheduled for November-December 2006. 
 
27. They recalled the importance of cooperative and effective international action against the illicit trade 
in small arms, light weapons and ammunition, and the need for the 2006 Review Conference of the 
United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN-PoA), adopted at the Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.  
 
28. The Ministers welcomed the holding of transparent and free parliamentary elections in the 
Palestinian territories on 25 January 2006 and of general elections in Israel this very week. They 
welcomed the strengthening of the democratic process in Palestine and the peaceful nature of the 
polling. They expressed the hope that the newly formed government in Palestine and the newly formed 
government in Israel will continue to pursue peaceful negotiations as laid down by the Road Map for 
Situation in the Middle East 
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Peace and to abstain from taking any action or measure which might put in jeopardy the peace process 
in the region leading to the establishment of a viable, sovereign, independent State of Palestine living 
side by side in peaceful co-existence with the State of Israel.  
  
29. Considering the results of the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Hong Kong, in December 
2005, the Ministers emphasized the necessity of renewed political commitment to advance negotiations 
so that the Hong Kong deadlines are met. 
 
30. As agriculture is central to development and the Doha Round, the Ministers expressed their 
conviction that Hong Kong consolidated the G-20 as an element of systemic relevance in WTO 
Agriculture negotiations. 
 
31. The Ministers emphasised the need to consolidate unity on the development content of the Round. 
This is supported by increased activity, in the form of consultations, held in Geneva by Indian, Brazilian 
and South African delegations, in order to co-ordinate positions and strengthen Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA), as well as the establishment of the NAMA -11 whose two main principles are 
supporting flexibilities for developing countries and balance between NAMA and other areas under 
negotiation. 
 
32. They recognized the importance of incorporating the development dimension in international 
discussions concerning intellectual property, as a means to preserve the policy space that countries 
enjoy in ensuring access to knowledge, health, culture and a sustainable environment. In this context, 
they welcomed the launching of a “Development Agenda in the World Intellectual Property Organization” 
and reaffirmed their hope that the aforementioned Organization incorporates effectively the 
development dimension in all its bodies. 
 
33. The Ministers took note of the broader objectives of the European Union proposed Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) Legislation, in respect of the protection of human 
health and the environment. The Ministers reiterated their support for the commitments made on 
chemical safety at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. 
 
34. The ministers expressed their concern for the unintended consequences that REACH will have on 
developing economies exporting to the EU. Such consequences will negatively affect the attainment of 
International Trade  
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development goals in the South, including the MDGs . The Ministers recognised the efforts, 
commitments and determination of leaders of developing economies to effectively address the 
challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, marginalisation social exclusion and economic disparities.  
 
35. The Ministers urged the EU to give due consideration to the grave consequences for developing 
economies should REACH be adopted in its current form. The Ministers urged the EU to ensure that 
REACH will not become a Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT). The high costs for compliance, the 
possibilities for substituting commodities and the lack of technological and human resource capacity to 
comply may render the EU markets inaccessible for exports from developing countries. The Ministers 
expressed their desire that REACH should be consistent with the WTO laws and provide for adequate 
flexibility to developing countries.  
 
36. The Ministers undertook to work together and jointly to address the challenges posed by REACH. 
The Ministers resolved to make all efforts to cooperate in coordinated manner regarding REACH.  
 
37. The Ministers underlined the convergence of views regarding the need for enhancing the 
governance of the international financial system and, in this respect, reiterated their commitment to 
coordinate efforts on this issue. They further stressed that progress in this field will lead to 
improvements in crisis prevention and the increase of resources to finance development.  
International Financial System 
  
38. The Ministers reaffirmed the validity of the principles contained in the Rio Declaration, particularly on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, the Programme of Action contained in Agenda 21, and the 
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
Johannesburg. IBSA would continue its efforts to mobilise new and additional financial resources and 
the transfer of environmentally-sound technologies within an agreed time-frame in order to implement 
the outcomes of these conferences. 
 
39. They stressed that an international environment supportive of development would be critical to this 
process. They also called for a specific focus on capacity-building as well as on the transfer of financial 
resources and technology to developing countries. 
 
40. They noted with appreciation the stage of the TRIPS Council negotiations on the relationship 
Sustainable Development 
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between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and reaffirmed the urgent 
need that Members reach a prompt solution for the problem raised by the granting of intellectual 
property rights concerning or making use of genetic resources and/or associated traditional knowledge 
without compliance of relevant provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity. In this respect, they 
underscored the wide support for the proposal of amending TRIPS with a view to require intellectual 
property applications to disclose the country of origin of the subject matter as well as the compliance 
with the requirements of fair and equitable benefit-sharing and prior informed consent, in accordance 
with the legislation of the country of origin. 
 
41. They expressed, in this context, their positive expectations about the results of the VIII Conference 
of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP-8/CBD), which is being held in Curitiba, 
Brazil (March, 20th-31st). They concurred on that COP-8 constitutes an opportunity to advance the 
effective implementation of CBD. 
 
42. They also called for expediting negotiation and conclusion of the international regime on access and 
benefit sharing, as an instrument for protecting intellectual property rights concerning traditional and 
indigenous knowledge. India, Brazil and South Africa, as the founding members of the Group of Like-
Minded Megadiverse Countries, agreed to strengthen cooperation and co-ordination, with an emphasis 
on multilateral negotiations and in fostering activities related to South-South Cooperation. 
 
43. They recalled that Brazil, India and South Africa will jointly participate in the Capacity Building 
Committee of the Group on Earth Observation (GEO), an intergovernmental partnership entrusted with 
implementing the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). The participation in the 
Capacity Building Committee provides a unique opportunity for the three countries to cooperate in 
enhancing the capabilities of developing countries, especially less developed ones, in the use, analysis, 
interpretation and modelling of Earth Observation data, for applications in the nine societal benefit areas 
of GEOSS, which comprise Agriculture, Health, Disasters, Water, Ecosystems, Climate, Meteorology, 
Energy and Biodiversity. 
  
44. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the results of the Montreal meetings (COP-11, 
COP/MOP-1), particularly with the adoption of the Marrakech Accords and the establishment of the Ad-
hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to consider 
such commitments for the period beyond 2012. They further urged developed countries to meet their 
Climate Change 
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own commitments and undertakings under the Protocol not only in terms of complying with current 
targets for Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emission reduction, but also in terms of their commitment in 
respect of technology transfer, capacity building and financial support to developing countries. They also 
welcomed the dialogue on long term co-operative action to address climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the Convention. 
 
45. They also agreed on the need for continued consultations within IBSA Forum on the environment 
and climate change issues.  
 
IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger
46. The Ministers reiterated the fundamental character of the IBSA Fund as a means to disseminate the 
best practices in the alleviation of poverty and hunger. They emphasized the importance of the 
participation of institutions of IBSA countries (Governmental and Non-Governmental) in the projects 
financed by the Fund and recommended that the UNDP, as administrator of the Fund, find means to 
make that participation possible.  
 
47. The Ministers received the report of the visit of the Technical Monitoring Committee (TMC) to 
Guinea Bissau and accepted the recommendations made by the TMC, especially concerning the 
management of the project, and urged the UNDP Office in Bissau to work more closely with the UNDP 
Special Unit for South-South Cooperation in New York, the Coordinator of the project and the Guinean 
Bissau national authorities. They accepted the Committee´s recommendation that an additional 
agreement be signed with UNDP in order to clarify rights and obligations of both parties. 
 
48. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to move forward with other projects in the scope of the 
Fund. They welcomed the finalisation of the concept paper of the project on waste collection in Haiti 
(Carrefour Feuille) and called upon speedy appointment of a project coordinator so that the project can 
be implemented as soon as possible.. They underlined the importance of making progresses in the 
drawing up of the projects benefiting Palestine and Laos.  
 








51. Reference was made to the two Workshops on Information Society and E-Government, held in 
South Africa and India, and to the commitment of the three delegations to actively participate in the last 
event of the series, to take place in Brazil, in June 2006. 
 
52. The Ministers welcomed the agreement reached by the Working Group on the Information Society, 
on the content of the “IBSA Framework for Cooperation on Information Society”, setting up the basis 
and defining modes of cooperation in the fields of Information Society and Communication 
Technologies, and took note with satisfaction of the Joint Action Program for 2006-2007, prescribing 
specific initiatives in all fields of cooperation covered by the Framework. The Ministers also welcomed 
the development of the IBSA website (www.ibsa-trilateral.org), maintained by South Africa, and invite 
the various working groups of the IBSA Forum to provide content and make full use of this channel of 
communication. 
 
53. The Ministers recognized with pleasure the high level of coordination between the three delegations 
during the second phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in Tunis, in 
November 2005, and its preparatory works. In this regard, the three countries reiterated their 
commitment to keep working together during the WSIS follow-up process, as well as in other 
international fora related to the issue, to promote the use of Information and Communication 
Technologies as a tool for development and to build multilateral, democratic and transparent global 
Internet governance mechanisms. 
 
54. The Ministers decided to formalise the establishment of an additional sectoral working group on 
Social Issues, as a follow-up to the International Seminar on Economic Development and Social Equity, 
held in Rio de Janeiro, on 3rd and 4th August, 2005. They also expressed their intention of establishing 
as soon as possible a working group on Public Administration.  
 
55. The member countries reiterated their commitment to further promote the production and use of 
Biofuels as environmentally friendly and sustainable fuels which promote socio-economic development, 
taking into consideration their global importance. Progress is being made, on exchange of information 
on Renewable Energy and the Biofuels value chain.  
 
56. More emphasis will be placed on exchange of information into the areas of energy efficiency and 
conservation, and hydrogen energy. India will host the second technical meeting of the Energy Working 
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Group, to which other stakeholders including private sector players may be invited for the enhancement 
of implementation of IBSA initiatives.  
 
57. The Ministers agreed on the importance of new initiatives aimed at strengthening economic and 
trade relations among developing countries, as a means to generate business opportunities and 
contribute to an international trade scenario more suitable to their development projects. In that regard, 
they took note with great satisfaction that Mercosul will be proposing to SACU and India the creation of 
a Working Group to explore the modalities of a Trilateral Free Trade Agreement (T-FTA) among them. 
They underlined the significance of this exercise and expressed their full support to the initiative. 
 
58. Further the Ministers supported the initiative of a renewable source of energy seminar and the 
proposals to assist Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises through the proposed study on how to make 
business in the IBSA countries, and the proposals on sharing of experiences and training opportunities. 
 
59. The Ministers also laid emphasis on the need to conclude the bilateral customs cooperation 
agreements expeditiously. 
 
60. The member countries decided that, in taking forward the renewed approach to IBSA deliverables, 
South Africa should host a meeting on civil aviation and maritime transport in April 2006. This meeting 
will focus on the finalization of the trilateral on maritime transport agreement and also review 
implementation of air transport agreement. It should be noted, in addition, that during the present 
meeting of the working group in Rio, which also included the presence of representatives of Air India, 
VARIG and SAA, tremendous progress has been made and concrete projects have been identified for 
cooperation. To this end cooperation will be fostered in areas of airlink expansions, training and 
knowledge sharing in airports and airspace management, port management, operational and 
infrastructural systems, including capacity building in shipbuilding, environmental management and 
navigational systems.  
 
61. The development of transshipment facilities will also be made a priority in order to support the IBSA 
trade strategy which advocates for the creation of South-South shipping highway that integrate 
subregional connection between MERCOSUL, SACU and Indian regions.  
 
62. The Ministers noted progress on the establishment of a framework to strengthen cooperation in the 
field of agriculture. Specific areas of cooperation that have been identified are: research and capacity 
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building, agricultural trade, rural development and poverty alleviation, and other allied areas as may be 
agreed. 
 
63. Following the successful meeting of the health working group held in Brazil from 6th to 10th 
February 2006 in which broad areas of cooperation were discussed, the South African Minister of Health 
invited her counterparts for a meeting in March 2006. However, this meeting will now take place on the 
margins of the WHO meeting in Geneva, in May 2006. 
 
IBSA Trade and Investment Forum
64. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the results of the Trade and Investment Forum. The forum was 
divided into four panels: a) Trilateral trade analysis; b) implementation of the preferential trade 
agreements between Mercosul, India and Southern African Customs Union (SACU); c) challenges to 
the growth of the trilateral trade (barriers, logistics and financing); and d) organization of the trilateral 
business meeting on the occasion of the IBSA Meeting of Heads of Government and State in 
September 2006.The delegations of India, Brazil and South Africa presented data and facts concerning 
trade issues that thrusted fruitful discussions among the businessmen attending the meeting.  
 
65. It was presented an evaluation of the current aspects of the negotiations involving Mercosul, Sacu 
and India. All delegations concluded that there must be an expansion on acting positions to fit the ever 
growing market of the three countries. The importance of solid links between the three countries was 
mentioned several times and also the necessity of a stronger South-South union. The possible 
substitution of imports from northern countries by imports from southern countries was considered a 
possible solution to enforce this new commercial agreement. 
 
66. Brazilian businessmen pointed out that among the main barriers to be eliminated to foster trilateral 
trade are: a) logistics, b) customs procedures, c) lack of information and d) distances. The logistic 
problem was tackled by the suggestion of a study (previously discussed in the IBSA work group for 
trade and investment (on March 28th) to further address the issue. The private sector also emphasized 
the necessity of creating flights uniting Brazil-South Africa-India. The measure would help to narrow the 
distances both physical and cultural between IBSA partners. 
 
67. In what concerns customs procedures, it was suggested more cooperation in the area by the 
specific government institutions, in order to simplify many of the regulations and turn the customs 




68. The study suggested in the work group of trade and investment, as well as the magazine “Brazil 
Brand of Excellence”, the Brazilian website “Brazil Trade Net” and the creation of the IBSA site, were 
solutions proposed to help ease the gap of information, and bring businessmen from the three countries 
closer. 
 
69. A great deal of possible solutions were suggested to help strengthen the IBSA economic area: more 
aggressive free trade agreements, closer relations between businesses and industries from the three 
countries, enhancing contact between the automobile industries of IBSA.  
 
70. Some sectors were also given special attention: the renewable energy sector and ethanol industry. 
The WG on trade and investment decided to create a seminar that will happen in South Africa before 
the Summit in September.  
 
71. The meeting was praised and considered by the attendants as highly productive. It is expected new 
steps towards a more united and stronger IBSA by all. 
.  
72. The Ministers of India and South Africa confirmed the participation of Prime Minister Singh and 
President Mbeki in the IBSA Summit to be convened by Brazil on 13th September 2006. 
 
73. The Ministers welcomed the announcement by Brazil of the II Conference of Intellectuals from the 
Africa and the Diaspora, which will take place in Salvador, on 12th-14th July 2006. Representatives 
from India will also be extended an invitation to attend this meeting as observers. 
 
74. The Ministers of India and South Africa expressed their deep gratitude to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Brazil for convening the Third Meeting of the Trilateral Commission. 
 
75. The Ministers agreed that the next meeting will be hosted by India in the first quarter of 2007.  
 
APPENDIX 6: TSHWANE DECLARATION, OCTOBER 2007 
 
1. The Prime Minister of India, H.E. Dr Manmohan Singh, the President of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva, and the President of South Africa, H.E. Mr. Thabo Mbeki (thereafter referred as “the 
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leaders”) met in Tshwane, South Africa, on 17 October 2007, for the 2nd Summit of the India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. 
 
2. The leaders recognised that since its inception in 2003, the IBSA Dialogue Forum provided a strong 
framework for trilateral cooperation in several key sectoral areas amongst IBSA partners. They noted 
that IBSA also provides them an important instrument for cooperation on regional and international 
issues and promoting the interests of the developing countries, thus contributing to the strengthening 
and deepening of South-South cooperation. 
 
3. The leaders adopted the outcome of the 4th Ministerial Commission held in New Delhi on 17 July 
2007. 
 
4. The leaders recommitted themselves to vigorously pursue the deepening of South-South cooperation 
for sustainable development. They reaffirmed their shared commitment to the eradication of poverty 
through sustained and inclusive economic growth. They highlighted the importance of implementing the 
principles adopted in the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, particularly the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and emphasized that capacity and institution building is a key to global sustainable 
development. 
5. The leaders acknowledged with appreciation the continued participation by academia and business 
leaders. The leaders are satisfied that the participation by civil society contributed to the enhancing the 
visibility of IBSA. They also applauded the commitment by the peoples of the three countries to 
participate at the Music and Dance Festival in Brazil later in October 2007.  
 
6. The leaders welcomed and applauded the coming together of parliamentarians from India, Brazil and 
South Africa and the fruitful talks they had as an important contribution to people to people relations and 
strengthening of the IBSA Dialogue. 
 
7. The leaders welcomed and fully supported the launch of the Women’s Forum which strengthens 
participation of women in IBSA and recognised the fundamental contribution of women in the social, 
cultural and economic development of India, Brazil and South Africa. They reaffirmed their commitment 
to the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights.  
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8. The leaders reiterated the importance of strengthening the global governance system as it forms a 
critical ingredient for promoting peace, security and sustainable socio-economic development. They 
reaffirmed their abiding commitment and faith in multilaterism, with the United Nations playing the pre-
eminent role. They reiterated that the international system cannot be reordered meaningfully without a 
comprehensive reform of the United Nations. The leaders emphasized that the reform of the Security 
Council is central to this process to ensure that the UN system reflects contemporary realities. They 
expressed their full support for a genuine reform and expansion of the Security Council, in permanent 
and non permanent categories of membership, with greater representation for developing countries in 
both. They reiterated that inter-governmental negotiations on the issue of Security Council reform must 
commence forthwith. They agreed to further strengthen cooperation amongst their countries and with 
other member states interested in a genuine reform of the Security Council. They also reaffirmed the 
need for concerted efforts by member states towards revitalisation of the General Assembly. 
 
9. The leaders emphasised their commitment to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
and expressed concern over the lack of progress in the realisation of this goal. They emphasised that 
nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring 
continuous, irreversible progress on both fronts, and reaffirmed, in this regard, that the objective of non-
proliferation would be best served by the systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons in 
a comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner. They further emphasized the 
necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
with a specified framework of time to eliminate nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, 
production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their 
destruction. 
 
10. The leaders strongly emphasized the need for ensuring the supply of safe, sustainable and non-
polluting sources of energy to meet the rising global demand for energy, particularly in developing 
countries. In this context, they agreed to explore approaches to cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy under appropriate International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards. They 
further agreed that international civilian nuclear cooperation, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, 
amongst countries committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, could be 
enhanced through acceptable forward-looking approaches, consistent with their respective national and 
international obligations. They also reiterated the importance of ensuring that any multilateral decisions 
related to the nuclear fuel cycle do not undermine the inalienable right of States to pursue nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their international legal obligations. 
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11. The leaders called for the international community to work together on Climate Change under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in accordance with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. They urged all developed countries to take 
more ambitious and quantifiable GHG emission reduction targets in the post 2012 period under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Moreover they stressed the imperative of addressing unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption. This would also spur the Carbon market and significantly enhance the 
Clean Development Mechanism’s contribution to sustainable development, financial flows and transfer 
of clean technologies to developing countries. They urged that significant progress is needed in Bali in 
December 2007. 
 
12. The leaders stressed the disproportionately high impact of Climate Change on developing countries 
with their greater vulnerability, inadequate means and limited capacities to adapt to its effects. They 
emphasised the importance for adequate, new and additional financing for the adaptation efforts of 
developing countries without diverting resources for development. There should be no foreclosure of 
opportunities for developing countries to secure the technological and financial resources required for 
adaptation through development.  
 
13. The leaders urged an agreement on innovative modalities for the development, transfer and 
commercialization of technologies, including clean coal technologies, at affordable costs to developing 
countries noting that rewards for innovators need to be balanced with common good for humankind. 
They also urged the international community to work in a collaborative manner for the development and 
deployment of renewables, biofuels and biomass, and advanced clean technologies. In this connection 
they welcomed the work done by the International Forum on Biofuels and underlined the importance of 
the International Conference on Biofuels, to be held in 2008.  
 
14. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights for all. 
They expressed their commitment towards developing the institutional framework of the Human Rights 
Council, including the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, based on effective international 
cooperation. They reaffirmed their determination to work towards the operationalisation of the right to 
development. 
 
15. The leaders reaffirmed that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security. They strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed 
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by whomever, wherever and for whatever purpose. They stressed that there can be no justification, 
whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. They emphasized the need for concerted and cooperative action 
by the international community to realize the objectives of eradicating terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations. In this regard, they called for the early adoption of a Comprehensive Convention against 
International Terrorism. They emphasized that international cooperation in combating terrorism should 
be conducted in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter, relevant UN Resolutions and 
International Conventions, and Human Rights. 
 
16. The leaders noted the progress being made on the African continent towards the achievement of 
peace, security, stability and development. They reaffirmed their determination to support these efforts 
while noting the inextricable link between peace and security on the one hand, and development on the 
other. They commended the efforts of the African Union and noted the ongoing work to strengthen its 
structures.  
 
17. The leaders reiterated their firm belief in NEPAD a key framework for socio-economic development 
in Africa. They acknowledged that the Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund will, as it evolves, 
help accelerate Africa’s growth and development to meet the objectives as set out in the NEPAD. In this 
regard, the IBSA partners agreed to associate with the development of the fund in accordance with their 
respective rules and regulations.  
 
18. The leaders called upon all parties in the Sudan to recommit themselves to the implementation of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to its spirit and letter, as it is the viable option to the 
resolution of the conflict in the Sudan. They urged all parties involved in the conflict in Darfur to 
participate in the forthcoming Darfur peace talks in Libya. In the same vein they expressed their concern 
at the increasing violence in Darfur, and in this respect, call on all the parties in Darfur to exercise 
restraint. They call upon the international community to provide financial and material support for the 
deployment of the UN-AU Hybrid Force and the alleviation of the humanitarian situation in Darfur. 
 
19. The leaders reflected on the situation in Zimbabwe and took note of the positive progress of SADC 
initiative to promote a negotiated political solution in Zimbabwe between the Government of Zimbabwe 
and the opposition party, under the facilitation of President Thabo Mbeki. They reiterated the need for 
the international community to continue its support for the people of Zimbabwe in order to overcome the 
challenges they are facing.  
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20. The leaders reaffirmed their long-term commitment for a democratic, prosperous and stable 
Afghanistan. They reiterated that a coherent and united international effort, in its military, political and 
developmental aspects, to assist the Government of Afghanistan remained vital. They underlined their 
centrality of the regional aspect in the reconstruction and development process. They strongly 
condemned the continued terrorist attacks by the Taliban on aid –workers, civilians, Afghan and 
international forces. The agreed that the international community needed to act resolutely and with 
determination, in coordination with the Government of Afghanistan, in facing the challenge of the 
resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
 
21. The leaders reflected upon the Middle East Peace Process, and looked forward to progress towards 
goals of the Arab and all other major ongoing peace initiatives, including elements of the Roadmap, by 
means of intensified and meaningful dialogue among Israel, Palestine and other countries resulting in 
the establishment of an independent, sovereign, viable and united state of Palestine, living side by side 
at peace with Israel, within recognized and well-defined borders. 
 
22. The leaders, in recognition of the many commonalities in the three countries in the socio-economic 
areas, welcomed the preparation of an integrated IBSA Social Development Strategy which will build on 
the best practices of the three countries for serving as a blue print for South-South Cooperation.  
 
23. The leaders noted that WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations is entering a critical stage. These 
negotiations are now in a genuine multilateral process, with draft modalities texts for agriculture and 
industrial goods that provide a good basis for negotiations. They reaffirmed their commitment to carry 
out negotiations towards an outcome that is fair and acceptable to all.  
 
24. The leaders reiterated the importance of the development dimension of the Round and welcomed 
the strengthened engagement, solidarity, and cooperation among developing countries in that process. 
 
25. The leaders underlined that agriculture remains the key to the conclusion of the Round. To truly 
deliver on the development benefits of the Round, they called for the removal of long-standing 
distortions and restrictions in international agricultural trade, such as subsidies and trade barriers that 
affect the agricultural exports of and domestic production in developing countries. They also asserted 
that developed countries must agree to substantial and effective cuts in the latter’s trade distorting 
support, with new disciplines that prevent box shifting and commit to real and new trade flows in 
agriculture. They underscored that meaningful and operable special and differential treatment, which 
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includes development instruments of Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism are vital 
to address the concerns of developing countries with subsistence and low-income farmers. 
 
26. The leaders emphasized that any progress towards achieving the above goals is a development 
imperative and should not be linked with meeting the disproportionate demands by developed countries 
in the NAMA and services negotiations.  
 
27. The leaders asserted that developing countries have been constructive and willing to negotiate in all 
areas. They urged others to act with the same disposition.  
 
28. The leaders recalled their commitment to making a contribution to market opening in the Doha 
Round in agriculture, NAMA, and services that will create new trade flows. They also committed to 
ensure that the process of the negotiations is not held hostage to “who goes first”. They reaffirmed their 
conviction that all members must “move together” to arrive at a balanced and fair outcome of the 
negotiations. 
 
29. The leaders stated that through constant dialogue, reciprocal flexibility, non-dogmatic approach and 
good faith efforts, full modalities in the agriculture and industrial goods negotiations could be achieved 
before the year-end, together with equivalent results in other areas. They reaffirmed their commitment to 
achieving such a positive outcome within this framework. 
 
30. The leaders underscored the importance of incorporating the development dimension in 
international discussions concerning intellectual property. They reaffirmed that intellectual property is 
not an end in itself, but one of the instruments to encourage innovation for technological, industrial and 
economic and social development. They also recalled that it is fundamental to preserve policy spaces 
necessary for ensuring access to knowledge, promoting public goals in the fields of health and culture, 
and a sustainable environment. In this context, they welcomed the adoption of 45 recommendations of 
concrete actions regarding the “Development Agenda” by this year’s WIPO General Assembly, as well 
as the establishment of the WIPO Permanent Committee on Development and Intellectual Property. 
 
31. The leaders reaffirmed the need to reach a solution for the problem raised by the granting of 
intellectual property rights on biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, without due 
compliance with relevant provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, such as the granting of 
erroneous patents or the registration of undue trademarks. In this regard, they recalled the presentation 
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in the WTO of the proposal co-sponsored, among others, by the three IBSA countries to amend the 
TRIPS Agreement by introducing a mandatory requirement for the disclosure of origin, prior informed 
consent, and also fair and equitable benefit sharing of biological resources and/or associated traditional 
knowledge used in inventions for which applications for intellectual property rights are filed. 
 
32. The leaders welcomed the ongoing discussion in the Inter-Governmental Working Group (IGWG) on 
Intellectual Property and Public Health of the World Health Organization. They stated the important role 
of WHO in the discussion of the impacts of intellectual property protection on public health and on the 
access to medicines. 
 
33. The leaders agreed to work towards a trilateral initiative on cooperation in the field of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) concerning capacity building activities, human resource development and public 
awareness programmes. 
 
34. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the envisaged India-MERCOSUR-SACU Trilateral Free 
Trade Agreement (T-FTA), and welcomed the initial meeting amongst the representatives of SACU, 
MERCOSUR and India on a possible T-FTA during the exploratory discussions held in Pretoria on the 
6th October 2007. They also noted with satisfaction that all sides agreed to continue discussions on the 
trilateral trade arrangement. They urged the need for sustained efforts to realize early an India-
MERCOSUR-SACU FTA. In this regard, the leaders supported the proposal to hold a Trilateral 
Ministerial meeting in 2008. They also welcomed the significant progress made in MERCOSUR-SACU 
negotiations in Pretoria, on the 8-9 October 2007, as well as the launching of the SACU-India 
negotiations in the meeting held in Pretoria on 5 - 6 October 2007. MERCOSUR-SACU, MERCOSUR-
India and India-SACU negotiations laid the basis for achieving the goal of a T-FTA.  
 
35. The leaders expressed the importance of regular interaction among businesspersons of the three 
countries, with Government authorities playing a facilitating role in the process, for sharply enhancing 
the momentum of trade and investment with a view to fully utilising the large and growing opportunities 
in their markets. For the continued expansion of trade, investment and economic ties, the leaders 
encouraged the implementation of further initiatives amongst IBSA countries on standards, customs 
procedures, intellectual property rights, small and medium enterprise development, business-to-
business linkages and participation in trade exhibitions.  
 
 180 
36. The leaders underlined the need to provide a greater voice for and participation by developing 
countries in the Bretton Woods Institutions and expressed concern at the slow rate of progress that has 
been achieved so far. They acknowledged the role of the G20 as a key forum on global economic 
development and governance, and looked forward to its contribution to accelerating governance reforms 
in the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
 
37. The leaders expressed their concern that many developing countries are still far from achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They expressed their determination to mobilize support in this 
regard, with the specific objective to intensify common efforts towards achieving the MDGs and other 
internationally agreed development goals embodied in the Monterrey Consensus. They particularly 
stressed the need to address the problem of developing countries debt, increase the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) flows and reduce the inequalities in the international trading system. 
They committed to close cooperation amongst IBSA partner countries while preparing for the “Financing 
for Development” Review conference that will take place in Doha, Qatar, in the second half of 2008. In 
this regard, they emphasized the importance of enhancing international efforts to develop innovative 
financial mechanisms to fight poverty and hunger. 
 
38. The leaders reiterated the importance and uniqueness of the IBSA Fund Facility for South-South 
Cooperation for the benefit of other developing countries. They noted with satisfaction the South-South 
Partnership Award received by the Fund from the UN. They also agreed for a more effective mechanism 
for the utilization of the Fund.  
 
39. The leaders underscored the importance of vibrant sectoral cooperation for providing a firm 
foundation of the IBSA Forum. 
 
40. The leaders stressed the need for improved air and maritime connectivity among IBSA countries for 
expanding trade, investment and tourism. In this regard, they encouraged the concerned authorities to 
work towards achieving this important goal on a priority basis. They expressed the hope that by the time 
of the Third Summit in India, effective and innovative solutions would have been put in place to mitigate 
this problem.  
 
41. The leaders called for the establishment of joint projects and collaboration for the increased usage 
of alternative sources of energy such as biofuels, synthetic fuels, wind and solar energy to help achieve 
the objective of energy security which can bring significant reduction in GHG emissions.  
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42. The leaders expressed the need to promote and enhance cooperation among the IBSA partners in 
the ICT infrastructure development, including for the Soccer World Cup being hosted by South Africa 
and the Commonwealth Games by India in 2010, 
 
43. The leaders welcomed the progress made in the sector of Education with the identification of areas 
of cooperation. In pursuance of this, they encouraged holding of workshops and seminars, exchange of 
information, and joint projects. They also welcomed avenues of cooperation among the diplomatic 
institutes of IBSA countries.  
 
44. The leaders also called for an early implementation of the Action Plan in the sector of Health and 
called upon the IBSA Health Ministers to meet within the next three months. Cooperation in this area is 
of particular importance and needs to be energized. 
 
45. The leaders appreciated the initiative being taken with regard to formulation of joint projects in the 
sector of Agriculture and expressed the need for their expeditious implementation, for the purpose of 
inclusive growth and benefits to farmers. They further expressed the need to explore cooperation in the 
field of food processing. 
 
46. The leaders stressed the need to explore avenues of cooperation in the sector of defence for the 
common benefit of the three countries. 
 
47. While underlining the importance of cooperation in the S&T sector, they emphasized the need for 
immediate action to start implementation of joint research projects. They welcomed the creation of a 
seed fund of US$ 1 million in each country for collaborative activities. 
 
48. The leaders welcomed the signing of MoUs and Agreements on cooperation in areas of Wind 
Resources, Health and Medicines, Culture, Social Issues, Public Administration, Higher Education and 
on Customs and Tax Administration Cooperation, which will help further deepen trilateral cooperation 
among IBSA partners. 
 
49. The leaders supported the establishment of two additional Working Groups on “Human Settlement 




50. The leaders called for an intra-IBSA trade target of US$ 15 billion by 2010 and urged business and 
industry to be even more ambitious and exceed this target. 
 
51. South Africa and Brazil welcomed the offer by India to host the 3rd IBSA Summit in 2008. 
 
52. The President of Brazil and the Prime Minister of India expressed their deep gratitude to the 
President and the people of South Africa for successfully convening the 2nd IBSA Summit which 
represented a new milestone in the progressive development of IBSA. 
 
APPENDIX 7: NEW DELHI SUMMIT DECLARATION, OCTOBER 2008. 
 
1.    The Prime Minister of India, H.E. Dr Manmohan Singh, the President of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva, and the President of South Africa, H.E. Mr. Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe (thereafter referred 
as “the leaders”) met in New Delhi, India, on 15 October 2008, for the 3rd Summit of the India-Brazil-
South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. 
 
2.    The leaders of Brazil and South Africa expressed appreciation to H.E Dr Manmohan Singh, the 
Government and people of the Republic of India for the warm reception and for hosting this Summit. 
 
3.    The leaders expressed their deep satisfaction with the progress on the consolidation of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum in the five years since its inception in 2003 and their gratitude to the sterling 
contribution of former President TM Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa in the formation and 
consolidation of IBSA and South–South cooperation in general. They reaffirmed their commitment to 
further strengthening the trilateral cooperation and reaffirmed that the Forum is an important mechanism 
for closer coordination on global issues, for promoting the interests of developing countries, enhancing 
cooperation in sectoral areas and improving their economic ties. 
 
4.    The leaders of Brazil and South Africa noted with regret the recent bomb blasts in India that 
resulted in the loss of innocent lives, damage to property and offered condolences to the government 
and the people of India. They joined the international community in condemning these acts of brutality 
and committed to strengthen mechanisms aimed at ending terrorism. 
 
5.    The leaders expressed satisfaction with the developing participation of civil society in its activities. 
 183 
They acknowledged with appreciation the involvement and participation by academicians, business 
leaders, editors and women in their respective forums. They welcomed the holding of IBSA Cultural 
Festival and the first Food Festival in New Delhi. 
 
Global Governance 
6.    The leaders reiterated the need to make the structures of global governance more democratic, 
representative and legitimate by increasing the participation of developing countries in the decision-
making bodies of multilateral institutions.  
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
8.    The leaders reiterated their support to the efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs and 
expressed their concern at the fact that the assistance for development is currently insufficient. In this 
context they called upon the developed countries to fulfill their commitments in the global partnership on 
increased financial flows to developing countries, including increasing Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to 0.7% of their GNI, and on transfer of technology and capacity building.  
9.    The leaders recognized the importance of and instructed their officials to explore new models of 
cooperation for development and the substantive role of innovative finance mechanisms, 
complementary to the ODA, in order to support the efforts made to the fulfillment of the MDGs, to the 
fight against hunger and poverty and to sustainable development.  
 
7.    The United Nations (UN) High level Event on MDGs held on 25 September 2008 has helped focus 
the world’s attention on the urgent need to accelerate work towards achieving the MDGs. The leaders 
recognized that invigorated global efforts are required for developing countries to achieve the MDGs.  
 
 
10.    The leaders reaffirmed their determination to work together and coordinate their positions at the 
“Financing for Development” Monterrey Review conference that will take place in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2008.  
 
South-South Cooperation 
11.    The leaders underscored the importance and relevance of South-South Cooperation in an 
uncertain international environment contributed to by factors such as rising food and energy costs, 
climate change and financial uncertainty, which made it all the more imperative to strengthen the 
collective voice of the South, in order to assist in its development efforts.  
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12.    The leaders noted with satisfaction that the dynamism of the South is driving growth today with a 
substantial part of global GDP growth and trade being on account of countries of the South and intra-
South trade. They pledged to promote these mutually beneficial trends through enhanced linkages such 
as trade, investment and technology transfer including trade agreements of bilateral or multilateral 
nature such as the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). 
 
13.    They reiterated that South-South Cooperation cannot replace commitments by developed 
countries but is only a complement to North-South Cooperation. In this context, they welcomed the 





14.    The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to sustainable development and the eradication of 
poverty and hunger. They noted with appreciation that Brazil intends to host a meeting in 2012 to mark 
twenty years of Rio and in this context called upon the international community to support this initiative 
and to vigorously enhance the implementation of the principles and goals in the Rio Declaration, 





15.    The leaders reaffirmed their continued support for the reform of the United Nations to make it more 
democratic and responsive to the priorities of its Member States, particularly those of developing 
countries that constitute the vast majority of its membership. They expressed their full support for a 
genuine reform of the Security Council, with expansion in both permanent and non-permanent 
categories of membership, with greater representation for developing countries in both, to ensure that its 
composition reflects contemporary realities. They also emphasized that inter-governmental negotiations 
on the issue of Security Council reform should commence expeditiously and welcomed, in this regard, 
the General Assembly’s Decision of 15 September 2008, which determined that negotiations shall begin 
no later than 28 February 2009, in an informal Plenary of the General Assembly. They agreed to further 
strengthen cooperation amongst their countries and with other member states interested in a genuine 
reform of the Security Council.  
Climate Change 
16.    The leaders underscored the importance for urgent action on climate change. The on-going 
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negotiations needed to move at an invigorated pace for long-term cooperative action in accordance with 
the provisions and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, and the critical priority of sustainable development for developing countries. They 
highlighted the imperative of priority action with vastly scaled up resource allocation for adaptation in 
developing countries given their vulnerabilities and low capacities to cope.  
 
17.    An equitable burden sharing paradigm for equal sustainable development potential for all citizens 
of the world that takes into account historical responsibilities must guide the negotiations on a shared 
vision on long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal for greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emissions reductions.  
 
18.    Given their overwhelming contribution to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere and 
continuing high levels of GHG emissions, developed countries must take quantified time bound targets 
and deliver truly ambitious and absolute greenhouse gas emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol 
after 2012 with comparability of efforts among them. Moreover, developed countries have to put in place 
policies and measures that promote sustainable consumption patterns and lifestyles. Developed 
countries should also make clear commitments under the UNFCCC for significant financing to support 
both mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. New and innovative financial mechanisms must 
mobilize additional resources beyond the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and other 
instruments of the carbon market, without diverting national or multilateral and ODA resources from the 
imperatives of development and poverty alleviation.  
 
19.    The leaders stressed that as developing countries pursue sustainable development, they are 
committed to taking nationally appropriate actions to address climate change. Their capacities for such 
actions need to be greatly enhanced through financing, technology and capacity building support. 
 
20.    Technology and transfer of advance clean technologies to developing countries has the potential 
to be a critical transformation agent in addressing climate change. The leaders called upon the 
international community to actively promote technology innovation and development and its transfer and 
deployment in developing countries. The intellectual property rights regime must also move in a 
direction that balances rewards for innovators and the global public good. 
 
Bio-diversity   
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21.    The leaders stressed the importance of a timely and successful conclusion of the ongoing 
negotiations of a legally binding international regime on access to genetic resources and sharing of the 
benefits derived from their use and from associated traditional knowledge (Access Benefit Sharing - 
ABS). In this regard, the leaders reaffirmed the urgent need for an adequate legal framework at the 
international level to prevent biopiracy, ensure that national rules and regulations on ABS are fully 
respected across borders and recognize the value of biological resources and of traditional knowledge 
as an additional tool to promote sustainable development. They recognized the positive role of the IBSA 
Forum in enhancing the coordination within the Group of Like Minded Megadiverse Countries, of which 




23.    The leaders underscored the importance of promoting cooperation on Human Rights with a view 
to exchanging information on national policies and initiatives, which could translate into dialogue and 
mutual benefit in the field of Human Rights promotion and protection. 
 
22.    Noting that 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the leaders reiterated their commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights. 
They expressed satisfaction at the progress in the development of the institutional framework of the 
Human Rights Council (HRC) including the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism and emphasized that 
the work of the HRC should be free from politicization, double standards and selectivity and should 






24.    The leaders agreed on the need for establishing trilateral cooperation in the field of intellectual 
property rights with the aim of promoting a balanced international intellectual property regime and to 
make a meaningful contribution to the economic and social progress of developing countries, ensuring 
access to knowledge, health care and culture. Moreover, they agreed that the countries should hold 
consultations on a regular basis on the evolution of the international agenda. 
Gender 
25.    The leaders called on the international community to reaffirm its commitment to gender parity and 
to identify concrete and action-oriented steps to advance the implementation of the Beijing Platform for 






26.    The leaders reiterated their commitment to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons and expressed concern over the lack of progress in the realisation of this goal. They 
emphasised that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes 
requiring continuous, irreversible progress on both fronts, and reaffirmed, in this regard, that the 
objective of non-proliferation would be best served by the systematic and progressive elimination of 
nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner. They further 
emphasised the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate nuclear weapons, to prohibit their 
development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide 
for their destruction. The leaders discussed the threat posed by non-state actors or terrorists acquiring 
nuclear weapons or their related materials and technologies. They reaffirmed their commitment to 
contribute to multilateral efforts to counter such threats and promote co-operation in this regard. 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
 
 
27.    The leaders underlined the importance of ensuring the supply of safe, sustainable and non-
polluting sources of energy to meet the rising global demand for energy, particularly in developing 
countries. The leaders further agreed that international civilian nuclear co-operation, under appropriate 
IAEA safeguards, amongst countries committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
objectives, and could be enhanced through acceptable forward-looking approaches, consistent with 
their respective national and international obligations. In this context, they welcomed the consensus 
decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to approve the India Specific Safeguards Agreement and the 
decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adjust its guidelines to enable full civil nuclear cooperation 
between India and the international community. They also reiterated the importance of ensuring that any 
multilateral decisions related to the nuclear fuel cycle do not undermine the inalienable right of States to 
pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their international legal obligations. 
Terrorism 
28.    The leaders reaffirmed that terrorism presents a grave threat to international peace and security. 
They strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They stressed that there can be 
no justification, whatsoever, for terrorist acts. They emphasized the need for a comprehensive and 
cooperative approach to eradicate terrorism. In this regard, they called for an early conclusion of 
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negotiations leading to expeditious adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism (CCIT). 
 
Doha Development Round & International Trade 
 
30.    The leaders welcomed the resumption of the multilateral process in the WTO and expressed the 
hope that this would lead to the early finalization of modalities in agriculture and NAMA. They also 
expressed the hope that multilateral discussions would resume in other areas of the negotiations as 
well, particularly issues of concern to developing countries.  
 
31.    The leaders reiterated the importance of the development objectives of the Doha Round and 
observed that many of the issues, which either remained unresolved or could not be addressed at all 
during the July informal ministerial engagement, were issues critical to developing countries. They 
called upon developed country members to demonstrate greater flexibility to address the development 
concerns, so that members could collectively achieve a positive and development oriented outcome in 
the Doha Round. 
 
32.    With reference to paragraph 8 of the Somerset West Ministerial Communiqué, South Africa, 11 
May 2008, the leaders reaffirmed the importance of granting support to the goal of/the envisaged 
MERCOSUR-SACU-India Trilateral Trade Arrangement (TTA) at the highest political level. In this 
regard, they welcomed the proposal of a MERCOSUR-SACU-India trilateral ministerial meeting in order 
to promote high level discussions on the topic. Furthermore, they greeted with satisfaction the significant 
progress made on the regional preferential agreements between MERCOSUR-SACU, MERCOSUR-
India and SACU-India towards a trilateral MERCOSUR-SACU-India TTA.   
 
29.    The leaders acknowledged that while substantial progress was made during the informal 
ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in July this year, the final modalities in 
agriculture and NAMA could not be achieved. They agreed that there must be a concerted effort by all 
member countries to take the process forward towards a successful conclusion of the Round. They 
emphasized the importance of concluding the Round to achieve its development objectives, which had 
assumed even greater significance in the wake of the global financial and food crises.  
 
International Financial Crisis 
33.    The leaders took note of the very serious financial crisis that has spread from the United States to 
the European Union and has begun to impact developing countries. This unprecedented turbulence in 
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financial markets and the resulting instability threatens global prosperity. The explosion of new financial 
instruments, unaccompanied by credible and systemic regulation, has resulted amongst others in a 
major crisis of confidence for which those responsible should be held accountable and liable. 
Developing countries are not immune from this and many would be very seriously affected. The leaders, 
therefore, stressed the need for a new international initiative to bring about structural reforms in the 
world’s financial system. The new initiative must take into account the fact that ethics must also apply to 
the economy; that the crisis would not be overcome with palliative measures and that the solutions 
adopted must be global and ensure the full participation of developing countries. The reform must be 
undertaken so as to incorporate stronger systems of multinational consultations and surveillance as an 




35.    Renewables have come to the centre-stage in the recent times from the perspective of sustainable 
development, energy security and climate change. While the developing countries are pursuing this 
mostly to address the needs of sustainable development and energy security, the developed countries 
have a responsibility in the deployment of renewables for their mandated GHG reduction under their 
commitments within the Kyoto Protocol. The leaders recognized the need of a concerted effort for jointly 
developing renewable energy technologies with the developed countries for the overall benefit of the 
mankind. Taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, they also called 
upon the developed countries to consider innovative modalities in the field of intellectual property so as 
to facilitate the access to such technologies by developing countries.  
 
34.    The leaders recognized that energy resources are a vital input upon which the socio-economic 
development of nation states rests. The recent price volatility of crude oil has posed a challenge to the 
economic growth and stability of emerging and developing economies. Increasingly, energy markets 
have become susceptible to political considerations, driving energy security concerns into strategic and 
foreign policy agendas. They agreed to collaborate in diverse policy and technology areas to strengthen 
energy security in the three countries. They also look forward to working towards the diversification of 
energy baskets for a larger share of renewable, alternate and clean energy. Towards these common 
aims, IBSA will deepen regular exchanges, to further knowledge and know-how in the areas of biofuels, 
nuclear, hydro, wind and solar energy. They recognized that fossil fuels continue to be a primary source 
of energy supply and any reduction of emissions would be considered within the framework of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. They also encouraged the sharing of best practices in energy 






36.    Food and nutritional security is critical for developing countries. The rise in global food prices has 
added a new and huge challenge to the fight against poverty and hunger, which can lead to the roll-back 
of hard-won development gains in several developing countries. It is imperative that the international 
community act resolutely and with urgency to vastly improve ways and means of producing and 
distributing food. This includes stepped up international collaboration to increase agricultural productivity 
and sharing the intellectual property of the research with developing countries in a manner that takes 
care of the greater good of humankind. There is also need for increased emergency aid and significant 
reduction in the very large trade-distorting support in developed countries. While welcoming the 
declaration of the High level Conference on World Food Security convened by FAO in Rome in June 
2008, the leaders urged countries to deliver on the commitments made to provide funding to address 




37.    The leaders reiterated their firm support to NEPAD as the key African Union (AU) socio-economic 
programme for Africa. Recognizing the central role of infrastructural development in growth and 
development of Africa, they re-affirmed their continued support of the programme and agreed that 
further cooperation should continue to focus on NEPAD's identified priorities in this regard in such 
sectors as ICT, energy, water and sanitation and transport. 
Sudan
  
39.    The leaders expressed concern on the situation in the Sudan and urged all parties involved to 
work and commit to a speedy resolution of the serious humanitarian situation in Darfur, the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and stopping attacks on UN personnel, in 
 
38.    The leaders noted that the 14 July 2008 formal application for a Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court against the President of the Republic of the 
Sudan is a cause for concern for Africa. In this regard, IBSA countries as members of the global South 
community expressed their support for the African Union’s Peace and Security Council position, which 
amongst others, expressed the AU’s conviction that in view of the delicate nature of the processes 
underway in the Sudan, the prosecution could undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the 
early resolution of the conflict in Darfur and the promotion of long-lasting peace and development in the 
Sudan as a whole. 
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accordance with the commitment made by the government of the Sudan and the resolutions of the UN 





40.    The leaders congratulated the people of Zimbabwe for their agreement reached on 11 September 
2008 in Harare on a government of national unity. They also paid tribute to former President TM Mbeki 
for his tireless mediation efforts on behalf of the Southern African Development Community and the AU. 




41.    The leaders reaffirmed their long-term commitment to a democratic, pluralistic and stable 
Afghanistan. They expressed concern at the continuing deterioration of the military and political situation 
in Afghanistan due to a determined and coordinated resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the 
growth in cross-border terrorism, its links with international terrorism, and the consequential danger 
these developments pose to the gains made in the recent past. They condemned the terrorist attack on 
the Indian Embassy in Kabul on 7 July 2008 and also the continued attacks on aid workers, civilians, 
Afghan and international forces by the Taliban and other insurgent groups. They reiterated, in this 
context, that a coherent and a united international commitment, both in its developmental and 
security/military aspects, remained of paramount importance and agreed to continue to cooperate and 
coordinate their efforts to impart greater strength to this process. They underlined the centrality of the 




42.    The leaders took note of the developments in the security environment in Iraq in 2008 and 
emphasized the need for the return of peace and stability in Iraq, which are essential for its development 
and prosperity. A peaceful, united and stable Iraq requires a democratic and inclusive polity. The UN 
together with the international community has an important role to play in this regard. They reiterated 
support to Iraq for its efforts at reconstruction and development and its process of nation building and 
national reconciliation. 
Lebanon 
43.    The leaders welcomed the establishment of a Government of National Unity in Lebanon and the 
approval of the new electoral law. They also expressed confidence that the consolidation of the national 
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dialogue will contribute to the further strengthening of the democratic institutions in Lebanon in 
accordance with UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1701. 
 
The Middle East Peace Process 
 
 
44.    The leaders underlined that the conflict between Israel and Palestine remains essentially political 
in nature and cannot be resolved by force. In this regard, they condemned the use of violence, 
particularly against innocent civilians and urged further easing of restrictions at check-points and road-
blocks on humanitarian grounds. They reiterated their support for a negotiated solution resulting in a 
sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine living, within secured and recognized 
boundaries at peace with Israel, in accordance with UN Resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1515. In this 
context, the leaders recalled the decision to donate US$ 1 million per year, from the IBSA Fund, over 
three years. In this regard, they welcomed the project for the construction of a sports complex in 
Ramallah. 
IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger
 
 
45.    The leaders recommitted themselves to assist developing countries in the fight against poverty 
and hunger. They reiterated that the Fund constitutes a pioneer and unique initiative to enhance South-
South Cooperation for the benefit of the neediest of nations of the South. The leaders reviewed the 
modalities of the disbursement of IBSA Trust Fund as well as the criteria for Project proposals and 
concurred with the new programme guidelines. In this context, the leaders welcomed with satisfaction 
the projects in Burundi, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Laos and Palestine.  
IBSA Sectoral Cooperation 
46.    The leaders reviewed the activities under sectoral cooperation and while acknowledging the 
meetings of the Working Groups and concurring with their reports, expressed satisfaction on the 
progress made. The leaders welcomed the signing of (i) Tripartitite Agreement on Tourism, (ii) MoU on 
Trade Facilitation for Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment, (iii) MoU on 
Environment, (iv) MoU on Human Settlements Development, (v) Five Year Action Plan for Maritime 
Transport, (vi) Five Year Action Plan for Civil Aviation, and (vii) MoU on Women’s Development and 
Gender Equality Programmes, to enhance cooperation in these sectors. They urged time-bound and 
concrete deliverables, in all the sectors. 
 
47.    The leaders noted with satisfaction progress made by the various Working Groups since the last 
IBSA Summit. They welcomed that Working Groups on Agriculture, Climate Change and Environment, 
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Culture, Defence, Education, Energy, Health, Human Settlement Development, Information Society, 
Public Administration, Revenue Administration, Science & Technology, Social Issues, Tourism, Trade & 
Investment and Transport had met and finalized their reports regarding trilateral cooperation, with many 
of them agreeing on Action Plans. The leaders noted with satisfaction the IBSA diplomatic academies 
have also met in New Delhi in September 2008. The leaders also took note of and instructed that work 
that had begun on the drawing-up of Social Development Strategy for IBSA and the future of agricultural 
cooperation in IBSA should be pursued in a meaningful manner so that these could be finalized in time 
for the 4th IBSA Summit.  
 
48.    The leaders expressed satisfaction that IBSA Ministers of Health as well as Science & Technology 





49.    The leaders of India and South Africa welcomed the offer of Brazil to host the 4th IBSA Summit in 




50.    In the month of October, India marks the celebration of various festivities and auspicious days, 
including Diwali (the celebration of light). The leaders of Brazil and South Africa wished the Government 
and the people of India well during these celebrations. 
 
 
 
